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Abstract  
This thesis combines behavioural and electrophysiological approaches in the 
study of the emotion-cognition interaction and sub-clinical anxiety.  The 
research questions addressed in this thesis concern, specifically: the impact of 
emotion on attention; the interplay between attention and emotion in anxiety; 
and the cognitive construct of affect.   
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to emotion research, cognitive models of 
anxiety and motivates the thesis.   
Chapter 2 investigates whether affective processing is automatic. More 
specifically, to elucidate whether facilitated processing of threat in anxiety, 
evidenced by emotion-related ERP modulations, requires attentional resources. 
It was previously reported that emotional expression effects on ERP waveforms 
were completely eliminated when attention was directed away from emotional 
faces to other task-relevant locations (Eimer et al., 2003). However, Bishop et 
al. (2004) reported that threat-related stimuli can evoke amygdala activity 
without attentional engagement or conscious awareness in high-anxious but not 
low-anxious participants. Spatial attention was manipulated using a similar 
paradigm as Vuilleumier et al. (2001) and Holmes et al. (2003), to investigate 
the mechanism underlying the threat-related processing bias in anxiety by 
examining the influence of spatial attention and trait anxiety levels on 
established ERP modulations by emotional stimuli. Participants were instructed 
to match two peripheral faces or two peripheral Landolt squares. The Landolt 
squares task was selected since this is an attentionally demanding task and 
would likely consume most, if not all, attention resources. The ERP data did not 
offer support to the claim that affective stimuli are processed during unattended 
conditions in high-anxious but not low-anxious participants.  Rather, it questions 
whether a preattentive processing bias for emotional faces is specific to 
heightened anxiety. This is based on the finding of an enhanced LPP response for 
threat/happy versus neutral faces and an enhanced slow wave for threat versus 
neutral faces, neither modulated by the focus of attention for both high and low 
anxiety groups. 
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Chapter 3 investigated the delayed disengagement hypothesis proposed by Fox 
and colleagues (2001) as the mechanism underlying the threat-related 
attentional bias in anxiety. This was done by measuring N2pc and LRP latencies 
while participants performed an adapted version of the spatial cueing task. 
Stimuli consisted of a central affective image (either a face or IAPS picture, 
depending on condition) flanked to the left and right by a letter/number pair. 
Participants had to direct their attention to the left or right of a central 
affective image to make an orientation judgement of the letter stimulus. It was 
hypothesised that if threat-related stimuli are able to prolong attentional 
processing, N2pc onset should be delayed relative to the neutral condition.  
However, N2pc latency was not modulated by emotional valence of the central 
image, for either high or low anxiety groups. Thus, this finding does not provide 
support for the locus of the threat-related bias to the disengage component of 
attention. 
Chapter 4 further investigated the pattern of attentional deployment in the 
threat-related bias in anxiety. This was done by measuring task-switching ability 
between neutral and emotional tasks using an adapted version of Johnson’s (in 
press) attentional control capacity for emotional representations (ACCE) task.  
Participants performed either an emotional judgement or a neutral judgement 
task on a compound stimulus that consisted of an affective image (either happy 
versus fearful faces in the faces condition, or positive versus negative IAPS 
pictures in the IAPS condition) with a word located centrally across the image 
(real word versus pseudo-word). Participants scoring higher in trait anxiety were 
faster to switch from a neutral to a threatening mental set.  This improved 
ability to switch attention to the emotional judgement task when threatening 
faces are presented is in accordance with a hypervigilance theory of anxiety. 
However, this processing bias for threat in anxiety was only apparent for 
emotional faces and not affective scenes, despite the fact that pictures 
depicting aversive threat scenes were used (e.g., violence, mutilation). This is 
discussed in more detail with respect to the social significance of salient stimuli. 
Chapter 5 in a pair of experiments sought to investigate how affect is mentally 
represented and specifically questions whether affect is represented on the basis 
of a conceptual metaphor linking direction and affect. The data suggest that the 
vertical position metaphor underlies our understanding of the relatively abstract 
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concept of affect and is implicitly active, where positive equates with ‘upwards’ 
and negative with ‘downwards’. Metaphor-compatible directional movements 
were demonstrated to facilitate response latencies, such that participants were 
relatively faster to make upward responses to positively-evaluated words and 
downward responses to negatively-evaluated words than to metaphor-
incompatible stimulus-response mappings. The finding suggests that popular use 
of linguistic metaphors depicting spatial representation of affect may reflect our 
underlying cognitive construct of the abstract concept of valence. 
Chapter 6 summarises the research in the thesis and implications of the present 
results are discussed, in particular in relation to cognitive models of anxiety. 
Areas of possible future research are provided. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
1.1 Organisation 
This thesis combines behavioural and electrophysiological approaches in the 
study of the emotion-cognition interaction and anxiety, addressing research 
questions concerning the attentional mechanisms underlying the threat-related 
processing bias in anxiety, the executive control processes that are modulated 
by anxiety and the cognitive representation of affect. The first part of the 
introduction chapter will introduce the historical background to the study of 
emotion and cognition and how developments in neurobiology set the path for 
subsequent research. Next, an overview of the leading cognitive theories of 
anxiety will be provided.  
The last sections of the introduction will provide an overview of the literature 
within the area of emotion processing. This will include discussion of seminal 
papers in the area and also issues relevant to the forthcoming experimental 
chapters. First, an overview of the behavioural studies investigating the 
attentional bias to threat in anxiety will be introduced. Followed by the study of 
executive control and anxiety. This is relevant for the third experimental 
chapter.  
The subsequent section will provide an overview of the relevant ERP components 
for emotion research. Alongside the discussion of relevant ERP components, the 
topic of attention will be touched upon. The reason for this is two-fold: first, 
ERPs have added a great deal of understanding to the mechanisms of attention 
and second, such attentional modulations of visual ERP components are relevant 
for experimental chapters 2 and 3 investigating the attentional mechanisms 
underlying affective processing. Next, event-related brain potential (ERP) 
studies detailing the temporal dynamics of emotion processing in the visual 
cortex are reviewed. Finally, the ERP and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) literature concerning the impact of emotional content on visual 
processing is reviewed and related to the threat-related bias in anxiety. 
Chapter 1  21 
Details that are only relevant for specific experimental chapters will be 
introduced in the introduction of that specific chapter, for example, partial 
least squares analysis is introduced in Chapter 2. While each experimental 
chapter will be discussed separately, a final general discussion chapter will 
integrate and examine the most important findings. 
1.2 The History of Emotion Research 
The word emotion derives from the Latin ‘emovere’, literally meaning to induce 
physical movement, which evolved into a figurative term relating to thoughts, 
feelings, body changes and so on that drive behaviour. The study of emotion has 
proven difficult perhaps due to its many different facets grouped under the 
umbrella term of emotion. Nonetheless, the last twenty years has seen a surge 
of interest in emotion research, especially to those aspects of emotion related 
to cognitive processes. What is exciting in this popular area of research is that 
the fields of cognition and neuroscience are collaborating in this unified goal. No 
more so than at present do we recognise the dependency of these approaches to 
come together to help us better understand the complicated interaction 
between affective experience and cognitive processing. 
Over the centuries the ancient Greeks and then later Western philosophers have 
contemplated the relationship between affect and cognition. The Platoistic 
tradition has exerted a lasting influence on subsequent theories of emotion, such 
as the James-Lange theory and related contemporary somatic theories of 
emotion. William James, in the article ‘What is an Emotion?’ (1884), argued that 
we experience bodily sensations and deduce our emotions from these. Plato’s 
‘feeling theory’ saw emotions as uncontrollable ‘passions’, a by-product of 
bodily processes, that were in conflict with reason and judgement. The term 
hysteria, originated by Hippocrates, referring to loss of control in woman 
suffering emotional excesses is an exemplar of the legacy of this approach. This 
dichotomy of emotion and reason was greater emphasised by René Descartes, 
who took one step further than the Greek philosophers to propose a mind/body 
dualism where an intangible soul separate from the body was the seat of 
consciousness. An emotion was perceived as a condition of the soul, manifest in 
a bodily response, such as increased heart rate or voice tremor, which only 
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served as an obstacle to clear thought. In Descartes’ thinking, these external 
influences must be struggled with in an attempt to think and act rationally, 
reducing our affective experiences to merely distractions that serve no purpose 
other than to impede cognitive functioning. Philosophy of the 1800s, including 
the speculations of Immanuel Kant, continued to see cognition and emotion as 
distinct mental faculties that combined to produce a unified experience.  
Beyond the intuitions of the philosophers, an influential biological theory of 
emotion was proposed by Charles Darwin in his book ‘The expression of the 
emotions in man and animals’ (1872), which held that emotion was part of the 
human evolutionary legacy that served adaptive ends. Through the process of 
natural selection, his book tells us that our ancestors refined emotions and facial 
expression in order to facilitate social communication. Darwin, however, 
considered contemporary adult human emotion to be a non-functional by-
product of our evolutionary past and that although we show emotions ‘they may 
not … be of the least use’ (Darwin, 1872). This downplay of emotion merely 
perpetuated the view of emotions as impediments to rational thinking. Thus, the 
study of emotion was overshadowed by what was considered to be more 
important mental faculties.   
A notable figure in the study of emotions, Paul Ekman has advanced Darwin’s 
contribution with his own cross-cultural investigation of facial expressions. His 
research acknowledges that emotions have evolved via natural selection and are 
therefore biologically universal to all humans. Based on his research, Ekman 
(1972) devised a list of basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, 
surprise, and neutral. This classification of emotional expression has made a 
marked contributed to the scientific study of emotions.  
1.2.1 The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition 
The notion that cognition and emotion are separate entities survived for the 
most part of the twentieth century, with the result that cognition and affect 
were studied in isolation of each other. However, a revival into emotion-
cognition relations emerged with developments in neuroscience implicating 
emotion-related structures (e.g. the limbic system) and was further influenced 
by the progress of cognitive psychology, in particular the delineation of distinct 
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mechanisms comprising cognitive processing (i.e. attention, encoding, storage, 
and retrieval, Nugent & Mineka, 1994).  Thus, there was a burgeoning of 
research focused on the effects of different emotions on cognition and vice 
versa. Cognitive theories were also applied to the study of emotional disorders 
(for reviews see, Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Williams, Watts, 
Macleod, & Matthews, 1988) and have practical applications, especially in 
therapy. This cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) rests on the idea that anxiety 
promoting patterns of thinking are what cause anxiety and depressive disorders 
(Beck, 1976). 
1.3 Emotion and its Neural Substrate 
Neurobiological theories of emotion suggest that a complex network comprising 
of higher order sensory cortices and deep sub-cortical structures is responsible 
for the detection and analysis of emotionally significant information. The limbic 
system, working in concert with other connected structures, is recognised as 
being the hub within this network. The limbic system is a complex set of 
structures that includes the hypothalamus, the hippocampus, the amygdala, and 
several other nearby areas. Activity in these brain areas function to direct our 
attention, motivate our behavior and determine the significance of 
environmental events. 
Specific neural activity within the amygdala is elicited in response to the 
detection of emotionally charged stimuli (e.g. Glascher & Adolphs, 2003). An 
amygdala response has even been reported under conditions where stimuli are 
masked and thus inaccessible to conscious awareness (e.g. Glascher & Adolphs, 
2003) and also under some unattended conditions (e.g. Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2001). Anderson and Phelps (2001) have suggested that a 
critical function of the amygdala may be to enhance perceptual encoding of 
emotionally salient stimuli, diminishing the need for attentional resources to 
procure the stimuli to awareness.  
Recent neuroscientific investigations of emotional processing have uncovered a 
human fear system, incorportating a range of neural areas, in particular the 
amygdala, which are sensitive to naturally-occuring fear-relevant stimuli, such 
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as spiders or angry faces (e.g. Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998). When the 
amygdala is removed, monkeys become indifferent to stimuli that would have 
otherwise have caused fear and tameness ensues (Kluver & Bucy, 1939). On the 
flip side, electrical stimulation of the amygdala in animals produces fear and 
autonomic arousal, and similar responses are seen in people. The adaptive 
function of the fear-system is likely to enable rapid detection and a subsequent 
response to danger in the environment, which might suggest that fear-relevant 
stimuli have a biological basis for being prioritised by the attentional system. It 
follows that if anxiety stems from a highly sensitized fear system, which is 
especially responsive to threatening stimuli, then it is reasonable to assume that 
the attentional system of anxious individuals might be particularly sensitive to 
the presence of fear-relevant stimuli in the environment. 
1.4 Overview of Cognitive Theories of Anxiety  
1.4.1 The Anxiety-Related Attentional Bias to Threat 
Rapid detection of aversive stimuli in an organism’s environment is crucial for 
survival. An attentional system that prioritises the processing of threat-related 
information would benefit the organism allowing them to make a swift and 
appropriate response to motivationally relevant stimuli. Emotions drive our 
motivations and consequently our actions; with some emotions invoking an 
appetitive and others an avoidant behavioural response. For example, a fearful 
state may enable defensive avoidant behaviour (e.g. escape from a highly 
threatening stimulus such as a tiger). Mathews (1990; , 1993) proposed that each 
of the primary emotions have a unique adaptive function. The underlying 
cognitive mechanisms specific to each primary emotion serve to influence 
processing in a specific way that optimises response to environmental stimuli. An 
anxious state was suggested to evoke a hypervigilant cognitive mode ensuing an 
automatic encoding of threat and hence, a rapid response. Studies of attentional 
responses to threat stimuli in anxiety-vulnerable individuals (i.e. individuals with 
high state and trait anxiety scores on the state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, 1983) and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) sufferers) have 
typically found that anxious individuals’ attention is preferentially allocated to 
threatening stimuli compared to normal controls (e.g. Mathews & Macleod, 
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1985). Such attentional biases to threat-relevant information have been 
suggested to be a vulnerability factor for clinical anxiety states (e.g. Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992).   
1.4.2 Beck’s Schema Model (1976) and Bower’s Semantic 
Network theory of Emotions (1981) 
Beck’s Schema model of emotional disorders (1976) has made a significant 
contribution to cognitive formulations of anxiety. Beck’s logic has been 
implemented in the development of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), a 
successful treatment for depression and GAD. It is based on the belief that 
anxiety stems from dysfunctional schemata that are sensitive to threat or 
danger. Once these schemata are activated, selective processing of schema-
congruent information occurs, leading to emotion-congruent biases that affect 
all aspects of information processing, including selective attention. Bower’s 
semantic network theory of emotions (1981) also acknowledges emotion-
congruent processing biases as a significant contributor to the etiology and/or 
maintenance of anxiety disorders. The difference with Bower’s model being that 
each emotion is represented as a node in an associative network in memory. 
Each emotion node is connected to multiple representations of associated 
emotional memories. When one emotion node is activated this leads to 
increased activation of all the associated representations and incurs an 
information processing bias for emotionally congruent information.  
1.4.3 Williams, Watts, Macleod, & Matthews’ (1988) Model 
Continued research into the cognitive biases underpinning anxiety disorders 
necessitated a revision of the antecedent models of anxiety postulated by Beck 
(1976) and Bower (1981). Many studies demonstrated attentional biases to threat 
to be characteristic of anxiety disorders (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 2005), however a 
failure to report any recall biases indicated that processing biases in anxiety did 
not operate across all cognitive processes,  inconsistent with the theories of 
Beck (1976) and Bower (1981), but instead were restricted to biases in selective 
attention.  In light of these findings, Williams et al. (1988) developed a cognitive 
formulation of anxiety describing pre-attentional (i.e. without awareness) and 
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attentional biases to threat as cognitive markers of anxiety.  Using the 
terminology of Graf and Mandler’s (1984) model of memory, Williams et al.’s 
(1988) model describes a preattentive, automatic processing bias for threat to 
be the underlying mechanism responsible for susceptibility to the development 
of anxiety disorders.  As argued by LeDoux (2000), the functional evolution of 
the basic emotion of fear is to enable an organism to detect and respond rapidly 
to threat-provoking stimuli. From this perspective, it is not surprising that mood 
congruent attentional biases, rather than general cognitive biases as predicted 
by Beck’s (1976) model, should characterise the cognitive mechanism associated 
with anxiety. 
 Williams et al.’s (1988) revised model of anxiety introduced a novel concept to 
the theory of cognitive bias; that the direction of the attentional bias was 
determined by trait anxiety levels, with high trait anxious individuals exercising 
an automatic orienting of attention towards threat and low trait anxious 
individuals automatically employing attentional avoidant strategies.  
Furthermore, these directional biases were proposed to be modulated by 
increased state anxiety. According to the interaction hypotheses (using Williams 
et al.’s (1988) terminology) the opposing effects of individual differences in trait 
anxiety (high vs. low) on attentional biases becomes more apparent as state 
anxiety is increased.  In contrast, when state anxiety is low the cognitive 
differences between high and low trait anxious individuals may not be apparent. 
The model explains the interaction effect of state and trait anxiety on the 
attentional orienting bias to threat in anxiety in terms of two cogitative 
mechanisms: the Affective Decision Mechanism (ADM) and Resource Allocation 
Mechanism (RAM). The ADM assesses the threat value of stimulus inputs.  When 
state anxiety is high the threat value of mild threat inputs are judged within the 
ADM to be equivalent to high threat inputs. The RAM receives the outputs (threat 
assessment units) from the ADM and it is at this level that trait anxiety 
determines the direction of the processing resources to be allocated to the 
salient stimulus; vigilance in high trait anxiety and avoidance of threat in low 
trait anxiety.   
Williams et al.’s (1988) model was recently revised (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997) using connectionist terminology, although the core assumptions 
remain unchanged. It still holds that individual differences in preattentive and 
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attentive processing may underlie vulnerability to clinical anxiety. Cognitive 
behavioural therapy modifying preattentive and attentional biases towards 
threat in anxiety to be more akin to the attentional processes of low-anxious 
individuals may be an effective method for the treatment of anxiety. However, 
there is a serious problem with the predictions made by his model for severe 
threat stimuli, casting doubt on its application to the treatment of anxiety 
disorders. An effective threat-detection system must ensure that highly 
threatening stimuli receive preferential processing, irrespective of trait anxiety. 
It is counter-intuitive to predict that individuals with low trait anxiety would 
show increased avoidance of threat with increasing stimulus threat value. The 
cognitive-motivational formulations of anxiety overcome this limitation of the 
purely cognitive theories by recognising the importance of subjective appraisal 
of stimulus threat value. 
1.4.4 Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) Cognitive-Motivational Model 
According to Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive-motivational model, two 
motivational systems in combination mediate cognitive and behavioural 
responses to emotional stimuli, namely the valence evaluation system (VES) and 
the goal engagement system (GES). Attentional responses to emotional stimuli 
are determined by the output of the VES, which essentially reflects the 
subjective appraisal of stimulus threat value. The VES is influenced by a 
multitude of factors, which includes, for example: context, state anxiety, prior 
learning and individual differences in vulnerability to anxiety. Trait anxiety 
reflects reactivity of the VES to aversive stimuli. It is these individual differences 
in threat appraisal processes that mediate a vulnerability to anxiety. Individuals 
with high trait anxiety would therefore appraise a reasonably innocuous stimulus 
as having a high subjective threat value as compared to low trait anxious 
individuals. This output from the VES then feeds into the GES which determines 
the allocation of processing resources to the stimulus and hence mediates a 
response. When there is a low subjective threat value then the GES avoids the 
mildly negative stimuli, averting attention away from the stimulus, to pursue 
with current goals. In contrast, high subjective threat evaluation (a function of 
increasing objective stimulus threat value and/or individual differences in trait 
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anxiety) incites a reallocation of attentional resources to the salient stimulus, 
interrupting current goals.   
Unlike the interaction hypothesis (Williams, Watts, Macleod, & Matthews, 1988), 
the cognitive-motivational view makes more intuitive predictions about the 
attentional processes engaged in low trait anxious individuals when the 
objective threat value is significantly high. It predicts that both high and low 
trait anxious individuals will demonstrate an orienting response to severely 
threatening stimuli. The interaction hypothesis, on the other hand, stated that 
the key difference between high and low trait anxiety lay in the direction of the 
attentional bias. Thus, the more threatening the stimulus was evaluated to be, 
the more likely that strategic attentional avoidance strategies would emanate. It 
seems unlikely that such a maladaptive mechanism would have evolved in the 
potentially dangerous environment that our primitive ancestors had to endure 
therefore, the curvilinear relationship between the subjective threat value of a 
stimulus and the attentional bias (i.e. either vigilant or avoidant) suggested by 
the cognitive-motivational model appears to be more suitable. At mild levels of 
stimulus threat an attentional avoidant strategy would reduce distractibility 
from current goals. However, as stimulus threat level increases attention is 
much more likely to be oriented towards the salient stimulus in both high and 
low trait anxious individuals. This implies that attentional biases for threat are 
just as likely to be found in low trait as it is in high trait anxiety individuals 
when a severely threatening stimulus is presented. Therefore, attentional biases 
to threat may not be a causal factor in the etiology of clinical anxiety states. 
This does not, however, rule out the possibility that preattentive and attentional 
biases for mild threat may signify a vulnerability to anxiety, but not necessarily 
determining this vulnerability. 
In the treatment of anxiety disorders it is irrelevant whether attentional biases 
necessarily play a causal role in the etiology of clinical states since the 
cognitive-motivational view doesn’t exclude the possibility that attentional 
processes are important for maintenance. Cognitive-behavioural treatment 
strategies targeting the appraisal process in highly anxious individuals may be 
effective in reducing anxiety and preventing relapse. Indeed, cognitive 
restructuring techniques have proven to be an affective therapeutic approach. 
Chapter 1  29 
1.4.5 Attentional Control Theory of Anxiety  
The theoretical distinction between goal-directed (top-down) and a stimulus-
driven (bottom-up) attentional systems (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) provides a 
framework for understanding how emotionally salient events might recruit 
attentional resources.  According to Corbetta and Shulman (2002), the goal-
directed attentional system is governed by expectations, knowledge, and current 
goals, while the stimulus-driven attentional system is sensitive to salient stimuli.  
A delicate balance between these inputs has to be maintained, which according 
to Eysenck et al.’s (2007) attentional control theory is distorted in anxiety 
favouring stimulus-driven influences over goal-directed attention.  This 
purportedly leads to performance deficits in tasks involving the central 
executive of the working memory system. Evidence for this hypothesis comes 
from studies in which performance on a central task is negatively affected by 
interference from a task commanding attention from the stimulus-driven 
attentional system in high compared to low anxious individuals (e.g. Hopko, 
McNeil, Gleason, & Rabalais, 2002; Janelle, Singer, & Williams, 1999). 
Attentional control theory further predicts that anxiety is especially associated 
with a decreased ability to inhibit interference from threat-related distractors 
(which engage the stimulus-driven attentional system) disrupting the goal-
directed attentional system. Indeed, the attentional bias literature 
demonstrates that highly anxious individuals direct their attention to threat 
faster than low anxious individuals (e.g., review by Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997), and also show deficits in being able to disengage attention from 
threat (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). Accordingly, it is a reasonable 
prediction that threat-related stimuli should engage the stimulus-driven 
attentional system to a greater extent than non-threatening stimuli in anxious 
individuals. 
1.4.6 Conclusions 
The theoretical accounts of the underlying mechanisms responsible for clinical 
and subclinical anxiety presented thus far provide a possible explanation for the 
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. It is by no means a complete 
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account, although what it does provide is a theoretical framework for future 
research into the cognitive and behavioural processes underling anxiety. 
1.5 The Attentional Bias to threat in Anxiety - The 
Behavioural Studies  
The cognitive literature reports that heightened anxiety is associated with 
increased interference from irrelevant threat-stimuli compared to low anxious 
individuals, as demonstrated using the emotional ‘Stroop’ and dot probe tasks 
(Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The 
classical Stroop task presents words such as blue, green red etc. printed in a 
colour different from the semantic value of the word; for example, the word 
‘red’ is displayed in blue ink. Since reading is a highly practiced skill, it is 
difficult to inhibit an attentional response to the word meaning and this 
produces interference when the task is to name the text colours. The Stroop 
effect demonstrates this interference in increased reaction times on trials where 
the colour and name of the word do not match. The emotional Stroop task is a 
variation on the original, which examines attentional selectivity of emotional 
words. Emotional and neutral words are presented in coloured ink and typically 
responses are slower to name the colour of negative emotional words than either 
positive emotional words or neutral words. This interference has been 
interpreted as a difficulty in suppressing responses to emotionally relevant 
words, while selectively maintaining attention to the colour of the word.  
Pratto and John (1991) presented subjects with positive and negative trait 
adjectives in different coloured text and found that Stroop-like interference in 
the colour-naming task was greater for the negative trait words.  They 
concluded that the negative information automatically captured attention, 
increasing response times to the colour of the text. Similar studies investigating 
the effect of sub-clinical anxiety on colour-naming latencies have found that 
anxious individuals had more interference on the colour-naming task when 
negative trait words were presented as compared to non-anxious subjects (see 
Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The slower colour naming latencies to 
threat stimuli in anxious individuals are held to reflect a selective orienting 
response towards these stimuli. 
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However, there are problems with this interpretation. The threat value of the 
single word stimuli is prone to confound with subjective frequency effects, i.e. 
there tends to be a higher usage of high threat words in highly anxious 
individuals. More significantly, the longer latencies in response to threat-related 
words may in fact be due to effortful avoidance rather than vigilance (Deruiter & 
Brosschot, 1994), or possibly reflect competition at a later response-selection 
stage of information processing (Macleod, 1991). In response to such criticisms, 
MacLeod, Mathews and Tata (1986) developed the dot-probe paradigm to allow 
for a more direct measure of attentional biases in anxious individuals.  In this 
task, two emotional stimuli are presented on either side of a central fixation 
point (one neutral, one threat-related), following a brief presentation period 
one of these stimuli are replaced by a dot to which the participant must make a 
simple detection response. The theory is that response latencies in this task 
reflect initial shifts of attention; fast responses to the probe indicate that 
attention was initially oriented towards the preceding stimulus at the current 
probe’s location; in contrast, longer latencies reflect the deployment of 
attention from the previous stimulus to the alternative spatial location of the 
probe. Anxious individuals tend to respond faster to probes replacing threat-
related rather than neutral stimuli, whereas non-anxious subjects do not show 
this pattern (e.g. Fox, 1993; Macleod & Mathews, 1988). What is more, the dot-
probe task, unlike the Stroop task, permits the use of more biologically and 
socially significant stimuli such as faces or images of threatening stimuli like 
lions, as opposed to single word stimuli with relatively mild threat value. The 
findings from the dot probe studies have been taken as further evidence that an 
anxiety-related bias exists in the initial orienting of attention towards threat 
material. 
An anxiety-related processing bias has even been demonstrated when threat 
stimuli are presented subthreshold (e.g. Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 
1993). Models of anxiety have interpreted such findings as evidence of an 
automatic preattentive threat evaluation system which is modulated by anxiety, 
making threat-detection much more likely for highly anxious individuals 
(Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997). In summary, results from the Stroop and dot-probe tasks have been 
understood as reflecting an anxiety-related bias in the orienting of attention 
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towards a threat source. Investigation into the mechanism underlying the 
prettentional bias to threat in anxiety thus necessitates the supplementation of 
behavioural studies with neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques, 
employing a range of stimulus types, to provide a more detailed picture of 
affective processing.   
1.5.1 Attentional Orienting to Threat versus Delayed 
Disengagement 
However, there are some serious problems with the emotional Stroop and dot-
probe tasks that casts doubt on the interpretation from such studies that threat-
stimuli automatically attract attentive processing. One issue with the Stroop 
task is that given the general belief that information located within 1 degree 
radius from fixation is impossible to ignore (see Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), it 
would be impossible not to attend to the semantics of the word since this is 
within foveal vision (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). Thus, it is ambiguous 
whether threat stimuli capture attention or once attended are more difficult to 
disengage from. Both explanations would produce the same results. A similar 
ambiguity exists for the dot-probe task. Both probes are task relevant and are 
presented for a relatively long duration (500ms), as such it could be argued that 
the participant adopts a strategy to attend to both locations by rapidly shifting 
attention between stimuli. Under these circumstances the dot-probe task would 
not provide a ‘snapshot’ of the distribution of attention as once thought, since 
both locations would receive attentive processing. It is therefore possible that in 
the dot-probe task threat stimuli do not attract attention but rather make it 
more difficult to disengage attention once it has settled on the stimulus. Indeed, 
Cooper et al. (2006) demonstrated that the 500ms stimulus presentation time 
adopted in most dot-probe tasks is an unreliable measure of initial allocation of 
attention, and that a 100ms presentation time is likely to reflect automatic 
initial shifts of attention. Hence, it is ambiguous whether the attentional bias to 
threat in anxious individuals as measured by the dot-probe and Stroop tasks 
reflects attentional dwell time or attentional orienting. 
Following the Stroop interference effects with threat-related words found by 
Pratto and John (1991), White (1996) conducted a study to investigate whether 
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spatially separate adjectives would produce similar Stroop-like interference. 
Participants had to name coloured patches presented at fixation while ignoring 
trait adjectives presented spatially separate from fixation. However, no Stroop-
like interference effects were found, weakening the theoretical position that 
threat stimuli automatically draw attention. Furthermore, Fox (1994) conducted 
a study employing the same design as White (1996) but in addition controlling for 
levels of anxiety. Again, no Stroop-like interference effects were found for 
either high- or low-trait anxious groups. Given these findings, a hypervigilant 
attentional system in anxious individuals seems unlikely and instead favours the 
notion that the attentional bias is influenced by the disengagement component 
of attention. Relying upon Posner and Petersen’s (1990) tripartite model of 
visual-spatial attention where separate mechanisms are involved in shifts of 
attention, engagement and disengagement, this hypothesis was directly 
investigated in a study conducted by Fox and colleagues (2001).  
Employing a variant of the spatial cueing paradigm used by Posner, Inhoff, 
Friedrich, and Cohen (1987), Fox et al. (2001) assessed the precise mechanism 
responsible for the attentional bias. In this task, cues presented in one of two 
locations were either valid or invalid predictors of the spatial location of the 
succeeding target. What is generally found is that the cue orients attention to 
the cued location leading to faster responses on valid-cue trials and slower 
responses on invalid-cue trials. The cost of having to disengage attention from 
invalidly cued targets has been attributed to the slowing observed. Fox et al. 
(2001) found that for high-anxious participants their response to invalidly-cued 
targets was slower when threat-related cues were presented as compared to 
neutral or positive cues. No such effect was found for low-anxious participants. 
It was inferred that these results indicate that the attentional bias in anxious 
individuals is due to defective disengagement from threatening stimuli. What is 
more, no differences were found between responses on threat-related and non 
threat-related valid trials, suggesting that a threat-related cue did not affect 
the ability of the cue to draw attention. This finding tentatively implies that 
threat-related stimuli do not involuntarily draw attention, and provides further 
support to the theory that the attentional bias towards threat can be localised 
to the disengage component of attention.   
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However, an evaluation of the shift component of attention may not be best 
measured using the spatial cueing paradigm. The cue validity effect predicts 
that responses are faster in valid cue trials in general. Therefore, it may be 
presumptuous to expect any further speeding up of responses following threat-
related cues (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). 
In conclusion, the behavioural studies investigating the attentional bias in 
anxiety, although informative, had their limitations. Consequently, the 
neuroimaging techniques have been imperative in furthering our understanding 
of the attentional mechanisms underlying the attentional bias in anxiety. Thus, 
one of the aims of the current thesis was to elucidate the underlying 
mechanisms responsible for the attentional bias to threat in anxious populations, 
supplementing behavioural measures with recordings of ERPs to provide 
additional information regarding the attentional processes. 
1.6 Attentional Control Processes in Anxiety 
Anxiety is assumed to increase attentional awareness, alerting the system to be 
always on the ‘look-out’ for signs of threat in the environment. The direct cost 
of broadening attentional resources means that goal-directed attention suffers. 
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) explain that two competing attentional systems 
are operating, a stimulus-driven and a goal-directed system, which must 
compromise on their performance to attain optimal attentional control. 
According to attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007) anxiety impairs this attentional control, a primary function of the central 
executive, and increases the tendency to place greater weight on stimulus-
driven influences. As such, attentional bias to threat-related stimuli and reduced 
attention directed to goal-directed tasks are incurred.  
Miyake et al. (2000) identify task switching as a major central executive 
function, which is assumed to reflect attentional control processes. Attentional 
control theory emphasizes the attentional demands imposed following a switch 
in task requirements are reflected in increased reaction times and/or errors. 
The further assumption that anxiety impairs attentional flexibility has found 
most validity in task switching studies whereby increased levels of anxiety are 
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associated with elevated switching costs. Miyake et al. (2000) indentified the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting task as a useful tool for measuring central executive 
switching ability. Performance efficiency and accuracy on this task has been 
found to be hindered for anxious relative to non-anxious individuals (Goodwin & 
Sher, 1992). Comparable processing efficiency impairment can be found with the 
task switching paradigm. In the study of Santos and Eysenck (2006) target 
location served as a switch cue identifying three different tasks which had to be 
performed on the presented digit (odd vs. even; <5 vs. >5; A-R vs. S-Z). They 
successfully demonstrated that anxious participants took significantly longer 
than non-anxious participants to perform on trials following a switch. What is 
more, enhanced brain activation over areas associated with central executive 
functioning (right BA 9/46) during switching tasks were disproportionally active 
in high as opposed to low anxious individuals. This finding suggests cognitive 
inefficiency of attentional control processes in high anxiety in accordance with 
the predictions of attentional control theory.  
Paradoxically, in some circumstances anxiety has been associated with 
attentional flexibility, marked by relatively reduced switching costs. Kofman et 
al. (2006) found that exam stress enhanced switching performance in a spatial 
cueing task. The observed facilitatory effect is likely the product of improved 
functioning on shifting and inhibition processes under conditions of induced 
environmental stress. As such, a naturalistic stress response can be interpreted 
as adaptive for goal-directed behaviour.   
1.7 ERP waveforms and Cognitive Performance 
The current thesis contends with the visual processing of affective information, 
therefore the review of ERP components will focus on the visual modality with 
respect to cognitive performance.  
1.7.1 Attention-Sensitive components 
1.7.1.1 P1 
The P1 component occurs at lateral occipital sites, elicited 60 – 90 ms and 
peaking around 100 ms after stimulus onset. Dipole modelling of the P1 
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component has demonstrated that its scalp distribution is consistent with a 
neural generator source within lateral extrastriate cortex (Clark & Hillyard, 
1996). 
The P1 is sensitive to variations in stimulus parameters, for example, P1 peak 
latency will be delayed for stimuli presented in lower contrast. Taylor (2002) 
reported enhanced P1 amplitudes in response to images of upright faces 
compared to inverted faces and natural scenes containing animals compared to 
natural scenes not containing animals. These results were taken as evidence that 
P1 amplitude is sensitive to stimulus saliency.  
However, it is typically assumed that P1 is the earliest component that is 
sensitive to the top-down influence of visual spatial attention. P1 peak 
amplitude is reportedly larger for stimuli presented at the attended location. 
For example, in the endogenous cueing paradigm, cue validity resulted in 
amplitude differences in P1 peak with larger peaks for valid trials (Hillyard, 
Luck, & Mangun, 1994). Attentional P1 modulations are assumed to reflect 
sensory gating mechanisms in early visual processing. 
1.7.1.2 N170 
ERP studies have identified a negative component over lateral occipital regions 
that peaks 170 ms after stimulus onset. This electrophysiological component 
responds maximally to face stimuli compared to other object categories and has 
been termed the N170. The N170 has been interpreted as reflecting a face-
specific structural encoding stage, performed prior to the recognition of a face 
as familiar or not (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Eimer & 
McCarthy, 1999). 
Holmes, Vuilleumier, and Eimer (2003) investigated the effect of selective 
attention on the N170. Participants were presented with two face stimuli and 
two house stimuli arranged in horizontal and vertical pairs. The participants task 
was to perform a matching task (same vs. different) on either the face stimuli or 
the house stimuli. The relevant stimulus dimension was cued on a trial-by-trial 
basis by a cue that directed attention to either the vertical or horizontal 
dimension. The researchers compared the amplitude of the N170 when the face 
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was presented at the cued location (task-relevant) and when the face was 
presented at the uncued location (task-irrelevant). Results indicated that the 
N170 component showed increased amplitude on trials where attention was 
focused toward the face stimuli relative to trials where attention was focused 
toward the house stimuli. These observations suggest that the structural 
encoding of faces can be affected by attention. 
1.7.1.3 N2pc 
The N2pc is an attention-sensitive ERP component that is typically elicited 
between 200 and 350 ms after stimulus onset at posterior electrode sites 
contralateral to the side of a visual target. Brain source analyses based on 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) recordings have demonstrated that its scalp 
distribution is consistent with a neural generator source within extrastriate 
visual areas (e.g. Hopf et al., 2000).  
Luck and his colleagues have proposed that the N2pc is a possible index of 
attentional suppression of surrounding non-targets, which in effect highlight the 
target input (Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997; Luck, Girelli, 
McDermott, & Ford, 1997; Luck & Hillyard, 1994). Eimer (1996) contends this 
conjecture in demonstrating N2pc modulation by single target stimuli, which 
runs counter to the supposition that the N2pc reflects distractor suppression. 
Generally, the N2pc is assumed to reflect the spatially selective processing of 
task-relevant versus distractor items in visual search. 
1.7.1.4 SPCN 
This sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) typically arises 
approximately 350 to 400 ms after stimulus onset over posterior cortical areas. 
An SPCN has previously been observed when lateralised target stimuli appeared 
among nontargets, and is thought to reflect additional processing of target 
stimuli after their attentional selection, including their maintenance in visual 
short-term memory (Dell'Acqua, Sessa, Jolicoeur, & Robitaille, 2006; Mazza, 
Turatto, Umilta, & Eimer, 2007; McCollough, Machizawa, & Vogel, 2007; Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004).  
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1.7.2  LRP 
The Lateralised-Readiness Potential (LRP) is an index of hand-specific response 
preparation that appears several hundred milliseconds prior to voluntary hand 
movements and is larger contralateral to the hand to be moved. The LRP 
component is calculated as the asymmetrical cortical activation contra- minus 
ipsilateral to the responding hand, which is proposed to offer an index of 
response preparation (Kutas & Donchin, 1980). Thus, the LRP is a proposed index 
of hand-specific activity (Coles, 1989; Osman & Moore, 1993) that is mainly 
generated in the primary motor cortex  (M1) (cf. Leuthold & Jentzsch, 2002).   
The locus of experimental effects can be inferred from the LRP calculated time-
locked to either the stimulus or the response (Leuthold, Sommer, & Ulrich, 1996; 
Osman & Moore, 1993). The interval between stimulus onset and LRP onset is 
defined as the stimulus-locked LRP (S-LRP) latency and is related to the duration 
of pre-motor processes. The interval between the onset of the LRP and the overt 
response is referred to as the response-locked LRP (LRP-R) latency and is related 
to the duration of motor processes (Osman, Moore, & Ulrich, 1995). Thus, LRP 
measures are useful chronometric markers of different cognitive operations from 
pre-motor (S-LRP) to motor processing (LRP-R). 
1.7.3 ERP Components Sensitive to Stimulus Emotion and 
Arousal 
1.7.3.1 Early Anterior Negativity 
Eimer and Holmes (2002) report a reduced frontocentral negativity elicited by 
upright fearful faces relative to neutral faces within 120 ms after stimulus onset. 
The authors propose that this early emotional modulation of the ERP waveform 
reflects an initial rapid detection and analysis of facial expression. In a later 
study (Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003), this early emotional expression 
effect was replicated however, it was also shown to be modulated by spatial 
attention. 
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1.7.3.2 EPN 
An early posterior negativity (EPN), typically elicited at post-stimulus latencies 
of 200 to 300 ms at lateral posterior and occipital locations, is larger for 
emotionally arousing (i.e. both pleasant and unpleasant) than for neutral 
pictures (Schupp, Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003a, 2004; Schupp et al., 
2003). This component is thought to have its neural source within the visual 
cortex, reflecting increased activity in relatively early visual processing (Schupp, 
Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003b, 2004).  
However, there is evidence to suggest that visual processing capacity, as 
reflected by EPN modulations, is limited. In one study (Schupp et al., 2007), an 
emotion-linked EPN response to the processing of emotional pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) was strongly attenuated when 
participants performed demanding attention tasks. 
Larger EPN amplitude for highly arousing pleasant and unpleasant stimuli has 
been interpreted as indexing greater attentional engagement with 
motivationally relevant appetitive and aversive cues (Lane et al., 1997; Schupp, 
Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003a; Schupp, Ohman et al., 2004; Schupp, Weike, 
& Hamm, 2000). The finding of an EPN enhanced for individuals with high versus 
low levels of social anxiety in response to fearful and angry facial expressions 
(Muhlberger et al., 2009) is consistent with the notion of motivationally-driven 
attention. Notably, enhancement of the EPN is more pronounced for highly 
arousing pictures, such that erotic stimuli and mutilations produce the largest 
effects (Schupp, Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003a; Schupp et al., 2003), 
perhaps because they have important relevance for survival. 
1.7.3.3 LPP 
A later, sustained emotional expression ERP positivity referred to as the late 
positive potential (LPP) (sometimes referred to as the P3b component) is evoked 
in response to both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli compared to neutral, which 
develops around 300–400 ms following picture onset, lasts for several hundred 
milliseconds and is maximal over centro-parietal sites (Cuthbert, Schupp, 
Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Foti & Hajcak, 2008; Hajcak, Moser, & 
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Simons, 2006; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Hajcak & Olvet, 2008a; Keil et al., 
2002; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Schupp et al., 2000b; Schupp, Cuthbert 
et al., 2004). The LPP is sustained for as long as the affective stimulus is 
presented (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000), and even 
persists after the stimulus is removed (Hajcak & Olvet, 2008a).  
The LPP can be thought of as the emotional equivalent of the classic P300 
component. Just as the P300 appears to index transient increases in attention 
toward targets, the LPP might reflect the commitment of attentional resources 
toward emotional stimuli, thus mediating appropriate survival behaviours (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). In combining fMRI and ERP techniques, Sabatinelli et 
al. (2007) reported that neural activity in the lateral occipital, inferotemporal, 
and parietal visual areas, correlated with the LPP supporting the notion that it 
reflects increased perceptual and/or attentional processes engaged by 
motivationally relevant, emotional stimuli. 
Larger LPP amplitudes evoked in response to both pleasant and unpleasant 
stimuli compared to neutral are assumed to reflect the processing of arousal 
information, as LPP amplitude has been shown to co-vary with arousal level 
(Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000) and amplitudes are 
enhanced in response to highly arousing pleasant and unpleasant stimuli with 
respect to comparably low arousing stimuli (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, 
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Schupp et al., 2000b). Variations in arousal level 
between negative and positive facial expressions might therefore explain why an 
LPP is commonly found for negative facial expressions (Eimer, Holmes, & 
McGlone, 2003; Marinkovic & Halgren, 1998), but evidence for the presence of 
this component in response to happy facial expression is less consistent (e.g. 
Williams, Palmer, Liddell, Song, & Gordon, 2006). 
1.8 Evidence for Enhanced Processing of Emotional 
Information - the ERP Studies 
Increased allocation of attention to threatening stimuli is particularly evident in 
the emotional Stroop task. Mathews and MacLeod (1985) reported delayed 
response latencies on threat vs. non-threat word trials, and markedly so in 
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individuals with high levels of anxiety. These data provide behavioural evidence 
that threatening words capture attention, however it is questionable whether 
this also implies that anxiety modulates the depth of semantic processing of 
threat-related words on a psychophysiological level. Weinstein (1995) directly 
addressed this question, demonstrating two event-related potential components 
of facilitated processing of threatening information by high, compared to low 
trait-anxious, individuals.  Subjects had to decide whether a visually presented 
probe word (positive, neutral, or threat) matched semantically with a previously 
presented priming sentence (threat or positive). The high anxiety group showed 
an enhanced frontocentral N100 and central P400 amplitudes in the threat 
priming conditions in comparison to the low anxiety group. The low anxiety 
group showed similar processing in both threat related and positive situations. 
The results of this experiment suggest that the attentional bias in anxiety 
prioritises threatening information over all else and deploys more resources to 
process this information.  
The facilitated encoding of threat has been reported to occur within the first 
100ms of stimulus presentation, supporting the hypothesis that it is a fast, 
involuntary perceptual process. ERP studies using the dot-probe paradigm have 
shown that the occipitoparietal P1 component is enhanced by targets, which 
follow a valid vs. invalid cue (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991). This so-called ‘P1 
effect’ is believed to reflect enhanced sensory processing which facilitates the 
visual processing of attended locations (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998) and 
supports the notion that the faster response times on validly cued trials are due 
to enhanced visual processing (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000).   
Pourtois et al. (2004) investigated the effect of emotional faces on the visual P1 
component. In this study a pair of horizontal faces were briefly presented, one 
fearful and the other neutral in expression. The participants then had to make a 
manual response to the target stimulus, which appeared in the location 
previously occupied by one of the face stimuli. The results showed that the 
lateral occipital P1 was larger when the target replaced a fearful face as 
opposed to a neutral face. Hence, they managed to demonstrate enhanced 
perceptual processing of fearful faces, which subsequently influenced later 
visual inputs. Li et al. (2005) were interested whether trait-anxiety levels could 
modulate the enhanced early visual processing of threatening information as 
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reported by Pourtois et al. (2004). Using colour pictures selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) as 
location cues they found that highly anxious individuals were faster to respond 
and the occipitoparietal P1 amplitude was enhanced when  targets appeared at 
the same location as threatening images, relative to non-threatening ones.  In 
comparison, the low anxious individuals showed enhanced P1 amplitudes when 
the target replaced the non-threatening pictures, as opposed to the threatening 
one. Such dissociation of P1 activation in response to the same visual target 
demonstrated that an attentional bias to threat in high anxious individuals, and 
conversely attentional-avoidance of threat in the low-anxiety group, facilitated 
the processing of subsequent visual inputs as early as 90ms post stimulus. A 
number of studies have reported enhancement of the visual P1 component for 
negative relative to neutral faces over posterior regions peaking around 130ms 
post stimulus onset (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Eger, Jedynak, Iwaki, & Skrandies, 
2003; Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Pizzagalli, Regard, & Lehmann, 
1999; Pourtois, Dan, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Streit et al., 
1999). In contrast, an enhanced P1 for happy relative to neutral faces has been 
less reliable, hence augmented P1 effects have been attributed to an attention 
bias to negative affect (Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008), possibly via 
feedback from the amygdala to the extrastriate visual cortex (Amaral, Behniea, 
& Kelly, 2003). Using a dot-probe task, Santesso et al., (2008) even reported 
enhancement in response to neutral faces relative to happy, and from this they 
inferred that attention was diverted towards the relatively more threatening 
stimulus within the visual field. Anxiety related enhancement of the P1 
component for negative as compared with neutral or happy faces has also been 
reported in the literature; with the magnitude of this effect being significantly 
enhanced for the high-trait group in comparison with the low-trait group (e.g. 
Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008). 
However, other studies have failed to replicate this finding (Fox, Derakshan, & 
Shoker, 2008; Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; Rossignol, Philippot, 
Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005), thus it is questionable whether an 
individual’s level of anxiety is an important determinant of this early 
electrophysiological response to a negative stimulus.  
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Facilitated emotional stimulus encoding has also been observed over posterior 
visual areas in the form of an early posterior negativity (EPN), which is 
maximally pronounced around 200-300ms post stimulus onset for pleasant and 
unpleasant compared to neutral images (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; 
Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Schupp, Ohman et al., 2004; Schupp et 
al., 2007).  As with the P1 component, augmented EPNs in response to emotional 
expressions have been proposed to reflect activity of an underlying motivational 
system involving the amygdala and interconnected subcortical regions (Sato, 
Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, & Matsumura, 2001) that operates at an early perceptual 
level (Junghofer et al., 2002).  Subsequent to the emotion-specific modulation 
during perceptual encoding, researchers found a sustained positivity (LPP) for 
emotional faces with a broad fronto-parietal scalp distribution, most apparent 
around 400-600ms post stimulus. Although the LPP appears to represent 
facilitated attention to both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli compared with 
neutral, in general the LPP effect is larger for unpleasant than pleasant pictures, 
in accordance with the notion of a negativity bias (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & 
Cacioppo, 1998).  Moreover, in the face literature an LPP response to negative 
versus neutral facial expressions is routinely detected, contrasting with the 
relatively inconsistent reportage of an LPP response to positive facial 
expressions (e.g. Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008). The LPP appears to be 
highly significant in the investigation of emotional processing biases in anxiety; 
since a large body of literature indicates that modulations of the LPP serves as a 
neural index of the intrinsic relevance of emotional stimuli (Cuthbert, Schupp, 
Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Schupp et al., 2000a).  Such ERP modulations 
in response to affective faces may provide direct evidence for the chronometry 
of emotional face processing, thus enabling the investigation of a threat 
processing bias in anxiety at each successive stage. 
1.9 The Role of Attention in Emotional Processing -
Evidence from fMRI and ERP studies 
In the investigation of attentional biases in anxiety, the fundamental conception 
that emotional processing can occur independently of attention has been the 
subject of much controversy. Attempts to determine the extent to which our 
visual perception is reliant upon our limited attentional resources has brought 
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mixed results. Under most circumstances, attention constrains our perceptual 
capabilities and with an exhausted store of attentional resources, consumed by 
the demands of competing tasks, perception fails. ‘Inattentional blindness’, the 
failure to perceive an object in the visual field because attention is elsewhere 
engaged, can be accounted for by such a conception of the critical role of 
attention, as can many other psychological phenomenon. However, there has 
been some evidence to suggest that the perceptual processing of emotional 
stimuli may be an exception to this rule. For example, neglect and extinction 
patients, two forms of brain injury where hemi-inattention results,  are more 
likely to detect emotionally significant rather than neutral stimuli presented in 
their affected visual hemifield (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001a, 2001b), and 
secondary task performance does not modulate an amygdala response to 
emotional scenes (Lane, Chua, & Dolan, 1999).  
An influential study by Vuilleumier et al., (2001) systematically compared 
amygdala activity to fearful faces while varying attentional focus. On a trial-to-
trial basis, spatial attention was manipulated by having subjects attend to pairs 
of images presented at relevant locations. Faces or houses could unpredictably 
appear in the relevant or irrelevant locations and participants performed a 
matching task for the relevant stimuli. The study revealed that there was a 
differential response to fearful and neutral faces in the amygdala but that this 
effect was not modulated by the focus of attention (i.e. whether faces were the 
attended stimuli or not), supporting the view that amygdala responses to threat-
related stimuli may be independent of attentional resources.  
However, contradictory findings have also emerged within the neuroimaging 
literature. Pessoa et al. (2002) hypothesised that the a failure to consume all 
attentional resources in the competing task in Vuilleumier et al.’s (2001) study 
may explain the apparent attentional redundancy in the processing of emotional 
stimuli.  Using a similar paradigm but employing a more demanding competing 
task with a high attentional load, Pessoa et al. (2002) demonstrated differential 
fMRI responses to fearful vs. neutral faces in the amygdala only when sufficient 
attentional resources were available.  In a follow-up study, attentional demands 
on a central task varied as a function of task difficulty, enabling a direct 
comparison between evoked amygdala activity to unattended emotional faces 
under conditions of both high and low attentional load (Pessoa, Padmala, & 
Chapter 1  45 
Morland, 2005). In contrast to the high attentional load condition, when the 
attentional demands of the central task were low differential responses to 
fearful faces in the right amygdala were observed just as Vuilleumier et al. 
(2001) reported. The modulation of amygdala responses to emotional stimuli by 
attention is in accordance with Lavie’s (1995; Lavie, 2000) proposed model of 
selective attention, which predicts failed distracter processing when attentional 
capacity limitations are exhausted during task processing. Lavie’s hybrid model 
favours the notion that capacity limitations steer early selective attention 
processes under conditions of high perceptual load, however she also argues that 
it is impossible to suppress the processing of irrelevant information in situations 
of low perceptual load. This model leaves no room for pre-attentive selective 
processes preceding selective attention. The study of Pessoa et al. (2002) 
confers the predictions made by the model and further suggest that emotional 
stimuli are not ‘special’ in the sense that they receive automatic preferential 
processing, but rather highlights the mandatory role of attention in emotion 
perception. 
The significance of amygdala activation in emotional processing is certain, 
however recent studies challenge the preattentive nature of processing in this 
limbic structure (Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa, Padmala, & 
Morland, 2005).  Recently, a series of experiments employing the ERP technique 
have investigated the impact of selective attention on the processing of 
emotional facial expressions (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; Holmes, 
Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003). It was consistently reported that when faces were 
attended, emotional faces elicited an enhanced positivity relative to neutral 
faces. These emotional expression effects were completely eliminated on trials 
where faces were presented at unattended locations. The emotional expression 
effects were very similar across all six basic emotional facial expressions, 
suggesting that emotional expression processing, as reflected by ERP 
modulations, are gated by spatial attention. This finding challenges the 
hypothesis that there is preattentive processing of emotional facial expressions, 
including processing of highly salient fearful faces (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 
2003).  However, fMRI studies showing that amygdala responses to fearful faces 
appear to be unaffected by spatial attention (e.g. Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, 
& Dolan, 2001), and that secondary task performance does not modulate 
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amygdala activations triggered by highly arousing emotional scenes (Lane, Chua, 
& Dolan, 1999) are apparently at odds with the ERP findings. Eimer and Holmes 
(2007) propose that a fast sub-cortical system (involving the amygdala) provides 
the substrate for the automatic processing of emotional stimuli, which only high 
spatial resolution measures can tap into. Emotion-specific ERP modulations by 
attention, they suggest, reflect neocortical stages of emotional processing, 
which may lack ‘immunity to attentional capacity limitations’. Undoubtedly, 
there are many functionally important neural processes that electrophysiological 
measures cannot tap into. The arrangement of neurons in deep subcortical 
regions, including the amygdala, makes activity within these regions 
undetectable to surface electrodes. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
the activity measured in ERP and fMRI studies of attention and emotion 
processing are indicative of different stages of information processing, which 
would explain the discrepancies.   
1.9.1 Research Gap 
Interestingly, none of these studies addressed whether anxiety modulates 
attentional requirements of emotional processing. It is an important factor for 
consideration given the expansive cognitive literature on anxiety proposing an 
automatic preattentive bias to threat. Eminent models have been presented 
proposing that anxiety modulates the output of an amygdala-based preattentive 
threat evaluation system (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Öhman & Wiens, 2004).  
Bishop et al. (2004) tested this model and found evidence to suggest that anxiety 
may interact with attentional focus to determine the magnitude of the amygdala 
response to threat-related stimuli. In this study, high anxious participants 
showed an increased amygdala response to fearful versus neutral faces which 
was unaffected by attentional focus. However, in the low-anxious group 
amygdala response to fearful faces reduced when these stimuli were not the 
focus of attention. Bishop et al. (2004) propose that this finding may help to 
explain the discrepancies of previous research in this area; Vuilleumier at al.’s 
(2001) results are fitting with the results of the high-anxious group alone, as are 
Pessoa et al.’s (2002) findings consistent with the low-anxiety group.  Bishop et 
al. (2004) suggest it may be the lack of consideration of this covariate of 
interest, which produced these apparently contradictory findings.  
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1.10 Forthcoming Studies 
Cognitive theories have described anxiety in terms of a biased information-
processing system, with particular emphasis on a bias in attention (e.g. Beck, 
1976). According to these theories, anxious individuals are characterised by an 
attentional bias specifically related to the processing of threat-related stimuli. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the present thesis intend to address the nature of this 
anxiety-related processing bias and its regulation by attentional control 
processes.   
Chapter 2 tests the hypothesis that anxiety modulates a preattentive threat 
evaluation system by examining whether threatening faces may be processed 
‘automatically’, unconstrained by the availability of attentional resources. The 
aim of this study was to investigate the influence of focal spatial attention on 
ERP modulations sensitive to emotional facial expression. 
The pattern of attentional deployment to threat-related stimuli in anxiety is still 
a matter of debate in the literature. Chapter 3 will test the specific hypothesis 
that heightened anxiety is associated with an increased attentional dwell-time 
on emotional relative to neutral stimuli. Chapter 4 will investigate attentional 
control capacity for emotional representations using a task-switching paradigm. 
A primary finding in the anxiety literature is that anxiety increases attention to 
threat-related stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
van Ijendoorn, 2007; Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & 
Dixon, 2004), however, Eysenck et al.’s attentional control theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) predicts that anxiety impairs attentional 
control processes. Therefore, this study will investigate whether anxiety 
modulates the ability to shift attention toward and away from threatening 
mental sets. 
Finally, Chapter 5 investigates the metaphorical representation of affect. It was 
tested whether a spatial metaphor that associates good with up and bad with 
down underlies our cognitive representation of positivity and negativity. More 
specifically, this study examined how the association between valence and 
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verticality influences motor responses (upwards and downwards) to the locations 
of emotional word stimuli.
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Chapter 2 An Investigation into the Role of Attention 
in Affective Processing 
2.1 Introduction 
Vigilance towards threatening stimuli in our environment serves the evolutionary 
advantage of enabling a fast response to potential danger. Correspondingly, 
preferential attentional engagement of threat-related stimuli has been 
demonstrated with a variety of stimulus types, from spiders in spider-phobics 
which are detected more easily than relatively innocuous flowers or mushrooms 
(see Öhman & Mineka, 2001), to angry faces which appear to ‘pop-out’ in a 
crowd of emotionally discrepant faces, regardless of array size (Ashwin, 
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2006). Such findings suggest that we possess a 
tendency to prioritise threatening stimuli, perhaps as a result of a preattentive, 
parallel search for immediate signals of threat (Hansen & Hansen, 1988). 
Rapid attentional engagement of threat-related stimuli is certainly adaptive; 
however, an over-sensitive threat detection mechanism may result in 
maladaptive cognitive processing, as is implicated in the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders such as generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and 
social anxiety disorder. The clinical-cognitive literature reports that heightened 
anxiety is associated with increased interference from irrelevant threat-stimuli, 
as demonstrated using the emotional Stroop and dot probe tasks (Macleod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Models of anxiety 
have interpreted such findings as evidence of an automatic preattentive threat 
evaluation system which is modulated by anxiety, making threat-detection much 
more likely for highly anxious individuals (Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 
1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The aim of the present 
study was to investigate the mechanism underlying the threat-related processing 
bias in anxiety by examining the influence of spatial attention and trait anxiety 
levels on established ERP modulations by emotional stimuli. To assess the 
accuracy of the cognitive models of anxiety we wished to investigate whether 
threat-related stimuli receive preferential processing, irrespective of the focus 
of spatial attention, and if this is a rapid, involuntary process. 
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2.1.1 Electrophysical effects of emotional processing-previous 
findings 
Research into the electrophysical effects of emotional processing at scalp 
electrodes has provided insights into the automaticity of affective processing. 
Although we cannot directly identify the neural generators of the scalp-recorded 
ERPs, the ERP technique is particularly suitable for investigating the temporal 
characteristics of the threat-related processing bias. Facilitated encoding of 
threat has been reported to occur within the first 100 ms of stimulus 
presentation, supporting the hypothesis that a fast, involuntary process is 
involved in threat-related visual processing (Lang, Bradley, Drobes, & Cuthbert, 
1995; Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004). Reduced negativity 
over frontocentral areas has been observed for negative relative to neutral facial 
expressions as early as 120 ms post-stimulus onset  (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 
2003; Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003).  Subsequent modulations of the 
occipital P1 component by facial expression peaking around 130 ms post stimulus 
onset (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Eger, Jedynak, Iwaki, & Skrandies, 2003; Holmes, 
Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Pizzagalli, Regard, & Lehmann, 1999; Pourtois, 
Dan, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Streit et al., 1999) have been 
shown to precede the N170.  As the N170 is taken to reflect the structural 
encoding of faces, this result raises the possibility that discrimination of 
negative from neutral/positive facial affect may occur at early perceptual stages 
prior to the structural encoding of faces (Eimer, 2000).  In comparison, the 
aforementioned P1 effect has been less reliable for happy relative to neutral 
faces, suggesting that the observed augmented P1 effects relating to emotional 
facial expression processing can be attributed to attentional biases to negatively 
valenced stimuli (Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008).   
Anxiety-related enhancement of the occipital P1 component for negative as 
compared with neutral or happy faces has also been reported in the literature; 
with the magnitude of this effect being significantly enhanced for the high-trait 
anxiety group in comparison with the low-trait group (e.g. Holmes, Kragh 
Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008). These findings 
provide additional information regarding the attentional bias towards threat in 
anxiety reported in many behavioural studies (see, Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
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Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007 , for a review). However, the 
modulation of the occiptial P1 by emotional expression has not been consistently 
reported (Dennis & Chen, 2007; Leppanen, Moulson, Vogel-Farley, & Nelson, 
2007), nor have anxiety-related modulations of the P1 component (Fox, 
Derakshan, & Shoker, 2008; Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; Rossignol, 
Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005). Thus it is questionable 
whether the occipital P1 component is a reliable electrophysiological marker of 
early facilitated processing of threat or emotionality in general.   
Effects of emotional expression on the face-specific N170 component have also 
been examined. The results of these studies have not been conclusive, with 
some studies showing differentiation between fearful and happy/neutral facial 
expressions (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Leppanen, Moulson, Vogel-Farley, & Nelson, 
2007; Rossignol, Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005) and 
others revealing no evidence of emotion specific effects (Bobes, Martin, 
Olivares, & Valdes-Sosa, 2000; Eimer & Holmes, 2002; Eimer, Holmes, & 
McGlone, 2003; Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008). If the structural 
encoding of faces is an independent and parallel process to emotional expression 
detection, as postulated by the most prominent model of face recognition (Bruce 
& Young, 1986), one would expect there to be no systematic emotional 
expression effects on the N170 component. 
Facilitated emotional stimulus encoding has also been observed over posterior 
visual areas in the form of an early posterior negativity (EPN), which is 
maximally pronounced around 200-300 ms post stimulus onset for pleasant and 
unpleasant compared to neutral images (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; 
Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Schupp, Ohman et al., 2004; Schupp et 
al., 2007) and is assumed to originate from extrastriate visual areas sensitive to 
the selective attentional processing of negative affect (Holmes, Kragh Nielsen, & 
Green, 2008). Investigating the influence of trait anxiety on the attentional 
processing of threat-related facial expressions, Holmes et al. (2008) reported a 
diminished EPN in response to fearful stimuli in high- relative to low-anxious 
individuals. The authors took this to be indicative of an attentional avoidance 
strategy, an attempt of highly anxious individuals to reduce their sense of fear 
evoked by the stimulus. 
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Subsequent to the EPN, researchers have found a sustained positivity (LPP) for 
stimuli of high emotional arousal with a broad centro-parietal scalp distribution, 
most apparent around 400-600 ms post stimulus (e.g. Eimer & Holmes, 2002; 
Krolak-Salmon, Fischer, Vighetto, & Mauguiere, 2001; Williams, Palmer, Liddell, 
Song, & Gordon, 2006).  Although the LPP appears to represent facilitated 
attention to both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli compared with neutral stimuli, 
in general the LPP effect is larger for unpleasant than pleasant stimuli, in 
accordance with the notion of a negativity bias (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994).  
Moreover, in the face literature an LPP response to negative versus neutral facial 
expressions is routinely detected, contrasting with the relatively inconsistent 
reportage of an LPP response to positive facial expressions (e.g. see Holmes, 
Kragh Nielsen, & Green, 2008). The LPP appears to be highly significant in the 
investigation of emotional processing biases since a large body of literature 
indicates that modulations of the LPP serves as a neural index of the intrinsic 
relevance of emotional stimuli (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 
2000; Schupp et al., 2000a).   
2.1.2 Pre-attentive Affective Processing 
A strong notion of automaticity assumes that affective processing is 
uncompromised by attentional resources (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984).  If the 
threat-related processing bias in anxiety is indeed preattentive then we would 
expect to observe facilitated processing of threat under conditions where 
attention is otherwise engaged. Over the last two decades neuroimaging studies 
have established the significant role of the amygdala in responding to the 
emotionality of a stimulus, especially when pertaining to threat.  Reports of 
amygdala activation in response to unattended threatening faces (Anderson, 
Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Lane, Chua, & Dolan, 1999; 
Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001) and briefly presented, masked 
threat-related stimuli have led to the proposal that threat-related stimuli can 
evoke amygdala activity without attentional engagement or conscious 
awareness.  However, evidence of an amygdala-based fear response that is 
compromised by current task processing demands contests the notion that 
amygdala activation by emotional stimuli is attention-independent (Bishop, 
Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; 
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Phillips et al., 2004). Based on these findings it is questionable whether salient 
information receives preferential processing by means of a fast subcortical 
thalamo-amygdala route, by-passing top-down processing strategies (Dolan & 
Vuilleumier, 2003).   
Eimer and his colleagues (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; Holmes, Vuilleumier, 
& Eimer, 2003) carried out a series of experiments employing the ERP technique 
to investigate the impact of selective attention on ERP correlates of emotional 
processing. Using a similar paradigm to that employed in Vuilleumier et al.’s 
(2001) fMRI study, participants had to selectively attend to a face-pair or house-
pair randomly located either above/below or flanking fixation. When faces were 
attended, emotional faces elicited an enhanced early frontocentral positivity 
relative to neutral faces between 160 and 215 ms post-stimulus. These 
emotional expression effects were completely eliminated on trials where faces 
were presented at unattended locations. The emotional expression effects were 
very similar across all six basic emotional facial expressions (i.e. angry, 
disgusted, fearful, happy, sad, and surprised; Ekman & Friesen, 1976) in 
comparison to neutral, suggesting that emotional expression processing, as 
reflected by ERP modulations, are gated by spatial attention. This challenges the 
hypothesis that there is preattentive processing of emotional facial expressions, 
including processing of highly salient fearful faces (Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 
2003). 
Interestingly, few studies have addressed whether anxiety modulates the 
attentional requirements of affective processing (e.g. Bishop, Duncan, & 
Lawrence, 2004; Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007).  Given the expansive 
cognitive literature on anxiety proposing an automatic preattentive bias to 
threat this is perhaps surprising. Eminent models of anxiety propose a 
modulatory effect on the output of an amygdala-based preattentive threat 
evaluation system (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Öhman & Wiens, 2004).  The 
findings of Bishop et al. (2004) are in accordance with these predictions. 
Manipulating spatial attention to facial expressions of emotion, they reported 
that attentional focus did not modulate the increased amygdala activation to 
fearful- versus neutral- faces in high-anxious participants, unlike the low-anxious 
group. The observed modulatory effect of anxiety on fMRI correlates of 
emotional face processing highlights a contingency between heightened anxiety 
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and automaticity. Based on these findings the authors posited that elevated 
anxiety does not necessitate attention to ensure an amygdala response to 
threatening stimuli and is capable of running concurrently with other 
attentionally demanding processes. On the contrary, emotional processing in 
low-anxious individuals was subject to attentional constraint. 
These findings may help to reconcile earlier discrepancies in the literature (i.e. 
Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, 
& Dolan, 2001), whereby individual differences in anxiety between the subject 
pools could have contributed to the inconsistencies in the amygdala response to 
unattended emotional stimuli across these studies (Bishop et al., 2004). 
However, we cannot so easily extend this argument to the ERP findings of 
Holmes et al. (2003). Eimer and Holmes (Holmes, Kiss, & Eimer, 2006) propose 
that a fast sub-cortical system (involving the amygdala) provides the substrate 
for the automatic processing of emotional stimuli, which only high spatial 
resolution measures can tap into. Emotion-specific ERP modulations by 
attention, they suggest, reflect neocortical stages of emotional processing, 
which may lack ‘immunity to attentional capacity limitations’. Undoubtedly, ERP 
responses to emotional stimuli are unlikely to have originated from the 
amygdala, given its neuronal arrangement, and as such both measures may have 
been reflecting distinct processes. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
activity measured in ERP and fMRI studies of attention and emotion processing 
are indicative of different stages of information processing (Holmes, Vuilleumier, 
& Eimer, 2003). However, it remains to be seen whether individual differences 
in anxiety modulate affective processing as recorded at scalp electrodes.   
2.1.3 Present Study 
Thus, in the present study the primary aim was to investigate whether trait 
anxiety modulates preattentive threat-related processing at neocortical stages 
by investigating the impact of spatial attention on ERP correlates of emotional 
facial expression. Modulations by anxiety which parallel the neuroimaging 
studies (i.e. Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004; Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 
2007; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001) would implicate direct 
communications between visual cortical areas and the amygdala. 
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The current investigation adopted the experimental design used in earlier ERP 
and fMRI studies investigating affective processing (Holmes, Vuilleumier, & 
Eimer, 2003; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). The study aimed at 
testing the strict notion of automaticity, which assumes complete independence 
from attentive processing. Therefore, the house task employed in the 
Vuilleumier et al. (2001) and Holmes et al. (2003) studies was replaced by a 
difficult Landolt-square matching task. This maximized the task difficulty of the 
non-face task to ensure exhausted attentional resources on the faces-
unattended condition. Spatial attention was manipulated on a trial-to-trial basis 
towards either face-pairs or a pair of Landolt squares, which randomly appeared 
either above/below or flanking fixation while participants performed the 
matching task for the relevant stimuli.  
ERPS were recorded in order to examine the influence of trait-anxiety and 
spatial attention on early and later ERP components implicated in emotional 
processing (P1, N1, EPN, LPP and slow wave). Fearful, happy and neutral facial 
stimuli were selected from the California facial expressions (CAFE) database 
(Dailey, Cottrell, & Reilly, 2001). Stimuli were selected from the CAFE database 
in preference to the commonly used Ekman faces set (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
since these stimuli are controlled for low-level features such as contrast and 
luminance, therefore any modulation of the ERP waveform by these stimuli are 
likely due to the affective properties of the stimulus. In addition to the standard 
repeated measures ANOVA analysis, a task partial least squares (Task-PLS) 
analysis was performed. PLS is a multivariate approach, which was used to assess 
simultaneously the spatial and temporal features of attentional effects across 
the scalp.   
It was hypothesised that if threatening facial expressions are detected 
preattentively and automatically, the facilitated processing of threat versus 
neutral faces should be unaffected by the focus of attention. Conversely, if 
essential attentional resources are allocated away from the face stimuli, 
towards an attentionally demanding task and we fail to observe ERP modulations 
by emotional expression then this would strongly challenge the notion of 
preattentive processing and correspondingly the automaticity of threat 
processing. Evidence of facilitated processing of threat relative to neutral faces 
that was unaffected by spatial location in the high anxiety group alone would 
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provide evidence of a threat-related preattentive/attentional bias in anxiety. 
Closely linked to this, the secondary goal was to test the emotionality 
hypothesis, to directly address whether the attentional bias in anxiety implies 
enhanced processing of negative stimuli or to emotional faces in general; for this 
purpose, positively (happy) and negatively (fearful)-valenced facial expressions 
were included. Positive and negative affective faces producing comparatively 
larger ERP effects than neutral faces would be evidence in favour of a general 
emotional bias. However, larger differences in ERP outcomes between negative 
valence stimuli and neutral controls than between positive and neutral stimuli 
would be supportive of a negativity bias. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 34 healthy volunteers from the University of Glasgow 
undergraduate population. Ten participants were excluded because of excessive 
eye blinks and other muscle artifacts during EEG recording, so that 24 
participants (13 male and 11 female; 18–33 years old; average age, 26 years) 
remained in the sample.  All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Participants performed an adapted version of the matching-task used by 
Vuilleumier et al. (2001) while event-related potential (ERP) data were 
collected. The study was approved by the Glasgow University Research Ethics 
Committee and performed in appliance with their guidelines. Individuals with a 
history of inpatient psychiatric care, neurological disease, or head injury were 
excluded, as were individuals on medication for anxiety or depression. 
Participants scoring ≤35 on the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, 1983) were classed as the low-anxiety group and those 
scoring ≥40 were included in the high-anxiety group.  Twelve participants (6 
males and 6 females; mean age, 24 years) were grouped as high-anxious (M = 
46.00, SD = 4.59 on the trait-anxiety scale of the STAI and 13.58 on Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Twelve participants (7 
males and 5 females; mean age, 28 years) were grouped as low-anxious (M = 
29.33, SD = 3.94 on the trait-anxiety scale of the STAI and 3.64 on the BDI). A t-
test showed that the two groups were significantly different in trait-anxiety 
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score (t(22) = -4.95, p < .05). Participant statistics for the two groups are 
summarized in Table 2-1. 
Participants completed the state version of the STAI before the ERP session and 
both the state and trait subscales were completed immediately following the 
experiment. A t-test showed that the two groups were significantly different in 
state-anxiety score with the high-anxious group scoring higher than the low-
anxious group (t(22) = -2.69, p < .05). Participants’ state anxiety scores before 
the ERP session ranged from 21 to 62 (M = 36.04, SD = 9.68) and immediately 
following the ERP session their scores ranged from 20 to 53 (M = 36.50, SD = 
8.74). A paired t-test showed that state anxiety scores were not significantly 
different before and after the experimental session (t(22)= -0.02, p > .05), 
suggesting that state-anxiety score is a stable measure of anxiety across the 
testing period. Participants’ trait anxiety scores ranged from 23 to 57 (M = 
37.67, SD = 9.49). These scores are similar to the published norms for college 
students (M(state) = 37.61, SD = 10.98; M(trait) = 39.35, SD = 9.66) (Spielberger, 
1983).   
Table 2-1. Participant scores on the trait and state subversions of the STAI. 
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for scores on the Trait and State versions of 
the STAI taken before and after the experiment and BDI scores. Statistics are provided for 
high and low anxiety groups and separately for males and females within each 
group.
 
 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
The face stimuli were selected from the California Facial Expressions (CAFE) 
database (Dailey, Cottrell, & Reilly, 2001), comprising 5 male and 5 female faces 
with fearful, happy and neutral expressions (making a total of 30 stimuli 
normalised for the location of eyes and the mouth). All 30 stimuli used met the 
Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1976) criteria. After the 
experiment, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire, rating each of 
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the 30 face stimuli according to their perceived intensity of emotion displayed 
by the stimulus. Each stimulus was rated on a 6 point scale from 1- not at all to 
6-very much for the representativeness of the of emotion depicted in the 
stimulus (see Table 2-2). Following a significant main effect of emotion in a 
repeated-measures ANOVA of the stimulus evaluation data (F(2,60) = 8.21, p < 
.05), contrast analyses revealed that participants rated the fearful face stimuli 
as statistically less representative of the depicted emotion than either the happy 
face stimuli (F(1,30) = 14.31, p < .05) or the neutral face stimuli (F(1,30) = 5.89, 
p < .05). The face stimuli covered a visual angle of about 2.5×3.5°. 
The Landolt square stimuli were black outlined squares covering a visual angle of 
about 1.1×1.1°, which on some trials had a gap on the side closest to the 
fixation point (covering a visual angle of about 0.1°) and on other trials a 
complete square.  
Table 2-2. Stimulus evaluation scores. 
Mean scores, from a six-point scale (1=not at all, to 6=very much), for the degree to which 
each of the thirty facial stimuli represents the emotion portrayed in the stimulus.  A grand 
average score over all stimuli for each individual emotion is provided. Standard deviations 
are in brackets. 
 
 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit sound-attenuated cabin, and a 21” 
computer screen was placed at a viewing distance of 80 cm. Participants used a 
chin rest to maintain a constant viewing distance throughout the experiment. 
The experiment consisted of one practice block of 20 trials followed by 15 
experimental blocks, each containing 48 trials. Two practice trials were 
performed at the start of each block, which were excluded from the data 
analysis. On each trial, two faces and two white Landolt squares were presented 
in vertical and horizontal pairs around a central fixation cross and all stimuli 
were presented in front of a black background. The eccentricity of these stimuli, 
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measured as the distance between the centre of each stimulus and the central 
fixation cross, was 2.5º. At the beginning of each trial a cue was presented that 
instructed participants to direct attention either to the two vertically aligned or 
the two horizontally aligned positions. This cue consisted of two white 
rectangles (each rectangle covering a visual angle of 3.0×3.5º) presented at 
either both horizontal or both vertical locations. Each trial began with an 83 ms 
presentation of the attentional cue followed by a 717 ms blank interval. Then, 
the face/Landolt square stimulus array was briefly presented for 300 ms. The 
interval between the offset of these stimuli and the beginning of the next trial 
was 1300 ms. 
 
Figure 2-1. Example of the cue and stimulus presentation. The figure at the top represent a 
horizontal cue trial and the bottom two figures show two alternative responses on a faces 
attended trial.  
 
Participants were instructed to maintain fixation while directing their attention 
to the locations indicated by the cue, and to respond as fast as possible with 
either a left or right hand keypress whenever they deemed the cued stimulus 
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pair as the same or different (the S-R assignment was balanced across 
participants), see Figure 2-1. On face-attended trials, participants had to make a 
same/different identity judgement for the face pair. The faces presented varied 
in identity, but both always showed the same expression (fearful, happy or 
neutral) and were of the same gender. On face-unattended trials, participants 
had to identify whether the Landolt squares were the same (i.e. both squares 
either had a gap in the side closest to the fixation point or neither of them had a 
gap) or different (i.e. only one of the squares had a gap in the side closest to 
fixation). Stimuli at uncued locations had to be ignored. There were four 
conditions for the presented stimuli; faces-same, squares-same, all-same and 
all-different. The factorial design of the experiment ensured that half of the 
trials required a same response and half a different response. Within each block 
of trials, paired faces and paired squares appeared randomly and with equal 
probability in the vertical and horizontal positions, and these positions were 
equally likely cued or uncued. For face pairs presented in the horizontal position 
one third of the stimuli displayed neutral, happy and fearful effect, 
respectively.  
Bishop et al. (2004) reported that the rostral anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) 
was strongly activated by infrequent rather than frequent threat-related 
distracters. This finding suggests that salient emotional stimuli induce processing 
conflict (from bottom-up interference) and are especially disruptive when they 
occur infrequently. To increase stimulus-driven effects in the present study, 
expressive faces (fearful and happy) in addition to neutral faces were presented 
only in the horizontal display condition, whereas all vertically presented face 
pairs were neutral. As a result, emotionally expressive faces (fearful and happy) 
occurred less frequently than neutral faces throughout the experiment. 
2.2.4 Electrophysiological Recording 
A BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system was used for continuous recording of 
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity from 72 Ag/AgCl electrodes over midline 
electrodes Fpz, AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, Oz, and Iz, over the left 
hemisphere from electrodes IO1, Fp1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, F5, F7, F9, FC1, FC3, 
FC5, FT7, C1, C3, C5, M1, T7, CP1, CP3, CP5, TP7, P1, P3, P5, P7, PO3, PO7, O1, 
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two nonstandard positions PO9’ and O9’ which were located at 33% and 66% of 
the M1-Iz distance, and from the homologue electrodes over the right 
hemisphere. Two additional electrodes (Common Mode Sense (CMS) active 
electrode and Driven Right Leg (DRL) passive electrode) were used as reference 
and ground electrodes, respectively (cf. www.biosemi/faq/cms&drl.htm). EEG 
and EOG recordings were sampled at 256 Hz. Off-line, all EEG channels were 
recalculated to an average reference. Trials containing blinks were corrected 
using the adaptive artifact correction method of Brain Electromagnetic Source 
Analysis (BESA) software (Ille, Berg, & Scherg, 2002). Automatic artifact 
detection software (BESA) was run and trials with non-ocular artifacts (drifts, 
channel blockings, EEG activity exceeding ± 75 µV) were discarded. The analysis 
epoch of a total duration of 1400 ms started 200 ms prior to the onset of the 
stimulus.  
2.2.5 EEG Data Analysis 
Only trials without EEG or EOG artifacts were included in the EEG data analysis. 
The signal at each electrode site was averaged separately for each experimental 
condition time-locked to the onset of the target stimulus. Before the 
measurement of ERP parameters EEG and EOG activity was band-pass filtered 
(0.03-25 Hz, 6 dB/oct). The ERP waveforms were aligned to a 100-ms baseline 
prior to the onset of the stimulus. Mean amplitude of the ERP waveform was 
measured in average waveforms within time intervals during which specific ERP 
deflections were found to be most pronounced upon visual inspection (see Figure 
2-2 for the topographies). Successive post-stimulus time windows defined the P1 
from 85-125 ms; the N170 from 145-190 ms; the EPN from 200-300 ms; the early 
LPP from 300-500 ms; the late LPP from 500-700 ms and the Slow Wave from 
700-1,000 ms. For the P1 and EPN components mean voltages were computed 
across four right hemisphere (RH) sites (P6, P8, PO8, PO10’) and four 
homologous electrodes over left hemisphere (LH) sites (P5, P7, PO7, PO9’). Mean 
N170 amplitude was measured across lateral occipitoparietal sites (P7/8, 
PO7/8). Mean amplitude measured in the early LPP, late LPP, and slow wave 
time intervals (300 - 500 ms, 500 – 700, 700 – 1,000 ms, respectively) was 
measured across three parietal midline electrodes (CPz, Pz, and POz for the 
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early LPP; Cz, CPz, and Pz for the late LPP and slow wave), where activity was 
found to be maximal. 
For the horizontal face trials I performed 2 (Group: High Trait Anxiety (HTA), 
Low Trait Anxiety (LTA)) × 2 (Attention: Attended, Unattended) × 3 (Emotion: 
Fearful, Happy, Neutral) × 2 (Hemisphere: LH, RH) repeated measures mixed 
ANOVAs, using the Huynh-Feldt correction, on the average voltage data in the 
P1, N170, EPN, early LPP, late LPP and slow wave time windows. For the early 
and late LPP, I performed a similar ANOVA, replacing the factor Hemisphere with 
Electrode. Finally, analysis of the N170 component was carried out on mean 
voltage data at lateral parietal regions (comprising P7/8, PO7/8) within a 145-
190 ms time window. Analogous analyses were performed on the Vertical face 
trials with the omission of the factor emotion. RT data analysis mirrored that of 
the ERPs, excluding the variables hemisphere/electrode.   
To address the multivariate nature of the data an additional partial least squares 
(PLS) analysis was performed to assess simultaneously the spatial and temporal 
features of attentional effects across the scalp. The PLS analysis of this data set 
was conducted using Matlab-based (v. 7.5, Mathworks, Inc.) graphical user 
interface (PLS; http://www.rotman-baycrest.on.ca/pls). Using this method, the 
whole epoch can be analysed across all electrodes rather than focusing on 
selected electrodes for a particular peak. The PLS analysis was conducted on the 
1200 ms post-stimulus interval (excluding the pre-stimulus baseline) for 66 scalp 
electrodes (excluding left and right mastoid electrodes and the EOG channels).  
Results are based on permutation and Bootstrapping tests with 100 replications 
each. 
2.2.6 Task-Partial Least Squares (Task-PLS) Analysis 
Partial Least squares analysis is a multivariate approach to the analysis of 
neuroimaging data that was first introduced to the field in 1996 (McIntosh, 
Bookstein, Haxby, & Grady, 1996). In its original application, PLS was applied to 
one-dimensional images from spectrographs but recent adaptations of the 
mathematical formulation has allowed for an extension into the temporal 
domain. Spatiotemporal PLS (ST-PLS) allows data in a time series format such as 
fMRI, EEG and MEG data to benefit from this novel approach.  
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The PLS method is not unlike principle components analysis (PCA), whereby it 
computes the best fit between modelled and observed data in its least-squares 
sense, but diverges in its approach to fit only part of a correlation or covariance 
matrix (Wold, 1982). The solution is constrained to the covariation among two or 
more defined ‘blocks’ of variables and produces a new set of variables that 
relates the optimal covariance between the blocks using the fewest dimensions.  
The unique contribution of PLS among alternative multivariate approaches is 
that it concerns itself with extracting the covariance between spatial patterns of 
brain activity, such as scalp potentials in an ERP dataset, and changing task 
demands (Task-PLS). Allowing the study of the whole epoch simultaneously for 
all electrodes, one of the advantages of PLS analysis is that it has a data-driven 
as opposed to a data-mining approach. PLS is also useful for highly correlated 
data sets, a common feature of neuroimaging data, since within-block 
adjustments for correlation are unnecessary. 
PLS operates on a matrix containing the entire data structure at once, which is 
compiled as follows. The rows of the matrix correspond to the conditions and 
subjects, while the columns contain electrode and time information. Singular 
value decomposition (SVD) is applied to the data matrix generating latent 
variable (LVs) and the associated vectors defining their structure: a vector of 
singular values and orthogonal vectors defining design saliences and electrode 
saliences for each latent variable. The singular values are used to calculate the 
proportion of cross-block covariance accounted for by a LV, in decreasing order 
of magnitude. Permutation tests are used to determine the significance of the 
singular values. The remaining set of vectors contain the structure of the LVs. 
The design saliences vector defines the contrasts among conditions and the 
electrode saliences vector identifies the spatial location and timing for the 
effects in the design saliences for each LV. Bootstrap resampling is applied to 
the electrode saliences to provide a measure of their stability at each timepoint 
and location in space (Efron & Tibishirani, 1985). 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Behavioural Results 
Trials in which participants made errors were excluded from the RT data 
analysis. The RT data were subjected to two trimming procedures; items with 
RTs less than 250 ms or greater than 1500 ms were excluded from further 
analysis.  
2.3.1.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
2.3.1.1.1 RT Analysis 
Responses were faster for face targets (816 ms) relative to square targets (887 
ms), resulting in a main effect of target category, F(1, 22) = 11.4, p < .05. RTs to 
targets were significantly influenced by the emotional expression of the face 
stimuli; responses to cued face targets and to vertically presented square 
targets were significantly affected by emotional expression, F(2, 44) = 5.9; p < 
.05. Follow-up analysis revealed delayed responses to targets when fearful faces 
were presented relative to neutral faces (864 vs. 847 ms), F(1, 22) = 5.7; p < 
.05. Similarly, fearful relative to happy face pairs produced delayed RTs to 
square targets (864 vs. 844 ms), F(1, 22) = 14.5, p < .05. On the contrary, happy 
vs. neutral horizontal faces did not produce significantly different effects on 
responses to targets (844 ms vs. 847 ms) F(1, 22) = 0.2; p < .05. There was no 
significant group effect on RT, F(1, 22) = 0.05, p > .05, nor any significant 
interaction effects, all Fs < 2.08, ps > .05. 
2.3.1.1.2 Error Analysis 
Participants made 10.1% of errors when faces were cued and 18.2% errors to 
cued squares, F(1, 22) = 5.06, p < .05. The percentage of error was affected by 
facial emotional expression, F(2, 44) = 3.7, p < .05, and this effect was further 
modulated by group, F(2, 44) = 6.2, p < .05. Simple main effects of group for 
each level of the factor emotion revealed that when fearful faces were 
presented the high anxiety group made more errors in comparison to the low 
anxiety group, irrespective of target category (16.8 vs. 10.3%), F(1, 22) = 6.0, p 
< .05. No significant group differences were found for either the neutral 
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condition, F(1, 22) = 0.4, p > .05, or the happy condition, F(1, 22) = 2.2, p > .05. 
The Target x Emotion interaction was insignificant, F(2, 44) = 2.5, p > .05, as 
were all other effects, all Fs < 2.48, ps >.05. 
2.3.1.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
2.3.1.2.1 RT Analysis 
Responses were faster for square targets (821 ms) relative to face targets (881 
ms), resulting in a main effect of target category, F(1, 22) = 7.4,  p < .05. No 
other effects were significant, all Fs < 0.43, ps >.05. 
2.3.1.2.2 Error Analysis 
Participants made 18.9% of errors on face target trials and 16.1% of errors when 
squares were cued, although this difference failed to reach significance, F(1, 22) 
= 0.8, p > .05. No effects of error rate were significant, all Fs < 0.43, ps >.05. 
2.3.2 Electrophysiological Results 
 
Figure 2-2. Spline-interpolated topographic maps representing the P1, N170, EPN, early LPP, 
late LPP, and slow wave, respectively. Isopotential line spacing is 0.75 µV. 
 
2.3.2.1 P1 Component at Lateral Posterior Locations (85-125ms post-
stimulus) 
2.3.2.1.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
Figure 2-3 (top row) shows P1 amplitudes in the faces horizontal condition at 
electrode sites PO7 and PO8, where activation was maximal within the analysis 
region. A main effect of attention revealed enhanced P1 amplitudes on the faces 
unattended condition relative to the faces attended condition (2.69 vs. 2.96 µV), 
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F(1,22) = 5.54, p < .05. Amplitudes were larger over the right hemisphere region 
as revealed in a main effect of hemisphere (1.95 vs. 2.45 µV), F(1,22) = 11.42, p 
< .01. No other effects were significant, all Fs < 2.72, ps > .05. 
 
Figure 2-3. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms at PO7 and PO8 elicited by face-target trials and 
square-target trials.  Faces horizontal condition is shown in the top row and faces vertical 
condition in the bottom row. 
 
2.3.2.1.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
None of the main effects were significant (attention: F(1,22) = 0.79, p > .05; 
hemisphere: F(1,22) = 2.64, p > .05). There was a significant Attention x 
Hemisphere interaction, F(1,22) = 6.65, p < .05, P1 amplitudes were enhanced 
when faces were attended than unattended over the right hemisphere region 
(3.09 vs. 2.55 µV), F(1,22) = 5.52, p < .05, however there were no significant 
attention effects over the left hemisphere, F(1,22) = 3.79,  p >.05, see Figure 
2-3 (bottom row). A significant Hemisphere x Group interaction effect, F(1,22) = 
4.31, p < .05, revealed that for the LTA group, P1 amplitudes were enhanced 
over the right hemisphere region (2.49 vs. 3.07 µV), F(1,11) = 5.43, p < .05, 
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while for the HTA group P1 amplitudes were not lateralized, F(1,11) = 0.14, p > 
.05. 
2.3.2.2 N170 Component Over Occipito-Parietal Regions (145-190ms post-
stimulus) 
2.3.2.2.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
Within this time window, at lateral parietal regions where the N170 component 
is maximal, no main effects were significant, all Fs < 1. There was a strong trend 
for an Attention x Hemisphere interaction, F(1, 22) = 4.17, p = .05, unattended 
faces tended to elicit a larger N170 than attended faces over the left 
hemisphere (-2.13 vs. -1.85 µV), with a reverse in amplitudes over the right 
hemisphere (-2.03 vs. -2.23 µV) (see Figure 2-4). The Attention x Emotion x 
Hemisphere interaction was significant, F(2, 44) = 3.74 , p < .05. Follow-up 
contrasts revealed that unattended rather than attended fearful faces elicited a 
larger N170 over the left hemisphere (-2.81 vs. -1.75 µV), F(1,22) = 11.83, p < 
.01, however this effect was not significant over the right hemisphere region (-
2.04 vs -2.30 µV), F < 1. Neither the neutral nor happy face conditions were 
modulated by attention at lateral regions, all F < 2.43 and ps > .05.  
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Figure 2-4. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms at P7/8 and PO7/8 elicited by face-target trials 
and square-target trials for the horizontal face condition. 
 
There was a significant Emotion x Group interaction, F(2,44) = 3.39, p < .05, 
although none of the simple main effects were significant, all Fs < 1. Overall the 
HTA group showed a pattern of enhanced N170 amplitudes relative to the LTA 
group, which was most pronounced for neutral (-2.63 vs. -1.60 µV) followed by 
fearful (-2.68 vs. -1.76 µV) and lastly happy faces (-2.24 vs. -1.92 µV). 
2.3.2.2.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
Only the main effect of attention was significant, F(1,22) = 15.15, p < .0001. 
N170 amplitudes were enhanced on faces unattended trials relative to faces 
attended trials (-3.12 vs. -2.53 µV), see Figure 2-5. All other effects, F < 3.81, ps 
> .05.   
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Figure 2-5. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms at P7/8 and PO7/8 elicited by face-target trials 
and square-target trials for the vertical face condition. 
 
2.3.2.3 Enhanced Posterior Negativity (EPN) (200-300ms post-stimulus) 
2.3.2.3.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
Significant main effects of emotion, F(2,44) = 10.46, p < .001, and hemisphere, 
F(1,22) = 6.38, p < .05, were qualified in an Attention x Emotion x Hemisphere 
interaction, F(2,44) = 3.99, p < .05. Follow-up contrasts revealed significant 
emotion effects over the right hemisphere region when faces were attended; 
Figure 2-6 shows that fearful and happy faces showed larger EPN amplitudes (-
0.38 and -0.06 µV) than neutral faces (0.58 µV), both Fs >8.64, ps < .0001. There 
was a trend for fearful faces to have enhanced EPN amplitudes relative to happy 
faces, although this was not confirmed in the analysis, F(1,22) = 3.53, p = .07. 
No emotional expression effects were observed over the left hemisphere region 
when faces were attended, F(2,44) = 1.07, p > .05. In the unattended faces 
condition, no significant effects were observed at lateral regions, all Fs < 1, ps > 
.05. All other Fs < 2.41, ps > .05. 
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Figure 2-6. Grand-averaged waveforms at PO7 and PO8 for faces attended and unattended 
trials are shown on the top and bottom rows, respectively.  
 
2.3.2.3.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
A main effect of attention, F(1,22) = 7.49, p < .05, was further enveloped in an 
Attention x Group interaction effect, F(1,22) = 6.81, p < .05. The LTA group 
showed enhanced negativity for the faces unattended than attended condition (-
1.58 vs. -0.57 µV), F(1,11) = 9.81, p < .01, whereas this effect was not 
significant for the HTA group (0.08 vs. -0.06 µV), F(1,11) = 0.01, p > .05. All 
other Fs < 1.52. 
2.3.2.4 Early LPP Time Window (300-500ms post-stimulus) 
2.3.2.4.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
There was a main effect of attention, F(1,22) = 8.66, p < .01, however this was 
modulated by electrode, F(2,44) = 29.95, p < .0001. Follow-up analyses revealed 
enhanced positivity for attended relative to unattended faces at electrode sites 
Pz (3.45 vs. 2.31 µV), F(1,22) = 9.99, p < .01, and POz (3.57 vs. 1.07µV), F(1,22) 
= 25.80, p < .0001. However, there was no significant effect of attention at CPz 
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(1.28 vs. 1.89 µV), F(1,22) = 2.53, p > .05. There was a trend for the HTA group 
to have enhanced early LPP amplitudes for faces attended relative to faces 
unattended trials, whereas the LTA group did not show this pattern, F(1,22) = 
4.18, p = .05, see Figure 2-7. No other effects were significant, all other Fs< 
3.40 and ps > .05. 
 
Figure 2-7. Grand-averaged waveforms for attended vs. unattended horizontal faces at CPz, 
Pz, and POz for HTA and LTA groups. The HTA group are shown on the left and the LTA 
group on the right. 
 
2.3.2.4.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
The main effect of electrode was significant, F(2,44) = 5.14, p < 0.05, as was a 
significant Attention x Electrode interaction, F(2,44) = 35.11, p < 0.0001, see 
Figure 2-8. Enhanced positivity for unattended relative to attended faces was 
present at electrode site CPz (2.59 vs. 0.29 µV), F(1,22) = 23.43, p < .0001. 
However, enhanced positivities for attended relative to unattended faces was 
observed at POz (3.35 vs. 2.07 µV), F(1,22) = 9.62, p < .01. The effect of 
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attention was not significant at electrode Pz (3.08 vs. 2.68 µV), F(1,22) = 0.73, p 
> .05. No other effects were significant, all Fs <1.56.   
 
Figure 2-8. Grand-averaged waveforms for attended versus unattended vertical faces at 
electrode sites CPz, Pz and POz. 
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2.3.2.5 Late LPP Time Window (500-700ms post-stimulus) 
2.3.2.5.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
A main effect of Emotion was observed, F(2,44) = 4.59, p < .05. Follow-up 
contrasts showed that there was enhanced positivity for fearful (5.27 µV), 
F(1,22) = 8.80, p < .01, and happy faces (5.11 µV), F(1,22) = 6.59, p < .01, as 
compared to neutral faces (4.62 µV), see Figure 2-9. Notably, the emotional 
expression effect was not modulated by attention, F(2,44) = 0.07, p > .05.  
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Figure 2-9. Grand-averaged waveforms for neutral, fearful and happy faces presented 
horizontally. 
 
The main effect of attention was significant, F(1,22) = 11.93, p < .01, as was the 
Attention x Group interaction, F(1,22) = 4.48, p < .05. Attention effects were 
further modulated by electrode, F(2,44) = 8.92, p < .001, and Electrode x Group, 
Chapter 2  75 
F(2,44) = 7.52, p < .01. Follow-up analyses revealed a significant Attention x 
Electrode interaction, for the HTA group, F(2,22) = 10.61, p < .01, but not the 
LTA group, F(2,22) = 0.22, p > .05, see Figure 2-10. As can be seen in Figure 
2-10, the HTA group showed enhanced positivities for attended than unattended 
faces at electrode site Pz (8.60 vs. 4.71 µV), F(1,11) = 17.91, p < .01, however 
attention effects were not present at CPz, (7.31 vs. 5.29 µV), F(1,11) = 6.68, p > 
.05, or Cz, (3.96 vs. 2.94 µV), F(1,11) = 3.47, p > .05. This group difference 
mirrors the earlier LPP modulations by attention, thus the observed effect in the 
late LPP window may indicate the sustained attention towards faces in 
heightened anxiety, replicating prior research (e.g. Hajcak & Olvet, 2008b). 
 
Figure 2-10. Grand-average waveforms for attended versus unattended horizontal faces for 
the HTA (left column) and LTA (right column) groups at electrode sites Cz, CPz and Pz. 
 
2.3.2.5.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
There was a main effect of electrode, F(2,44) = 10.69, p < 0.01, and a significant 
Attention x Electrode interaction, F(2,44) = 21.18, p < 0.001. Enhanced 
positivities for unattended versus attended faces was significant at electrode 
site Cz (4.07 vs. 2.57 µV), F(1,22) = 10.68, p < 0.01, with a similar tend at CPz, 
Chapter 2  76 
(5.50 vs. 4.52 µV), F(1,22) = 4.86, p > 0.016, however attention effects were 
non-significant at Pz, (5.14 vs. 6.00 µV), F(1,22) = 2.51, p > 0.05. F(2,44) = 
10.69, p < 0.01 
2.3.2.6 Slow Wave (700-1,000 ms) 
2.3.2.6.1 Horizontally Presented Face Stimuli 
There was a main effect of emotion F(2,44) = 4.54, p < 0.05, see Figure 2-9. 
Follow-up contrasts revealed enhanced positivities for fearful versus neutral 
faces (4.52 vs. 3.78 µV), F(1,22) = 10.27, p < 0.01, and a trend for enhanced 
positivites for fearful versus happy faces, although this did not reach 
significance, (4.52 vs. 3.99 µV), F(1,22) = 3.24, p = 0.08. However, amplitudes 
within this time window did not significantly differ between neutral and happy 
faces (3.99 vs. 3.78 µV), F(1,22) = 0.84, p > 0.05. 
A main effect of attention revealed enhanced positivities for attended than 
unattended faces (4.96 vs. 3.23 µV), F(1,22) = 18.69, p < 0.001. A significant 
Attention x Electrode x Group interaction, F(2,44) = 6.18, p < 0.01, revealed 
that both the HTA and LTA groups showed enhanced positivities for attended 
than unattended faces at electrode sites Cz, both Fs >5.65 and ps < .05, and 
CPz, both Fs > 6.58 and ps < .05, see Figure 2-10. However at Pz, the HTA group 
demonstrated significant attention effects (6.27 vs. 3.42 µV), F(1,11) = 12.46, p 
< 0.001, whereas for the LTA group attention failed to reach significance (3.36 
vs. 2.44 µV), F(1,11) = 3.22, p > 0.05, see Figure 2-10. All other Fs < 1.99, ps > 
.05. 
2.3.2.6.2 Vertically Presented Face Stimuli 
A significant Attention x Electrode interaction, F(2,44) = 10.5, p < 0.001, 
revealed enhanced positivities for attended than unattended faces at electrode 
site Pz, F(1,22) = 9.40, p < 0.01, see Figure 2-8. However, effects of attention 
were not significant at sites Cz, F(1,22) = 0.03, p > 0.05, or CPz, F(1,22) = 0.04, 
p > 0.05. All other Fs < 1.96, ps > .05. 
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2.3.2.7 Task ST-PLS results 
2.3.2.7.1 Horizontally Presented Faces 
An analysis including all 12 conditions (6 conditions x 2 groups) was run. PLS 
identified three major effects, three latent variables, which were significant by 
permutation test, ps ≤ .01, 100 permutations, see Figure 2-11. For the first LV, 
the dominant effect reflected the distinction between attended and unattended 
faces. It also indicated ERP amplitude differences between high and low anxiety 
groups for the attention effect. The second and third latent variables expressed 
complex interaction patterns between attention, emotion, and groups. These 
are described below. 
2.3.2.7.1.1 Attention to Faces Modulated by Anxiety  
The design saliences for the first latent variable (LV1) indicated that the largest 
difference among the conditions was between attended and unattended faces; it 
represented 60.19% of the cross-block covariance. The magnitude of the 
attended-unattended difference varied across groups. The electrode saliences 
indicate where the differences are being expressed, shown in Figure 2-11. The 
stable differences, as assessed by bootstrap tests (100 samples), are shown by 
the blue markers at the top of each channel plot. Close inspection of the 
saliences revealed that the attention effect was primarily posterior with a 
reversal in polarity at frontal sites (cf. F3/F4). It is largest where the saliences 
are maximal, and this occurred over the occipital and parietal-occipital 
electrodes (O1/O2, Oz, PO3/PO4, and POz). The effect emerged around 400 ms 
and had a long duration, until around 700 ms. 
To more fully appreciate the nature of the differences in ERP amplitude related 
to attention, the ERPs are shown in Figure 2-13, collapsed across emotional 
expression (as the effects were similar across emotional expression), for the 
channels showing the largest differences. Blue markers at the top indicate the 
time points of stable differences for the attention by group interaction pattern. 
Because the frontal sites reflected only a polarity reversal, we describe only the 
posterior electrodes.  
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Figure 2-11. Design Saliences for LV1, LV2 and LV3. Group 1 refers to the HTA group and 
group 2 refers to the LTA group. 
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Figure 2-12. Electrode Saliences for LV1. 
 
 
Figure 2-13. ERP waveforms showing attention effects across anxiety groups. The blue dots 
indicate the time points at which the effects were significant by bootstrap.  
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The attention by group interaction pattern started around 400 ms and prolonged 
until around 750 ms. The effect reflected larger amplitudes for the attended 
than unattended condition, with this difference being greater for the HTA in 
comparison to the LTA anxiety group. The negative saliences seen in Figure 2-12 
reaching a maximum around 500 ms reflected the larger LPP amplitudes 
obtained for attended faces, which was more pronounced for the HTA group.  
2.3.2.7.1.2 Interaction of Attention by Emotion and Group 
The second significant LV accounted for 9.95% of the cross-block covariance and 
reflected an interaction between all three factors; attention, emotion and 
group. The design saliences (Figure 2-11) showed that in the attended faces 
condition, amplitudes varied as a function of emotion for the HTA group, the 
effects being in opposite directions between neutral and emotional faces. The 
LTA, in comparison, did not show any modulations by emotion. The electrode 
saliences with the strongest effects (Figure 2-14) show where these differences 
were being expressed. The emotion effect was maximal at centro-parietal and 
occipito-parietal sites, with a polarity shift at central electrodes. The electrode 
saliences showed that these differences were robust ~600 to 750 ms across all 
electrodes.   
To more fully appreciate the nature of the differences in ERP amplitude related 
to emotion and group, the ERPs for faces attended and unattended conditions 
are shown in Figure 2-15 and Figure 2-16 respectively, for the channels showing 
the largest difference. Time points of the stable differences are indicated on the 
ERP plots (blue marker). 
Effects of emotion were robust around the 600 - 750 ms interval for the HTA 
group, but only when faces were attended. The effect reflected larger slow 
wave amplitudes for attended emotional (fearful and happy) compared to 
neutral faces, whereas for the LTA group amplitudes were equally large for 
neutral and emotional faces. However, for the unattended faces condition, 
enhanced amplitudes were observed for emotional compared to neutral faces at 
occipito-parietal locations for the LTA group. 
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Figure 2-14. Electrode saliences for LV2. 
 
Chapter 2  82 
 
Figure 2-15. ERP waveforms for faces attended condition for HTA (left column) and LTA 
(right column) groups. The stable differences by bootstrap are indicated for each electrode 
as in Figure 2-14 (blue = LV2).  
 
  
Chapter 2  83 
 
Figure 2-16. ERP waveforms for faces unattended condition for HTA (left column) and LTA 
(right column) groups. The stable differences by bootstrap are indicated for each electrode 
as in Figure 2-14 (blue = LV2). 
 
2.3.2.7.1.3 Further Interactions Between Attention, Emotion, and Group. 
The third (and last) significant LV accounted for 8.82% of the cross-block 
covariance and reflected further interactions among the factors attention, 
emotion, and group. The design saliences (Figure 2-11, bottom panel) showed 
that attention effects, the effects being in opposite directions between 
attended and unattended faces, varied as a function of emotion and group.  
The electrode saliences with the strongest effects were selected for inspection 
(O1, Oz, Iz, O9, and PO9). The effect was maximal at left hemisphere and 
central occipito-parietal sites, with a polarity shift at frontal electrodes. The 
electrode saliences showed that these differences were expressed from ~650 to 
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1200 ms at all electrodes except Iz where differences were robust from ~650 to 
800 ms.   
The ERPs for faces attended and unattended conditions are shown in Figure 2-18 
and Figure 2-19 respectively, and separately for HTA and LTA groups, for the 
channels showing the largest difference. Time points of the stable differences 
are indicated on the ERP plots (blue marker). The effect reflected larger slow 
wave amplitudes for attended fearful compared to neutral and happy faces in 
the HTA group (O1, Oz, Iz, PO9), and for the LTA group (Iz, O9). For the faces 
unattended condition, the effect reflected larger amplitudes for emotional 
versus neutral faces in the HTA group around ~650 to 800 ms at Iz, whereas the 
LTA group showed more sustained amplitude effects for emotional versus neutral 
faces (O1, O9, and PO9) 
 
Figure 2-17. LV3 electrode saliences. 
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Figure 2-18. ERP waveforms for faces attended condition for HTA (left column) and LTA 
(right column) groups. The stable differences by bootstrap are indicated for each electrode 
as in Figure 2-14 (blue = LV3). 
 
Chapter 2  86 
 
Figure 2-19. ERP waveforms for faces unattended condition for HTA (left column) and LTA 
(right column) groups. The stable differences by bootstrap are indicated for each electrode 
as in Figure 2-14 (blue = LV3). 
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2.3.2.7.2 Vertically Presented Faces 
An analysis including all 4 conditions (2 conditions x 2 groups) was run. PLS 
identified one latent variable, which was significant by permutation test, p ≤ 
0.0001, 100 permutations, see Figure 2-20. The design saliences showed the 
effect reflected the distinction between attended and unattended faces, which 
was the same across anxiety groups, see Figure 2-20.   
Electrode saliences indicate where the differences are being expressed, shown 
in Figure 2-21. The stable differences, as assessed by bootstrap tests (100 
samples), are shown by the blue markers at the top of each channel plot. Close 
inspection of the saliences revealed that the attention effect was primarily 
posterior with a reversal in polarity at central sites (cf. C1/C2). The effect is 
largest where the saliences are maximal, and this occurred over the occipital 
region (O1/O2, Oz, O9/O10, and Iz). The effect emerged around 400 ms and 
persisted until around 700 ms. 
ERPs displayed in Figure 2-22, show effects for the channels showing the largest 
differences. Blue markers at the top indicate the time points of stable 
differences for the attention effect. The ERP waveforms showed enhanced 
positivites for attended relative to unattended faces for both HTA and LTA 
groups across the 400 – 700 ms time window, reflecting an enhanced late 
positivity when faces were attended.  
 
 
Figure 2-20. LV1 for the faces vertical condition PLS analysis. Group 1 refers to the HTA 
group and group 2 refers to the LTA group. 
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Figure 2-21. Electrode salience for the faces vertical condition, LV1. 
 
 
Figure 2-22. ERP waveforms for faces attended versus unattended conditions, displayed 
separately for HTA and LTA groups at electrodes O1/O2, Oz, O9/O10 and Iz. The stable 
differences are indicated for each electrode as in Figure 2-21 (blue = LV1). 
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2.4 Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the mechanism underlying the 
threat-related processing bias documented in the anxiety literature. To answer 
the question of automaticity, one sought to elucidate whether facilitated 
processing of threat evidenced by emotion-related ERP modulations would occur 
rapidly and preattentively. It was hypothesized that stimuli that were 
automatically evaluated according to their emotional significance would not be 
subject to attentional constraints. In line with a number of studies, the evidence 
suggests that emotional processing occurs after facial configuration processes, 
with the earliest discrimination of emotional from neutral facial expressions 
reflected in the EPN component (~ 200–300 ms post stimulus). Replicating 
previous results (e.g. Schupp et al., 2007), emotional modulation of the EPN 
over the right hemisphere was observed in the faces attended task condition but 
not when attentional resources were directed towards non-face task-relevant 
stimuli. Homologous emotional expression effects persisted after stimulus 
presentation in the late LPP time window (~ 500-700ms post stimulus), with 
enhanced positivities for negative versus neutral facial expressions continuing 
throughout the recording interval (~ 700-1,000 ms post stimulus). Unlike the 
earlier EPN response, these later modulations were uninfluenced by the 
attentional demands of the task. However, the experiment failed to reveal any 
group differences in electrophysical correlates of emotional facial expression 
processing that would support the notion of a threat-related processing bias in 
anxiety. Instead, the data support a general processing bias for information of 
emotional significance, independent of anxiety level. Collectively, these data 
likely reflect distributed neural activation involved in a complex affective face 
processing network. 
Consistent with evolutionary theories of cognitive bias (e.g. seeBuss, 2001), our 
neural systems appear to be specialized for priority processing of emotional 
information. However, the neurophysiological and neuroimaging data is mixed as 
to whether automatic processing of emotional information is immune to 
attentional constraints, with a growing conviction that individual differences in 
trait anxiety modulate attentional dependency. By definition, automaticity 
assumes rapid, involuntary processing, but above this it also implies immunity 
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from attentional limitations. To address the issue of automaticity the current 
study was interested in investigating whether the detection and processing of 
affective faces can proceed when spatial attention is averted, particularly when 
anxiety levels are high. ERP responses to affective facial stimuli were compared 
across conditions where spatial attention was manipulated either towards or 
away from the affective stimulus. The experiment failed to reveal any emotion-
specific modulations of the ERP response throughout the 200 ms post-stimulus 
interval for either faces attended or unattended conditions, which would 
contradict the notion of a rapid, automatic processing of emotional information 
occurring prior to facial configuration and identification processes. 
Notably, the study found no evidence of a greater deployment of processing 
resources to emotional faces (fearful or happy) relative to neutral faces within 
the P1 time range in either high or low anxiety groups. Several challenging 
reports have, however, demonstrated that emotion-specific processes can 
impact ERP components as early as 120–160 ms (e.g. Eimer & Holmes, 2002) and 
an enhanced P1 for negative and positive faces relative to neutral has been 
observed (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Eger, Jedynak, Iwaki, & Skrandies, 2003).  
Anxiety-related effects have similarly been linked with early ERP responses to 
threatening face stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2005; Holmes et al., 2008). This is 
consistent with increased levels of trait anxiety potentiating attentional 
vigilance for threat-related material.  In accordance with the present study, 
other studies have also failed to reproduce this P1 effect (see  Eimer at al., 
2003; Schupp et al.,2004; Holmes et al., 2003), thus the reliability of the early 
emotional modulations reported in the literature is questionable and may be the 
product of differences in design rather than due to affective properties of the 
stimulus. For example, Holmes et al. (2008) presented participants with 
emotional faces interspersed with neutral faces, blocked according to emotional 
category. The fearful block would have undoubtedly built up an expectation of 
threat, which may have reinforced a state of hypervigilance, particularly in 
individuals with high levels of anxiety, possibly inflating P1 amplitudes.  
The onset of emotional expression effects in the current study was observed 
around 200-300 ms post stimulus as a pronounced ERP difference for the 
processing of fearful and happy faces relative to neutral faces. This differential 
ERP, known as the EPN, appeared as a negative-going waveform over the right 
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hemisphere occipito-temporal region and is generally considered the propagation 
of selective attention mechanisms originating in extrastriate visual areas. Right 
hemisphere lateralization for emotion specific effects converges with 
considerable evidence that the right hemisphere may be dominant for the 
perception of emotion, irrespective of valence (Davidson, 1992). EPN amplitudes 
for fearful and happy faces relative to neutral faces were enhanced when faces 
were attended, however, this effect was absent when attention was diverted 
away from the faces. This result is incompatible with a notion of automaticity, 
thus demonstrating that the EPN response to affective faces are subject to 
interference by competing processing demands. Previous studies have similarly 
found that significant emotional stimuli could only be processed when attention 
was either directed towards the stimulus and not otherwise occupied with an 
attentionally demanding competing task (e.g. Eimer et al., 2003), or when 
attentional load on a competing task was reduced (Okon-Singer, Tzelgov, & 
Henik, 2007). 
However, attentional gating of the ERP response to emotional faces is at odds 
with the results from neuroimaging studies (i.e. Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De 
Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). These 
studies report attention independent amygdala activation in response to threat-
related stimuli. While it is futile to suggest that scalp-recorded activations are 
echoes of an elusive amygdala response, they may very well represent a 
propagation of activation via a highly specialized and interconnected emotional 
circuit. Re-entrant pathways between the amygdala and visual cortical areas 
have been established in monkey brains (Amaral & Price, 1984; Amaral & Price, 
1992), which quite possibly control for limbic regulation of sensory cortical areas 
(Derryberry & Tucker, 1991). For instance, Sabatinelli et al. (2005) reported 
parallel BOLD (Blood Oxygen Level Dependent) activation in the amygdala and 
inferotemporal cortex for fear-relevant stimuli. While recent data emphasize 
obligatory activation of the amygdala for the enhanced perception of emotional 
stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001), the present findings suggest that attentional 
gating processes play a crucial role during the perceptual stage of information 
processing associated with cortical stages of processing, which are likely to be 
the neural source of the EPN. Other ERP studies have also reported attentional-
gating of emotional processing (i.e. Eimer, Holmes, & McGlone, 2003; Holmes, 
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Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003), in line with the hypothesis that top-down processes 
affect emotional processing beyond the amygdala (Pessoa et al., 2002). 
However, unlike the early EPN, later stages of stimulus processing were not 
subject to attentional-gating. Irrespective of whether the participants 
performed the faces task or the non-affective attention-consuming Landolt 
squares task, the findings reflect enlarged LPP amplitudes to emotional 
compared to neutral faces with a centro-parietal topography over the late LPP 
500-700 ms time window, and enhancement of the slow wave amplitude to 
fearful compared to neutral faces from 700 – 1,000 ms. The neural changes 
indexed by the LPP were proposed to demonstrate modulations of the waveform 
as a function of the intrinsic emotional properties of the affective stimulus, 
driving attention towards these motivationally salient stimuli (Cuthbert et al., 
1995; Schupp et al., 2000b; Schupp, Ohman et al., 2004). This finding is at odds 
with the hypothesis that this component reflects motivational engagement that 
necessitates attentional resources (Lang et al., 1998). However, none of these 
studies examined the impact of spatial attention on the LPP component. 
Therefore, the present study extends on previous studies of the LPP response by 
demonstrating that selective emotional processing as revealed by augmented 
LPP amplitudes reflects a default selective mechanism, insensitive to concurrent 
task demands.  
Considering the reputed role of the amygdala in regulating cortical stimulus 
processing under incidences of inattention (see Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 
2004), one might speculate that direct projections from this emotion-sensitive 
structure to visual cortical areas subserve the LPP response to unattended 
affective faces. The EPN component, in contrast, may reflect top-down 
influences operating via re-entrant projections to the amygdala during emotional 
perception originating from attention-related cortical networks (Pessoa et al., 
2002). If similar pathways were implicated in the EPN and LPP response to 
emotional stimuli one would expect similar modulations by attention, however 
this was not the case. Therefore, the EPN and LPP data suggest the distributed 
activation of affective processing. In support, differing neural pathways are 
highly likely given the contrasting topography for these two components and 
their staggered latency in response. In summary, the findings suggest that the 
automatic selectivity of affective faces involves neural structures that are at 
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least partially separate from those involved in the regulation of explicit 
attention. 
2.4.1 Anxiety–Related Effects 
If we consider the accumulating evidence that highly anxious individuals 
selectively attend to threatening information (e.g. Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), one would expect there to be a 
neural basis which modulates such behaviour. However, it was found that the 
automatic encoding of emotionally significant events as evidenced in the evoked 
LPP response was evident for both high and low anxiety groups on the faces-
unattended trials. From this result one can infer a preattentive processing bias 
subserves the attentional selective mechanism, but it would not appear that this 
processing bias is specifically characteristic of heightened anxiety. Thus, this 
finding is at odds with studies implicating a preattentional bias to threat unique 
to highly anxious individuals (e.g. Mathews & Macleod, 1985; Mattia, Heimberg, 
& Hope, 1993).  
Group differences in this later window were, however, observed in the PLS 
analysis; revealing a comparatively larger attention effect for the HTA group. 
Larger positivites in the faces attended condition relative to the unattended 
condition occurred for both groups in the time frame of the P300 component (~ 
400 – 700 ms), although this effect was significantly greater for highly anxious 
participants. Comparable morphological characteristics of the observed LPP and 
P300 components would seem to suggest that they are reflective of similar 
cognitive processes (Donchin & Coles, 1988). However, their topography and the 
experimental findings would suggest otherwise; the affective modulation of the 
LPP was observed at central midline sites, whereas the attention effect 
highlighted in the PLS analysis was pronounced at more occipital parietal 
locations. In line with previous studies of the classical P300, amplitudes were 
larger for attended than unattended stimuli. Going beyond previous studies, 
increases in P300 amplitude were associated with heightened anxiety, a 
variation which is generally accepted to relate to increases in the intensity, or 
level of arousal tied to a specific task (Hansenne, 2000). Thus, these data 
indicate that arousal-elicited attention was the driving force behind the group 
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differences in the attentional bias. However, arousal was not modulated by the 
emotional valence of the stimulus, which again is evidence against an 
attentional bias to threat in anxiety.   
A hypervigilant state incurring a threat-related bias may be more pronounced in 
individuals with clinical levels of anxiety, therefore a student sample may not be 
sufficient to produce visible anxiety-related effects on the ERP response to 
emotional faces. However, anxiety-related effects have previously been 
reported with sub-clinical samples (e.g. Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004). The 
inconsistency in group selection criteria across studies makes cross-comparison 
difficult and undoubtedly contributes to lack of replication of group effects, 
which may explain the failure to find any affective ERP modulations by anxiety 
in the current study. Future research might also consider supplementing self-
reported anxiety measures with online monitoring of the galvanic skin response 
(GSR) as a measure of the relationship between sympathetic activity and 
emotional arousal during the experiment. 
A further possible limitation is that the stimuli used in the present study may not 
have been arousing enough to induce group-specific effects on the ERP response 
to affective faces. Notably, happy and fearful faces produced similar effects on 
the ERP response, which may indicate that sensitivity thresholds were 
comparable. Indeed, the LPP response is presumably related to the intensity of 
the emotional stimulation and is generally more pronounced for images of high 
arousal (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Schupp 2000; 2003b). Angry expressions, in 
comparison to fearful faces, signify a direct source of threat for the observer 
and as such may attract attention more readily. Schupp et al. (2004), for 
instance, reported that angry faces enhanced EPN and LPP amplitudes in 
comparison to happy and neural faces. Sensitivity of response to direct threat 
may increase with increasing levels of anxiety and valence-specific effects may 
only become apparent once emotional arousal surpasses some threshold value 
unique to the individual.  
2.4.2 Attention Effects on the P1 component 
Effects of attention were reflected in modulations of P1 amplitudes. Spatial 
attention oriented towards the vertically-cued square stimuli relative to the 
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horizontally-cued faces inflated P1 amplitude. This effect was not predicted and 
so one can only speculate about the meaning of this finding. Attentional 
modulation of P1 has been proposed to reflect competition between attended 
and ignored stimuli for processing resources (Zhang & Luck, 2008). Therefore, 
enhanced P1 amplitudes on faces unattended trials is consistent with the 
hypothesis that salient face stimuli involuntarily draw attentional resources, 
since under these circumstance they must undergo effortful suppression, thus 
inflating P1 amplitude. Indeed it has been shown that the affective information 
contained in facial expression is perceived involuntarily (Eastwood & Smilek, 
2005), and is able to constrict the focus of attention. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that facial stimulus processing occurred preattentively, which 
created a competition between task-oriented attentional allocation and salient 
bottom-up influences. Nevertheless, the emotional expression of the face did 
not interact with the attentional effect on P1 amplitude. This is perhaps 
surprising given the numerous studies reporting a processing bias for threat-
related information. Based on this observation it seems less likely that the effect 
of attention on P1 amplitude was driven by stimulus saliency. An alternative 
explanation is that the enhancement of P1 amplitudes on the faces unattended 
task arises due to the increased attentional demands of the Landolt squares 
task.  Corroborating evidence comes from participants’ self-reports of increased 
difficulty on the squares task, which was confirmed by statistical analysis. 
Clearly when task difficulty is high ‘top-down’ influences on attentional resource 
allocation might constitute an important neural mechanism allowing the visual 
system to prioritize the processing of task-relevant stimuli overriding ‘bottom 
up’ influences. A third possible explanation takes into account that vertically 
presented faces elicited larger P1 amplitudes over the right hemisphere when 
attended. Thus, relevant stimuli along the vertical axis may elicit larger P1 
amplitudes in comparison to horizontally cued stimuli. This suggests that the 
observed P1 amplitude modulations by attention reflects the distribution of 
attention in visual space, consistent with selective mechanisms that prioritise 
vertically versus horizontally located stimuli.    
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2.4.3 Face Processing and the N170 
In accordance with the Bruce and Young (1986) model, the present study found 
no reliable modulation of the P1 component or temporally successive N170 
amplitude to emotional expression. Thus, the data confer that the intrinsic 
relevance of affective stimuli affects processes only once initial face 
configuration and identification is complete. 
The influence of emotional expression on the N170 response to faces has been 
the subject of several investigations. The renowned Bruce and Young face 
recognition model (Bruce & Young, 1986) differentiates between facial identity 
and facial expression processes.  This model is supported by event-related 
potential studies linking the structural analysis of faces to the N170 component, 
while later ERP components (i.e. EPN and LPP) are thought to reflect successive 
affective processing stages. The current study’s failure to find emotional 
modulations of the N170, while the preceding EPN and LPP components were 
affected, is fitting with the model. Further support for this finding comes from 
that of Holmes et al. (2003) who, using a similar paradigm as the present study, 
also reported null effects of emotion during the N170 window. This result 
demonstrates that the operation of face identification occurred independently 
of affective encoding.   
Regarding sensory features of the stimulus, the current study employed well-
controlled face stimuli in contrast to other studies that have reported emotion 
effects of the N170. Apparent modulations of the N170 by emotion might 
therefore stem from low-level variations between stimuli rather than their 
intrinsic affective properties, which would explain the discrepancy between such 
studies and the current investigation. In line with previous ERP (Eimer & Holmes, 
2002) and depth electrode studies (McCarthy et al., 1999) the present findings 
imply that the N170 reflects only basic structural encoding of facial information 
and is insensitive to affective properties of faces. 
While the N170 response on the horizontally presented face condition was 
uninfluenced by attentional focus, a rather surprising finding for the vertically 
presented face condition was that the N170 component was enhanced when 
faces were unattended. From visual inspection of the ERP waveforms we can 
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conclude that this effect was not due to attentional modulations of the P1 
carrying over to the N170 component. The common conception is that the N170 
is a face-specific response reflecting the rapid structural encoding of faces 
(Eimer, 2000). Holmes et al. (2003), for example, showed that N170 amplitudes 
were enhanced when faces were attended, however this effect was absent when 
spatial attention was directed away from the face stimuli. The authors conclude 
that the N170 response to faces is modulated by spatial attention. However, 
enhanced N170 amplitude in the faces unattended versus attended condition is 
at odds with this conclusion. Given the assumption that modulation of the N170 
reflects the detection and global processing of facial images, the current 
findings imply face processing under conditions of inattention (see Carmel & 
Bentin, 2002; Cauquil, Edmonds, & Taylor, 2000). In fitting with an automaticity 
account, one might expect unattended versus attended faces to enhance N170 
amplitudes since facial configuration is hampered by comparison, thus producing 
effects akin to the face inversion effect (see Rossion et al., 2000). However, it is 
questionable whether the observed N170 modulation is meaningful, especially 
since there was a null effect of attention for the horizontal face condition. 
2.4.4 Conclusions 
Overall, the results suggest that the attentive processing of emotional faces 
consists of an initial rapid registration of facial expression (reflected by an 
enhanced posterior negativity), which is followed by sustained obligatory 
analysis of the emotional significance of faces (reflected by later centro-parietal 
emotional expression effects). Attention-dependent and -independent biases for 
emotional faces appeared to develop over a different time frame, suggesting 
different underlying mechanisms may be responsible. This study aimed to 
investigate these biases in anxiety, however the results argue against hypotheses 
that facilitated affective processing is modulated by anxiety. Moreover, the data 
support the emotionality hypothesis since neural selectivity was evident for 
happy as well as threat faces. Future imaging studies are necessary to determine 
communications between limbic and cortical regions as a function of explicit 
attention demands, which may provide the neural substrate for the observed 
effects. 
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Chapter 3  Investigating the effect of valence on the 
disengage component of attention in 
anxious individuals 
3.1 Introduction 
Attentional capture of threat is generally considered to be a survival adaptation 
to enable interruption of goal-oriented behaviour, allowing a fast response to 
imminent threat (Öhman, 1996). The preferential detection of threat is 
therefore advantageous for all organisms and a purported marker of our 
evolutionary past (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
However, several cognitive models of anxiety propose that individual variations 
in threat-detection mechanisms may underlie vulnerability to develop or 
maintain anxious states (e.g., Eysenck, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
Studies of attentional allocation in affective processing implicate biases in 
processing threat-related information, particularly in high anxious individuals. 
Attentional capture of threat-related material is most notably reported in 
behavioural studies using classic attention selective tasks where competing 
threat and neutral stimuli are presented simultaneously. For example, Bradley 
et al. (1998), using a modified version of the dot-probe task, presented an 
emotional face (threatening or happy) alongside a neutral face of the same 
person.  After the offset of the face pair, a dot probe replaced one of the faces 
and participants were required to respond to the probe. Faster responses to 
threat-related than neutral stimuli on this task for high anxious in comparison to 
low anxious participants has been interpreted as reflecting an anxiety-related 
attentional orienting bias towards threat. Accumulating evidence concurs that 
there is a general tendency to orient towards a source of threat and that anxiety 
is indeed associated with a disproportionate attentional selection bias (e.g. 
Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Mogg, 
Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993). Therefore, probe detection task studies 
lend support for the hypothesis that anxiety-related disorders are characterised 
by increased vigilance for threat (e.g. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997). 
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Complicating the issue, however, are studies indicating that threat-related 
stimuli may affect attentional dwell time rather than automatically attracting 
attention (Pratto & John, 1991; White, 1996), consistent with the ‘delayed 
disengagement’ hypothesis.  A similar doubt was raised concerning the reliability 
of the dot-probe studies (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). It was argued 
that the pattern of RT data in the dot-probe tasks might reflect both attentional 
capture and attentional confinement by threat. Following this criticism, a 
second wave of studies employed a variation of the exogenous cueing paradigm 
(Posner, 1980) designed to be a more accurate measure of attentional bias. In 
contrast to the dot-probe paradigm, the exogenous cueing task presents only one 
stimulus at a time. Conceivable shifts of attention between emotional and 
neutral stimuli suggested to be a confounding factor in the dot-probe studies 
(see Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) are consequently eliminated. On a 
given trial, a single cue (typically an affective face stimulus; emotional or 
neutral) is presented to either the left or right of the monitor. Valid cue trials 
describe the situation where the probe replaces the location of the preceding 
cue. When the probe appears at the opposite location these are termed invalid 
cue trials. Using this task, Fox and colleagues (2001) reported relatively longer 
response times in the high state-anxious group for invalid threat as opposed to 
invalid neutral cued trials as evidence of delayed disengagement from threat in 
anxiety.  By comparison, anxiety-enhanced attentional orienting was not found; 
responses on valid cued trials were similar for threat and neutral conditions. 
Such anxiety-related bias exclusive to the disengage component of attention has 
been replicated in a number of studies (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Tipples & 
Sharma, 2000; Yiend & Mathews, 2001).      
Although evidence of delayed disengagement of threat-related stimuli has been 
reported in studies using the spatial cueing paradigm (e.g. Amir, Elias, Klumpp, 
& Przeworski, 2003; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 
2001), it has been argued that differences in RT between threat cue and neutral 
cue trials in these studies may be confounded by threat-related response slowing 
(Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). The so-called ‘freeze’ response is a 
well-documented survival mechanism in mammals. It is an automatic and 
involuntary response of the autonomic nervous system that occurs when faced 
with highly threatening environmental stimuli. Motor inhibition in the face of 
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threat was suggested by Fox et al. (2001) as a possible explanation for the 
delayed response times following threat versus neutral invalid cues. Mogg et al. 
(2008) readdressed this issue by adjusting for the RT slowing effect of emotional 
cues (using data provided from a central cueing task1) and found that the 
corrected RT data analysis provided evidence of an anxiety-related bias in the 
shifting component but not the disengage component of attention. Notably, the 
uncorrected data analysis reflected the earlier findings from the spatial cueing 
studies of an attentional bias located to the disengage component of attention 
(e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). 
The aforementioned limitations of the dot-probe and spatial cueing studies make 
it difficult to interpret the locus of the attentional bias in anxiety as it is beyond 
the experimental methodology to differentiate between threat-related 
attentional cueing and response slowing effects (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & 
Bradley, 2008). Therefore, as suggested by Mogg and colleagues (2008), the 
present study investigated threat-related biases solely in the disengage 
component. To provide a more detailed account of the attentional bias to 
threat, a covert measure of attentive processing was accomplished by recording 
EEG activity as participants performed a variation of the spatial cueing task.  
The successful application of the ERP technique in the investigation of the early 
neuronal response to threat has revealed the N2pc component to be a useful 
index of selective attention (i.e., Eimer & Kiss, 2007; Fox, Derakshan, & Shoker, 
2008; Holmes, Bradley, Kragh Nielsen, & Mogg, 2009). The N2pc component is 
typically elicited between 200 and 350 ms after stimulus onset, at posterior 
electrode sites contralateral to the side of a visual target. The temporal 
dynamics of the allocation of visual attention is represented by the emergence 
of the N2pc component. Recently, Eimer and Kiss (2007) demonstrated that task-
irrelevant fearful faces elicited an early N2pc response (170 – 220 ms), 
suggesting that threat-related stimuli can rapidly bias attentional selection 
                                         
 
1
  An RT difference score was calculated for each participant by subtracting the mean RT on 
neutral cue trials from the mean RT on threat cue trials. The RT data from threat trials in the 
spatial cueing task were adjusted by subtracting this difference value from the corresponding 
mean RT in each cue condition for each participant. 
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processes in favour of salient stimuli. Furthermore Holmes et al. (2009), using 
the N2pc as an index of attentional selection, found evidence for attentional 
capture of both positive and threatening faces. However, attentional orienting 
occurred earlier for angry than happy faces. As the authors note, these 
electrophysiological findings confirm that attentional mechanisms indeed 
prioritize threat-related stimuli. 
Attentional biases in anxiety have also been investigated using the N2pc 
response to threat as a marker of the distribution of attention. Using a spatial-
cueing task, in which an emotional face (angry or happy) was presented 
alongside a neutral expression, Fox and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that 
angry faces elicited an enhanced N2pc relative to happy faces, but only for the 
high anxiety group. Their results are consistent with the cognitive models of 
anxiety that posit an enhanced early shift of attention towards the source of 
threat (e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). 
Given the usefulness of the N2pc component as a tool for investigating the 
mental chronometry of attentional deployment, investigation into the ‘delayed 
disengagement’ hypothesis was similarly derived in the present study by 
examining the N2pc modulation by affective material. In the current task, the 
affective stimulus was presented centrally, simultaneously flanked on either side 
by a letter/digit stimulus, each of a different colour. The target letter/digit was 
defined by its colour and participants were required to direct their visuospatial 
attention away from the central image towards the location of the target in 
order to make a discrimination judgement. If negative stimuli are able to 
prolong attentional processing even when they are task irrelevant, the N2pc 
onset should be delayed relative to the neutral condition. The observance of an 
N2pc was expected because it was assumed that the task would require the 
deployment of visual-spatial attention to the letter/digit targets on the side 
cued by colour. P300 latency has been held to index stimulus evaluation time 
(Donchin & Coles, 1988), therefore given that the topography and time course of 
the LPP are similar to that of the P300 it has been suggested that these 
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components reflect the same underlying processes2, hence LPP latency was 
assessed as an additional measure of the time course of the allocation of 
processing resources dedicated to the irrelevant emotional stimulus.  Evidence 
in favour of prolonged processing of threat in anxiety would, in combination with 
the reportage of a rapid orienting towards threat (Fox, Derakshan, & Shoker, 
2008), be consistent with Beck’s (1976) schema model and Bower’s (1981) 
network model, which propose that a general cognitive bias exists throughout 
the cognitive system for anxious individuals.   
A further ERP deflection, which often immediately follows the N2pc, is the 
sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) originating around 300 ms 
post-stimulus. Generally observed in explicit memory tasks and tasks that 
presumably rely upon the process of retaining visual information for immediate 
goals, the SPCN is thought to indicate neural activity specifically associated with 
the encoding and maintenance of visual information in short-term memory 
(STM). Jolicoeur et al. (2008) provided further evidence that the amplitude of 
the SPCN increased as memory load increased but in particular, they showed a 
clear dissociation between the functionality of the N2pc and SPCN. This is 
because the number of items to be retained greatly influenced the amplitude 
and latency of the SPCN, whereas the N2pc was unaffected by memory load. In 
the present study, it was of interest to examine the role of the N2pc and SPCN 
components in emotion-related information processing. If there exits a stimulus 
driven bias in the maintenance of a visual representation of threat in STM, then 
it would be predicted that task-irrelevant yet salient stimuli would enhance 
SPCN amplitude relative to neutral visual stimuli. 
Another aim of this study was to examine the lateralised readiness potential 
(LRP) on emotional and neutral trials in order to assess whether potential 
response slowing on threat-related trials is indeed due to prolonged attentional 
engagement or rather inhibition of motor response. In chronopsychophysiology, 
the properties of stimulus-locked lateralised readiness potential (S-LRP) and 
                                         
 
2
  N.B. The LPP is sometimes referred to as a P3b (e.g., Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & 
Junghofer, 2006). 
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response-locked lateralised readiness potential (LRP-R) latencies were applied to 
determine whether emotional processing influences processes before the onset 
of hand-specific lateralization (S-LRP), after it (LRP-R), or both. If there are 
anxiety-related differences in speed of stimulus analysis, this should become 
evident in the S-LRP, which represents the time required from the onset of 
visual presentation until initiation of central motor activation. It was 
hypothesised that manipulations of central distracter valence would influence 
the S-LRP interval, such that negative stimuli would result in a longer S-LRP 
interval compared to neutral stimuli; evidence in favour of prolonged attentional 
engagement. Comparing LRP-R recordings of high and low anxious individuals 
represents a feasible test for the validity that the latency of central response 
organization should be longer in high anxious than low anxious individuals 
following threat-related response-freezing. The experimental design also allows 
the opportunity to assess an alternative theory for the maintenance of anxiety; a 
vigilance-avoidance account (see, Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998) would predict 
decreased S-LRP latency for high anxious than low anxious individuals under 
threat. 
Other ERP components associated with affective and attentive processing were 
also evaluated to provide a more full account of affective processing. Rapid 
spatial orienting towards fearful faces has reportedly been reflected in 
enhanced P1 amplitudes (Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004), 
with similar modulatory reports for threat-related affective pictures (IAPS) (Li, 
Li, & Luo, 2005). Thus, it was of interest whether irrelevant threatening pictures 
would selectively increase perceptual processes, and if trait anxiety would 
further influence this early stage of visual processing. The proceeding N170 
component was also of interest since there has been some reportage in the 
literature of N170 amplitudes being modified by facial expressions of emotion, 
especially for fearful expressions (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Righart & de Gelder, 
2006; Williams, Palmer, Liddell, Song, & Gordon, 2006), while others have found 
no such effects (Eimer & Holmes, 2002; Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003).  
The apparent discord regarding affective modulation of the face-sensitive N170 
was further investigated.   
Numerous studies have examined ERP responses to affective facial stimuli (e.g. 
CAFE database, Dailey, Cottrell, & Reilly, 2001;  Ekman database, Ekman & 
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Friesen, 1976) and complex images from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) to study both emotion and 
emotion regulation (Foti & Hajcak, 2008; Hajcak, Moser, Nieuwenhuis, & Simons, 
2006; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Hajcak & Olvet, 2008a; Sabatinelli, Lang, 
Keil, & Bradley, 2007; Schupp et al., 2000a; Schupp, Cuthbert et al., 2004; 
Schupp, Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003a, 2004). Particularly relevant to the 
current study, both positive and negatively valenced stimuli are associated with 
increases in two particular ERP components: the early posterior negativity (EPN) 
and the late positive potential (LPP). Modulation of these ERP components are 
thought to reflect the facilitated processing of, and increased attention to, 
motivationally salient stimuli at perceptual (EPN) and post-perceptual (LPP) 
stages of processing. The results should provide an indication of the time course 
of attentional resource allocation towards task-irrelevant emotional stimuli. 
Based on previous work on the attentional bias to threat, it was predicted that 
the EPN would be enhanced for negative compared to neutral images. Emotion-
related LPP modulations might reflect the continued increase in attention 
towards emotionally salient stimuli. 
Emotional faces are the typical choice of stimulus given that they have a high 
biological significance. A popular alternative are IAPS pictures (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008); a standardized set of hundreds of colour photographs that are 
designed to evoke a range of emotional responses. Their content ranges from 
unpleasant (e.g., threat scenes, mutilation), to neutral (e.g., household objects) 
to pleasant (e.g., erotica, sports scenes) and they are strictly controlled for both 
valence and arousal ratings. In the present study two conditions were 
implemented; one with face stimuli and another with IAPS, all else held 
constant. Fearful, happy, and neutral faces were selected to examine whether 
threat-related faces were more engaging than positively valenced faces. Highly 
arousing negative and positive IAPS pictures were selected, along with neutral 
IAPS pictures, which consequently have a low arousal level. If biologically and 
socially significant stimuli were important for evoking the threat-related bias 
then it would be expected that the face stimuli would produce stronger 
emotional effects than the IAPS. Otherwise, face stimuli and IAPS would not be 
expected to differ concerning their ability to maintain attentional engagement.  
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3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Thirty University of Glasgow undergraduate students with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision participated in the experiment. The study was approved by the 
Glasgow University Research Ethics Committee and performed in appliance with 
their guidelines. Individuals with a history of inpatient psychiatric care, 
neurological disease, or head injury were excluded, as were individuals on 
medication for anxiety or depression. Participants were categorized into high 
and low anxiety groups based on sample norms of the trait version of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983; 50th percentile=35.5, low 
N=15, high N=15), see Table 3-1.  Fifteen participants (8 males and 7 females; 
mean age, 23 years) were grouped as high-anxious (48.4 average on the trait-
anxiety scale of the STAI and 12.7 on Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996).  Fifteen participants (8 males and 7 females; mean age, 
22 years) were grouped as low-anxious (30.3 average on the trait-anxiety scale 
of the STAI and 2.6 on the BDI). A t-test showed that the two groups were 
significantly different in trait-anxiety score (t(28) = 6.65, p < .05). 
Participants completed the state version of the STAI before the ERP session and 
both the state and trait subscales were completed immediately following the 
experiment. Participants’ state anxiety scores before the ERP session ranged 
from 20 to 56 (M = 31.8; SD=9.6) and immediately following the ERP session their 
scores ranged from 20 to 53 (M =29.8; SD=8.1). A paired t-test showed that state 
anxiety scores were not significantly different before and after the experimental 
session (t(29)=0.86, p >0.05), suggesting that state-anxiety score is a stable 
measure of anxiety across the testing period. Participant’s trait anxiety scores 
ranged from 22 to 72 (M =39.4; SD=11.7). These scores are similar to the 
published norms for college students (M(state) = 37.61, SD = 10.98; M(trait) = 
39.35, SD = 9.66) (Spielberger, 1983).   
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Table 3-1. Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for scores on the Trait and State 
versions (before and after the experiment) of the STAI and BDI. Statistics are provided for 
high and low anxiety groups and separately for males and females within each group. 
 
 
3.2.2 Stimuli 
The face stimuli were selected from the California Facial Expressions (CAFE) 
database (Dailey, Cottrell, & Reilly, 2001), comprising 5 male and 5 female 
greyscale faces with fearful, happy and neutral expressions (making a total of 30 
stimuli normalised for the location of eyes and the mouth).  All 30 stimuli used 
met the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1976) criteria.  
The face stimuli covered a visual angle of about 2.9×4.3 °. Pictures of 
emotionally neutral, positive, and negative (threat-related) scenes were 
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008).  A total of 30 colour pictures were selected, 10 allocated to 
each emotional category3. The IAPS were selected to exclude pictures with 
front-view faces to avoid a possible confound with emotional facial expression. 
IAPS with people present were carefully selected to include only side-view faces 
or pictures where fine details of the face were not easily discernable. Normative 
rating data on affective valence is available for each picture in the IAPS 
database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008).  On a 9-point scale ranging from 
unpleasant (1) to pleasant (9), mean valence for the neutral pictures was 5.08, 
2.60 for the negative pictures, and 7.39 for the positive pictures. A one-way 
ANOVA for the three categories yielded a significant effect, F(2, 27) = 129.23, p 
                                         
 
3
  According to their IAPS number, the neutral pictures were: 7550 (side view of man working at a 
computer), 2880 (black shadow Figure), 7090 (book), 7009 (cup), 7050 (hairdryer), 7233 (plate), 
7595 (cars), 7004 (spoon), 7496 (street scene), 7150 (umbrella); the negative pictures were: 
6550 (aimed knife), 1930 (shark), 1302 (aggressive dog), 6510 (knife attack), 3000 (mutilation), 
3071 (mutilation), 9405 (mutilation), 9433 (mutilation), 6821(armed attack on car); and the 
positive pictures were: 1440 (seal), 5831 (beach), 1610 (bunny), 1602 (butterfly), 8502 (money), 
5628 (mountain), 5450 (NASA), 7230 (roast dinner), 5621 (skydive), 8420 (water slide). 
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< .0001. Bonferroni-corrected multiple post-hoc comparisons showed differences 
in valence between all emotional categories (all ps < .0001). The IAPS pictures 
covered a visual angle of about 4.7×3.3°. 
The target/non-target stimuli consisted of uppercase letters F, G, P, and R and 
numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5, which could appear normally or as a mirror image in 
either green (RGB: 64, 128, 102) or blue (RGB: 75, 132, 171). The luminance was 
measured using a Minolta digital photometer and green and blue stimuli were 
matched on this measure (Green: 6.60 cd/m2; Blue: 7.58 cd/m2). The 
letter/number stimuli covered a visual angle of about 1.8×2.2°. All stimuli were 
presented upon a black background. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit sound-attenuated cabin, and a computer 
screen was placed at a viewing distance of 80 cm. The experiment consisted of 
two successive experimental sections; one for the face stimuli and the other for 
the IAPS pictures. The order of presentation was balanced across participants so 
that half completed the face experimental blocks followed by the IAPS blocks, 
and vice versa. Each section was comprised of a practice session, which 
familiarised the participant with the two alternate response-mappings, followed 
by 12 experimental blocks, each containing 48 trials. Each trial commenced with 
the presentation of a central fixation cross, which was quickly replaced by a 
central distracter image (either a face or IAPS picture) flanked to the left and 
right by a letter/number pair, simultaneously presented in front of a black 
background, see Figure 3-1. The eccentricity of these stimuli, measured as the 
distance between the centre of each letter/number stimulus and the centre of 
the distracter image, was 5.4º. Each trial began with a 500-ms presentation of 
the fixation cross followed immediately by the visual stimulus for 300 ms. The 
interval between the response and the beginning of the next trial was 800 ms.  
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Figure 3-1. Example stimulus for the faces condition.  
 
Participants were instructed to focus their eye gaze initially on the location of 
the fixation cross and to shift their attentional focus to the target following 
stimulus presentation. The target was defined by colour (green or blue) and 
varied across participants; half responding to green targets and the other half 
responding to blue targets. The participants’ task was to decide whether the 
target stimulus was displayed in normal orientation or as a mirror image by 
making a left or right hand key press response. The S-R assignment alternated 
from block to block, and this order was balanced across participants. The 
emotional valence of the central distracter image varied randomly across trials. 
One third of the face distracters were happy, fearful, and neutral, respectively. 
Similarly, for the IAPS, one third of the images presented were positive, 
negative, and neutral, respectively. The factorial design of the experiment 
ensured that in half of the trials target stimuli appeared in the right visual field 
(RVF) and the other half in the left visual field (LVF). For each of the target 
locations, half the stimuli required a right-hand response for normally presented 
letter/number stimuli and half a left-hand response for normally presented 
letter/number stimuli. Within each block of trials, the valence of the distracter 
images varied randomly and with equal probability so that a 3 (valence) × 2 
(target location) × 2 (response) factorial design ensued.  
3.2.4 Electrophysiological Recording 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was continuously recorded from 70 
Ag/AgCl electrodes over midline electrodes Fpz, AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, 
Oz, and Iz, over the left hemisphere from electrodes IO1, Fp1, AF3, AF7, F1, F3, 
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F5, F7, F9, FC1, FC3, FC5, FT7, C1, C3, C5, M1, T7, CP1, CP3, CP5, TP7, P1, P3, 
P5, P7, P9, PO3, PO7, O1, and from the homologue electrodes over the right 
hemisphere using a BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system. Two nonstandard 
electrodes (PO9 and P10) were positioned at 33 % and 66 % of the M1-Iz distance 
(M2-Iz for the right hemisphere). EEG and EOG recordings were sampled at 256 
Hz. Vertical electroocular (vEOG) and horizontal EOG (hEOG) waveforms were 
calculated offline as follows: vEOG(t) = Fp1(t) - IO1(t) and hEOG(t) = F9(t) -
F10(t). Trials containing blinks were corrected using the adaptive artifact 
correction method of Brain Electromagnetic Source Analysis (BESA) software 
(Ille, Berg, & Scherg, 2002) and EEG activity was re-referenced off-line to an 
average reference. EEG and EOG activity was filtered (band-pass 0.01-40 Hz, 6 
db/oct), averaged time-locked to stimulus onset (S-locked data) or to response 
onset (R-locked data). In addition, an automatic artifact detection software 
(BESA) was run and trials with non-ocular artifacts (e.g. drifts, channel 
blockings, EEG activity exceeding ± 75 µV) were discarded. The analysis epoch of 
a total duration of 1400 ms started 200 ms prior to the onset of the stimulus. 
3.2.5 Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed by means of Huynh-Feldt corrected repeated 
measures analyses of variance (ANOVA). Separate analyses were performed for 
the faces and IAPS conditions. The ANOVA for the reaction time data included 
group (HTA, LTA) as the between-subjects factor and the within-subjects 
factors: valence (positive, neutral, negative), target location (RVF, LVF) and 
orientation (normal, mirrored). To ensure a reasonable signal-to-noise ratio in 
the ERP analyses and since valence effects were of primary interest in the 
present study, the factor orientation was dropped from the ERP analyses4.  
The ERP waveforms were aligned to a 100-ms baseline prior to the onset of the 
stimulus. Mean amplitude of the ERP waveform was measured in average 
waveforms within time intervals during which specific ERP deflections were 
                                         
 
4
  An initial omnibus analysis was performed for the EEG data including the factor orientation.  No 
Valence x Orientation interaction effects were significant, which further justified its exclusion 
from the reported analysis. 
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found to be most pronounced upon visual inspection. Successive post-stimulus 
time windows defined the P1 from 85-125 ms; the N170 from 150-200 ms; the 
EPN from 200-300 ms; the early LPP from 300-400 ms; the late LPP from 400-700 
ms. For the P1 component mean voltages were computed across sites O1/O2 and 
Oz, where the P1 was maximally observed. Mean N170 amplitude was measured 
at lateral occipitoparietal sites P7/8 and PO7/8 and separate analyses were 
conducted for the electrode pairs. Early Posterior Negativity (EPN) mean voltage 
was computed across four posterior electrodes over right hemisphere (RH) sites 
(P6, P8, PO8, PO10’) and four homologous electrodes over left hemisphere (LH) 
sites (P5, P7, PO7, PO9’). In the analysis of the early LPP and late LPP, mean 
amplitude was measured across parietal midline sites CPz, Pz, and POz where 
activity was found to be maximal, see Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-10 for the 
topographic maps for the faces and IAPS conditions, respectively. In addition a 
computerized peak-picking program was used to measure P1 peak latency at O2, 
and LPP peak latency at Pz (i.e., the time point, from 400-900 ms, when the 
voltage at Pz was maximally). For the N170 and EPN analyses a group (HTA, LTA) 
x valence (positive, neutral, negative) x target location (RVF, LVF) x hemisphere 
(left, right) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. For the P1, early LPP, 
and late LPP, a similar ANOVA was performed, replacing the factor hemisphere 
with electrode.   
3.2.5.1 N2pc and SPCN 
A second set of analyses focused on ERPs triggered in response to lateralised 
targets elicited at lateral occipital electrodes PO7/PO8. The ipsilateral 
waveform (average of voltage at the left-sided electrode for a left visual field 
target and voltage at the right-sided electrode for a right visual field target) and 
the contralateral waveform (average of voltage at the right-sided electrode for a 
left visual field target and voltage at the left-sided electrode for a right visual 
field target) time-locked to the stimulus onset were computed. The N2pc and 
SPCN were quantified by subtracting the signal recorded from the ipsilateral 
electrodes (with respect to the visual field of the target stimuli) from that of the 
contralateral electrode. N2pc onset latency and mean amplitude of the N2pc 
and SPCN were measured and analysed by applying the Jackknife-based 
procedure, suggested by Miller, Patterson, and Ulrich (1998) and Ulrich and 
Miller (2001). This jackknife procedure estimates voltages from grand averages 
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computed for subsamples of participants by successively excluding one 
participant from the original sample. 
N2pc onset latency was measured as the time point at which the voltage value 
on the ascending flank of the difference waveforms exceeded 40% of the N2pc 
mean amplitude. For the N2pc onset analyses a group (HTA, LTA) x valence 
(positive, neutral, negative) repeated measures ANOVA was performed for both 
the faces and IAPS conditions. N2pc mean amplitudes were computed relative to 
a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline for the 225-275 ms post-stimulus time window 
(where the N2pc was maximal), separately for the faces and IAPS conditions and 
for high and low anxiety groups. Mean amplitudes were also computed for a 
second longer-latency time interval (425-475 ms post-stimulus) that was 
included to measure the SPCN. ERP mean amplitudes were analysed with 
repeated measures ANOVAs, for the factors anxiety group (HTA, LTA) as a 
between-subjects factor and valence (negative, neutral, positive) as a within-
subjects factor. 
3.2.5.2 LRP 
For each participant and each experimental condition, the ERP at recording sites 
ipsilateral to the response hand was subtracted from the ERP at homologous 
contralateral recording sites. For each homologous electrode site-pair (e.g., 
C3/C4) the resulting difference waveform was averaged across hands to 
eliminate any ERP activity unrelated to hand-specific motor activation (cf. 
Coles, 1989). LRP was calculated for electrode pair C3/4. These positions were 
chosen because of their correspondence to the hand areas of the pre-central 
motor cortex (cf. Coles, 1989). Difference waveforms were computed time point 
by time point between recordings at C3 and C4 as a function of the response 
hand appropriate in a given trial. In every trial, the recording from the 
ipsilateral hemisphere was subtracted from contralateral recordings. The single-
trial difference waveforms were then averaged separately for left – and right- 
hand trials. Finally, the LRP was computed as the mean of the average 
difference waves. Deviations towards negativity of the resultant LRP wave 
indicate the activation of the correct response hand at the level of the motor 
cortex. 
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S-LRP onsets were measured relative to a 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline to the 
point in time where LRP amplitude exceeded a predefined criterion of -0.5 µV in 
that specific condition (cf. Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998).  The LRP-R interval 
was determined using the same onset criteria as the S-LRP with waveforms 
aligned to a 200 ms baseline that started 600 ms before the response.  Onsets 
were measured within a 200 ms wide time-span that preceded response 
execution. LRP onsets were measured and analysed by applying the Jackknife-
based procedure suggested by Miller, Patterson, and Ulrich (1998) and Miller 
(2001), to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. For the LRP analyses a group (HTA, 
LTA) x valence (positive, neutral, negative) repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed.   
Since the standard error of the mean differences becomes strongly reduced by 
the Jackknife procedure, for the analyses of the N2pc, SPCN and LRP the F-
values were corrected as follows: FC = F/(n-1)
2, where FC denotes the corrected 
F-value and n the number of participants (cf. Ulrich & Miller, 2001). For all post-
hoc comparisons the level of significance was Bonferroni adjusted with the alpha 
level per measure set at p = .05.   
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Behavioural Results 
3.3.1.1 Faces 
3.3.1.1.1 Reaction Times 
The main effect of emotion was not significant (fearful: 738 ms; Neutral: 738 
ms; happy: 736 ms), F < 1. There were significant main effects of visual field, 
F(1,28) = 14.23, MSE = 6022.18, p < .001, and orientation, F(1,28) = 33.00, MSE= 
3994.86, p < .0001, indicating faster responses to normal as opposed to mirror 
targets (718 ms vs. 756 ms) and faster responses to targets presented in the LVF 
than the RVF (722 ms vs. 753 ms). However, the significant Visual Field × 
Orientation interaction, F(1, 28) = 4.94; MSE = 1189.32; p < .05, indicated a 
larger orientation effect for targets presented to the LVF than the RVF (LVF: 699 
vs. 745 ms; RVF: 738 vs. 768 ms), see Figure 3-2. There was a trend for the high 
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anxiety group to respond slower overall compared to the low anxiety group (766 
vs. 708 ms), F(1, 28) = 3.23; MSE=92817.91; p = 0.08. No other effects were 
significant (All Fs < 2.52). 
 
Figure 3-2. Reaction time to targets in the face condition according to their visual field 
location and stimulus type (normal or mirrored). 
 
3.3.1.1.2 Error Analysis 
A higher percentage of errors were made to targets presented in the RVF than 
the LVF (12.1 vs. 9.9 %), F(1,28) = 13.37, MSE = 31.94,  p < .05, and to targets in 
mirrored than normal orientation (12.5  vs. 9.6 %),  F(1,28) = 8.34, MSE = 90.02, 
p < .05. The main effect of emotion, F(2, 56) = 3.20; MSE= 16.90, p < .05,  was 
further modified by group, F(2,56) = 3.46, MSE = 16.90, p < .05. Simple main 
effects analysis revealed that emotional valence significantly modulated error 
rates in the high anxiety group, F(2,28) = 4.69, MSE = 23.85, p < .05, but not for 
the low anxiety group, F(2,28) = 0.07, MSE = 9.95, p > .05. Bonferroni corrected 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the high anxiety group made 
significantly more errors on fearful than happy trials (13.2 vs. 10.7 %), F(1,14) = 
8.05, MSE = 186.29, p < .025, however the difference in percentage error rate 
between fearful and neutral trials marginally failed to reveal a significant effect 
(13.2 vs. 11.0 %), F(1,14) = 6.07, MSE = 191.31, p = .027, see Figure 3-3. No 
other effects were significant (All Fs < 4.06). 
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Figure 3-3. Percentage error to targets in the face condition for fearful, neutral, and happy 
trials, shown separately for high and low anxiety groups. 
 
3.3.1.2 IAPS 
3.3.1.2.1 Reaction Times 
A main effect of emotion, F(2,56) = 3.51, MSE = 958.11,  p < .05,  was present. 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc contrasts revealed a strong trend for faster 
responses for IAPS pictures displaying positive rather than negative affect (733 
ms vs. 743 ms), F(1,28) = 5.14, MSE = 9383.95,  p = .03, however, responses 
were not significantly different for neutral relative to fearful pictures (735 ms 
vs. 743 ms), F(1,28) = 2.99, MSE = 10179.86,  p > .025, see Figure 3-4. Responses 
were faster when targets appeared in the LVF relative to the RVF (719 vs. 754 
ms), resulting in a main effect of visual field, F(1, 28) = 26.47, MSE = 4169.00, p 
< .05. Finally, a main effect of target orientation revealed faster responses for 
targets presented in normal than mirror orientation (714 vs. 759 ms), F(1, 28) = 
42.73, MSE = 4359.14, p < .05). No other effects were significant, all Fs < 3.29, 
p > .05. 
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Figure 3-4. Reaction times (top) and percentage error (bottom) to targets in the IAPS 
condition for negative, neutral, and positive pictures.  
 
3.3.1.2.2 Error Analysis 
The main effect of emotional valence was significant, F(2,56) = 7.47, MSE = 
34.46, P < .05. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc contrasts revealed significantly 
higher percentage error rate for the negative condition relative to both positive 
(13.6 vs. 10.8 %),  F(1,28) = 9.79, MSE = 375.28, p  < .01, and neutral (13.6  vs. 
11.4 %) conditions, F(1,28) = 9.87, MSE = 239.05, p  < .01, see Figure 3-4. 
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Participants made more errors when targets were presented in the RVF than the 
LVF (13.0 vs. 10.9 %), F (1, 28) = 10.02, MSE = 38.76, p < .05, and when target 
stimuli were presented in mirror as compared to normal orientation (13.5 vs. 
10.3 %), F(1, 28) = 20.52, MSE = 44.6, p < .05. No other effects were significant, 
all Fs < 1.58, p > .05. 
3.3.2 ERP Results  
3.3.2.1 Faces 
 
Figure 3-5. Spline-interpolated topographic maps for the faces condition. P1, N170, EPN, 
early LPP and late LPP time windows are represented, respectively. Isopotential line 
spacing is 0.75 µV. 
 
3.3.2.1.1 P1 Window (85 – 125 ms)  
As can be seen in Figure 3-6, there was a strong trend for mean P1 amplitude on 
face trials to be larger for the high anxiety group in comparison to the low 
anxiety group (4.2 vs. 1.6 µV), F (1, 28) = 3.84, MSE = 244.93, p = .06. The main 
effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 3.21, MSE = 0.69, p < .05.  Follow-
up contrasts revealed that P1 amplitude was reduced in the fearful relative to 
the happy condition (2.76 vs. 2.98 µV), F(1, 28) = 4.67, MSE = 10.75, p < .05, and 
that there was a trend for reduced P1 amplitudes in the fearful relative to the 
neutral conditions also (2.76 vs. 2.92 µV), F(1, 28) = 3.86, MSE = 6.66, p = .06, 
see Figure 3-7. A main effect of electrode revealed enhanced positivity over the 
right hemisphere, F(2, 56) = 3.92, MSE = 12.26, p < .05; enhanced P1 amplitudes 
were observed over O2 relative to Oz(3.48 vs. 2.54 µV), F(1, 28) = 8.36, MSE = 
114.01, p < .01, however, P1 amplitudes over O1 and Oz were not statistically 
different (2.64 vs. 2.54 µV), F(1, 28) = 3.09, MSE = 247.78, p > .05. No other 
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effects were significant in the analysis of mean P1 amplitude for face trials, all 
Fs < 1.93.   
3.3.2.1.2 P1 Latency 
For P1 latencies at O2, there was a significant effect of target location, with RVF 
targets having an earlier P1 peak than LVF targets, (117 vs. 118 ms), F(1,28) = 
6.05, p < .05. No other effects were significant, all Fs < 2.10. 
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Figure 3-6. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited at lateral posterior electrodes O1/2 and 
midline electrode Oz for high and low anxiety groups in the face condition, collapsed across 
emotion (fearful, neutral, happy), target location (LVF, RVF),  and orientation (normal or 
mirrored targets).  
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Figure 3-7. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited at lateral posterior electrodes O1/2 and 
midline electrode Oz for fearful, neutral and happy trials in the face condition, collapsed 
across emotion (fearful, neutral, happy), target location (LVF, RVF),  orientation (normal or 
mirrored targets), and anxiety group (HTA, LTA). 
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3.3.2.1.3 N170 Window (150 – 200 ms)  
The face-specific N170 component was not modulated by the emotional 
expression of the face stimuli.  No effects were significant at lateral posterior 
electrodes P7/8 (all Fs < 3.15, ps > .05) or PO7/8 (all Fs < 1.93, ps > .05). 
3.3.2.1.4 EPN Window (200 – 300 ms)  
The main effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 7.59, p < .01. Planned 
contrasts revealed significantly reduced positivity for fearful faces relative to 
neutral faces (0.63 vs. 0.90 µV), F(1, 28) = 13.616, p < .01. However there was 
no significant difference in amplitudes between happy and neutral face 
conditions (0.88 vs. 0.90 µV), F(1, 28) = 0.07, p > .05. Amplitudes were 
significantly reduced over the left relative to the right hemisphere (-0.25 vs. 
1.86 µV), F(1, 28) = 16.65, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant across this time window, all Fs < 3.07 and all ps > .05. 
3.3.2.1.5 Early LPP Window (300-400 ms)  
A main effect of electrode was observed, F(2, 56) = 17.03, p < .0001, indicating 
the typical posterior distribution of the P300 with larger positivity over Pz and 
POz than CPz (about 3.8 vs. 1.7 µV). The main effect of emotion marginally 
failed to reach significance, F(2, 56) = 3.15, p = .05. Planned contrasts revealed 
significantly reduced positivity for the fearful relative to the neutral trials (2.98 
vs. 3.27 µV), F(1, 28) = 5.25, p < .05. Amplitudes across this time range were not 
significantly different for either happy or neutral face trials, (3.10 vs. 3.27 µV), 
F(1, 28) = 2.62, p > .05. Enhanced amplitudes were observed for LVF versus RVF 
targets, F(1, 28) = 4.56, p < .05. There were no amplitude differences at sites Pz 
and POz (3.57 vs. 4.06 µV), F(1, 28) = 1.81, p > .05. No other effects were 
significant across this time window, all Fs < 3.17 and all ps > .05. 
3.3.2.1.6 Late LPP Window (400-700 ms)  
Enhanced positivity was observed for LVF than RVF targets (5.13 vs. 4.71 µV), 
F(1, 28) = 8.03, p < .01. There was a main effect of Electrode, F(2, 56) = 4.74, p 
< .05, again demonstrating a posterior distribution like for P300.  All other main 
effects and interactions failed to reach significance, all Fs < 2.91 and all ps > 
.05. 
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3.3.2.1.7 LPP Latency (400-900ms) 
No effects were significant, all Fs < 1.42 and all ps > .05. 
3.3.2.1.8 N2pc 
3.3.2.1.8.1 Onset Latency 
The N2pc effect appears to be similar across conditions and this was confirmed 
in the statistical analysis. None of the effects were significant, all Fs < 1. Mean 
latency was 189 ms, see Figure 3-8. 
3.3.2.1.8.2 Mean Amplitude 
None of the effects were significant, all Fs < 1. 
3.3.2.1.9 SPCN 
3.3.2.1.9.1 Mean Amplitude 
None of the effects were significant, all Fs < 1.04, see Figure 3-8. 
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Figure 3-8. Grand average contralateral minus ipsilateral difference waves time-locked to 
the onset of the stimulus at electrode site PO7/PO8 for the faces condition, separately for 
LTA (top) and HTA (bottom) groups.   
 
Figure 3-9. Stimulus-locked LRP (top) and response-locked LRP (bottom) for the faces 
condition.  The vertical line indicates the time point of response and horizontal lines 
indicate the LRP onset cut-off. 
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3.3.2.1.10 Stimulus-Locked LRP Onset 
None of the effects were significant, all Fs < 1. Mean onset at 432 ms, see Figure 
3-9. 
3.3.2.1.11 Response-Locked LRP Onset      
The main effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 3.85, p < .05, see Figure 
3-9. Planned comparisons revealed a strong trend of longer intervals for fear vs. 
neutral faces (234 vs. 197 ms), F(1, 29) = 3.60, p = .06. Fearful versus happy 
faces show significantly longer intervals (234 vs. 187 ms), F(1, 29) = 6.50, p < 
.05. Neutral versus happy face trials were not significantly different (197 vs. 187 
ms), F < 1. No other effects were significant, all Fs < 1.21.   
3.3.2.2 IAPS 
 
Figure 3-10. Spline-interpolated topographic maps for the IAPS condition. P1, N170, EPN, 
early LPP and late LPP time windows are represented, respectively. Isopotential line 
spacing is 0.75 µV. 
 
3.3.2.2.1 P1 Window (85 – 125 ms)  
There was a strong trend for the mean P1 amplitude to be larger for the high 
anxiety group in comparison to the low anxiety group (2.76 vs. -0.19 µV), F(1, 
28) = 3.25, p = .08, see Figure 3-12.  The main effect of emotion, F(2,56) = 
34.10, p < .0001, indicating reduced positivity for negative relative to neutral 
pictures (0.57 vs. 1.87 µV), F(1,28) = 42.0, p < .0001, and reduced positivity for 
fearful relative to positive pictures (0.57 vs. 1.39 µV), F(1,28) = 40.78, p < 
.0001, with positive pictures also showing reduced positivity relative to neutral 
pictures (1.39 vs. 1.87 µV), F(1,28) = 11.95, p < .01. The main effect of emotion 
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was modulated by group, F(2, 56) = 3.73, p < .05. Simple main effects analysis 
performed separately for each group revealed that the effect of emotion was 
significant for the high anxiety group, F(2, 28) = 16.45, p < .0001, and low 
anxiety group, F(2, 28) = 20.0, p < .0001.  For the high anxiety group, P1 
amplitudes were significantly reduced for negative pictures relative to both 
neutral (2.18 vs. 3.10 µV), F(1, 14) = 19.78, p < .001, and positive pictures (2.18 
vs. 2.99 µV), F(1, 14) = 27.24, p < .001, however P1 amplitude did not 
significantly differ for neutral and positive pictures (3.10 vs. 2.99 µV), F(1, 14) = 
0.45, p > .05, see Figure 3-13.  For the low anxiety group, P1 amplitudes were 
significantly reduced for negative pictures relative to both neutral (-1.03 vs. 
0.65 µV), F(1,14) = 23.88, p < .001, and positive pictures (-1.03 vs. -0.2 µV), 
F(1,14) = 16.38, p < .01, and positive pictures showed significantly reduced P1 
amplitudes in comparison to neutral pictures (-0.2  vs. 0.65 µV), F(1,14) = 14.05, 
p < .01, see Figure 3-13.  A main effect of electrode, F(2, 56) = 7.92, p < .01, 
was indicative of enhanced P1 amplitudes over the right hemisphere relative to 
the midline (2.01 vs. 0.27 µV), F(1, 28) = 18.89, p < .001, and similarly enhanced 
P1 amplitude over the left hemisphere relative to the midline (1.56 vs. 0.27 µV), 
F(1, 28) = 15.34, p < .001. P1 amplitude was not statistically different over left 
and right hemisphere sites (1.56 vs. 2.01 µV), F(1, 28) = 0.57, p > .05.  No other 
effects were significant in the analysis of mean P1 amplitude for the IAPS 
condition, all Fs < 2.58 and ps > .05.  
3.3.2.2.2 P1 Latency 
For P1 latencies at O2 in the IAPS condition, there was a main effect of emotion, 
F(2, 56) = 4.37, p < .05, see Figure 3-11. Planned contrasts revealed significantly 
earlier P1 peaks for negative IAPS pictures relative to neutral IAPS pictures (111 
vs. 114 ms), F(1,28) = 5.08, p < .05 , whereas positive and neutral IAPS pictures 
did not differ, (113 vs. 114 ms), F(1,28) = 0.80, p > .05. No other effects were 
significant, all Fs < 1.62.  
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Figure 3-11. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited at electrode O2 for negative, neutral, 
and positive IAPS pictures, collapsed across anxiety group (HTA, LTA), target location (LVF, 
RVF), and orientation (normal or mirrored targets). 
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Figure 3-12. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited at lateral posterior electrodes O1/2 and 
midline electrode Oz for high and low anxiety groups in the IAPS condition, collapsed 
across emotion (negative, neutral, positive), target location (LVF, RVF), and orientation 
(normal or mirrored targets).   
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Figure 3-13. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited at lateral posterior electrodes O1/2 and 
midline electrode Oz in response to negative, neutral and positive trials for the HTA group 
(left column) and the LTA group (right column) in the IAPS condition, collapsed across 
target location (LVF, RVF),  and orientation (normal or mirrored targets).   
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Figure 3-14. Grand-averaged ERP waveforms elicited at lateral posterior electrodes P7/P8 
and PO7/PO8 in response to negative, neutral and positive IAPS pictures, collapsed across 
target location (LVF, RVF),  and orientation (normal or mirrored targets) and anxiety group 
(HTA, LTA). 
 
3.3.2.2.3 N170 Window (150 – 200 ms)  
For the P7/P8 analysis, the main effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 
6.68, p < .01. Follow-up contrasts revealed smaller N1 amplitudes for negative 
than neutral pictures (-2.80 vs. -3.28 µV), F(1, 28) = 8.01, p < .01, and smaller 
amplitudes for positive than neutral pictures (-2.90 vs. -3.28 µV), F(1, 28) = 
16.56, p < .001, see Figure 3-14. N1 amplitudes were enhanced for LVF than RVF 
targets (-3.07 vs. -2.91 µV), F(1, 28) = 5.92, p < .05. However these effects were 
further qualified by a significant Emotion x Target Location interaction, F(2, 56) 
= 3.49, p < .05, and a significant Emotion x Target Location x Electrode 
interaction, F(2, 56) = 4.04, p < .05. Simple main effects analysis examined the 
effect of emotion at each hemisphere separately for LVF and RVF targets. 
Results showed that over the left hemisphere (P7), there was no effect of 
emotion for RVF targets, F(2, 56) = 2.27, p < .05, or for LVF targets, F(2, 56) = 
2.15, p < .05. Over the right hemisphere contralateral to the target location, N1 
amplitudes were significantly smaller for negative than neutral pictures (-2.72 
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vs. -2.99 µV), F(1, 28) = 14.59, p < .001, and for positive than neutral pictures (-
3.02 vs. -2.99 µV), F(1, 28) = 33.41, p < .0001.  Similarly, over the right 
hemisphere ipsilateral to the target location, N1 amplitudes were significantly 
smaller for negative than neutral pictures (-2.54 vs. -3.54 µV), F(1, 28) = 14.59, 
p < .001. However, LVF targets did not significantly modulate N1 amplitudes 
according to emotion (negative: -2.72 µV; neutral: -2.99 µV; positive: -3.02 µV), 
F(2, 56) = 0.70, p > .05. No other effects were significant at P7/P8, all Fs < 1.99, 
ps >.05. 
For the PO7/PO8 analysis, the main effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 
9.38, p < .01. Follow-up contrasts revealed that negative pictures reduced N1 
amplitudes relative to neutral (-1.87 vs. -2.54), F(1,28) = 10.79, p < .01, as did 
positive pictures reduce N1 amplitudes relative to neutral (-2.08 vs. -2.54), 
F(1,28) = 10.78, p < .01. There was a trend for enhanced N1 amplitudes over the 
left relative to the right hemisphere (-2.79 vs. -1.54), F(1, 28) = 3.44, p = .07, 
however the Electrode x Target Location interaction was significant, F(1, 28) = 
6.03, p < .05. Simple main effects analysis revealed that at PO7 N1 amplitude 
was enhanced for LVF than RVF targets (-3.24 vs. -2.94), F(1, 28) = 6.02, p < .05, 
while at PO8, the effect of target location was not significant (-2.91 vs. -2.88), 
F(1, 28) = 0.05, p > .05. No other effects were significant at PO7/PO8, all Fs < 
1.99, ps >.05. 
3.3.2.2.4 EPN Window (200 – 300 ms) 
A main effect of hemisphere revealed that amplitudes were more negative-going 
over the left than the right hemisphere (1.05 vs. 3.13 µV), F(1, 28) = 11.70, p < 
.01. No other main effects or interactions were significant across this time 
window, all Fs < 1.79 and all ps > .05. 
3.3.2.2.5 Early LPP Window (300-400 ms time window)  
A main effect of electrode was present, F(2, 56) = 20.21, p < .0001. Follow-up 
contrasts revealed enhanced positivity at POz relative to CPz (4.12 vs. 1.78 µV), 
F(1, 28) = 20.87, p < .0001, and at Pz relative to CPz (3.36 vs. 1.78 µV), F(1, 28) 
= 59.71, p < .0001. There were no amplitude differences at sites Pz and POz 
(3.36 vs. 4.12 µV), F(1, 28) = 2.93, p > .05. No other effects were significant 
across this time window, all Fs < 3.15 and all ps > .05. 
Chapter 3  130 
3.3.2.2.6 Late LPP Window (400-700 ms)  
Enhanced positivity was observed for LVF than RVF targets (4.89 vs. 4.60 µV), 
F(1, 28) = 5.64, p < .05. There also was a significant three-way interaction 
between Emotion x Target Location x Group, F(2, 56) = 3.33, p < .05. However 
simple, main effects analysis examining emotion effects for RVF and LVF targets 
separately for the two groups did not reveal any significant emotion effects, all 
Fs < 3.05 and all ps > .05.  No other effects reached significance, all Fs < 2.62 
and all ps > .05. 
3.3.2.2.7 LPP Latency (400-900ms) 
The main effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 4.06, p < .05. Planned 
contrasts revealed delayed LPP peaks for the negative IAPS pictures relative to 
the neutral pictures (558 vs. 524 ms), F(1,28) = 10.31, p < .01. LPP latency on 
positive and neutral pictures did not significantly differ (545 vs. 524 ms), F(1, 
28) = 2.65, p > .05, and negative and positive pictures did not significantly differ 
either (558 vs. 545 ms), F(1, 28) = 1.07, p > .05. No other effects were 
significant, all Fs < 1.70 and all ps > .05. 
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Figure 3-15. ERP waveforms at the Pz electrode in response to negative, neutral and 
positive IAPS pictures. 
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3.3.2.2.8 N2pc 
3.3.2.2.8.1 Onset Latency 
Mean N2pc onset latency was 198 ms.  None of the effects were significant, all 
Fs < 1, see Figure 3-16.  
3.3.2.2.8.2 Mean Amplitude 
There was a significant Emotion x Group interaction effect, F(2, 56) = 3.68, p < 
.05, however none of the simple main effects were significant, all Fs < 2.48 and 
all ps > .05.  On visual inspection of the N2pc waveform in Figure 3-16, the 
interaction pattern seems to indicate that for the LTA group, the N2pc was 
numerically larger for positive than negative IAPS pictures (-1.61 µV vs.  -0.86 
µV), and similarly was larger for positive than neutral IAPS pictures (-1.61 vs. -
1.05 µV). This pattern was reversed for the HTA group, with a larger N2pc for 
negative than positive IAPS pictures (-1.24 vs. -0.86 µV). The N2pc did not 
appear to be much larger for negative than neutral IAPS pictures for the HTA 
group, (-1.24 vs. -1.10 µV).  No other effects were significant, all Fs < 1. 
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Figure 3-16. Grand average contralateral minus ipsilateral difference waves time-locked to 
the onset of the stimulus at electrode site PO7/PO8 for the IAPS condition, separately for 
LTA (top) and HTA (bottom) groups.   
 
Figure 3-17. Stimulus-locked LRP (top) and response-locked LRP (bottom) for the IAPS 
condition. The vertical line indicates the time point of response and horizontal lines indicate 
the LRP onset cut-off. 
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3.3.2.2.9 SPCN 
3.3.2.2.9.1 Mean Amplitude 
The main effect of emotion was significant, F(2, 56) = 3.93, p < .05.  Planned 
contrasts revealed significantly larger SPCN for negative than neutral IAPS 
pictures (-1.93 vs. -1.36 µV), F(1, 28) = 7.26, p < .01, and there was a trend for 
larger SPCN amplitudes for positive than neutral IAPS pictures (-1.71 vs. -1.36 
µV), F(1, 28) = 3.66, p = .06, see Figure 3-16.  The SPCN for negative and 
positive IAPS pictures did not differ (-1.93 vs. -1.71 µV), F < 1.  No other effects 
were significant, all Fs < 1. 
3.3.2.2.10 Stimulus-Locked LRP Onset 
Mean onset was 424 ms. None of the effects were significant, all Fs < 1, see 
Figure 3-17.  
3.3.2.2.11 Response-Locked LRP Onset    
None of the effects were significant, all Fs < 1. Mean LRP-R interval was 199 ms. 
See Figure 3-17. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The focus of the present study concerns the issue of whether threat-related 
information sustains visual attention as postulated by the delayed 
disengagement hypothesis (Fox et al., 2001). Notably, no emotion-specific 
modulations of the N2pc latency were observed, thus failing to support the 
delayed disengagement hypothesis. However, since LPP latency has been held to 
index stimulus evaluation time (Donchin & Coles, 1988), delayed LPP latency for 
negative relative to neutral IAPS pictures implies that information with a 
negative emotional value can prolong analysis and evaluative processes. 
Moreover, the data suggest that the threat-related bias may not be restricted to 
an evaluative stage of processing but may also affect the late motor stage. The 
finding of a longer LRP-R interval for threatening faces compared to neutral and 
happy is consistent with the view that motor responses freeze in face of threat. 
Hence, the present findings advance beyond previous speculation about threat-
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related effects of response freezing (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) 
in providing electrophysiological evidence in support of this view. 
The present study investigated reaction times to make an orientation judgement 
of a letter stimulus presented to the left or right of a central image. The 
emotional valence of this central image was manipulated to assess whether the 
emotional significance of this irrelevant image would affect behavioural and 
electrophysiological responses. Overall, the mean reaction time for mirror 
judgments was significantly faster than for normal letter judgements. Impaired 
recognition of mirrored targets was also reflected in the error rates. These 
findings match those of other studies adopting normal and oriented capital 
letters as stimuli (Bryden, 1966; Harcum, 1966).  Normally oriented language 
symbols are encountered much more frequently and this familiarity is likely to 
be responsible for the observed speeding of responses. Replication of the 
orientation effect shows that the paradigm was successful; participants were 
diverting their attention away from the central affective image to the target 
stimulus as the task required.     
The P1 component is thought to represent the earliest stage of visual processing 
that is modulated by voluntary shifts of attention (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991), 
whereby directing attention to the location of a stimulus typically results in an 
amplitude enhancement of the P1 evoked by that stimulus. Given that highly 
anxious individuals enhanced P1 amplitudes relative to low anxious individuals 
would seem to suggest that individual variation in sensory processing 
mechanisms presumably modulates inputs from attended locations so that more 
information can be extracted from relevant portions of the visual field in high-
trait anxious individuals. This would equate with the notion of anxiety being 
associated with heightened attentional vigilance, but not specifically to 
threatening information.  
Affective images (faces and IAPS) were found to modulate P1 amplitudes, which 
implies that sensory processes were influenced by the emotional property of 
irrelevant stimuli. Thus, the present study provides additional evidence for the 
notion that there is very rapid attentional orienting towards emotional 
information, although not just for those individuals with heightened anxiety. 
Rest assured that the affective stimuli influenced early visual attention, the aim 
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was to assess the time course of attentional biases in the allocation of attention 
away from threatening, as compared with neutral and positive stimuli, towards 
the target stimulus. The observance of an N2pc in each condition is evidence 
that participants shifted attention to the target location as directed on each 
trial. In comparing the N2pc onset latencies across the conditions, affect was not 
found to modulate the onset of an N2pc in either the face or IAPS condition. 
These data alone could be taken as evidence that covert shifts of attention are 
not delayed when orienting away from threatening images. On this basis, the 
‘delayed disengagement’ hypothesis was not supported. 
Using the LRP in order to investigate the time course of cognitive bias within 
information processing, additional insights could be made into the influence of 
threat-related stimuli on pre-motoric versus motor stages of processing. The 
significant valence-related difference in LRP-R latencies in the face condition 
clearly indicates that the time required from the onset of central hand-specific 
activation to the completion of response was longer for fearful than either 
neutral or happy faces. A longer LRP-R interval for threatening stimuli is 
consistent with the view that motor responses freeze in face of threat. S-LRP 
and LRP-R intervals should be additive according to Sternberg’s additive factors 
logic (1969), therefore since RTs were not modulated by facial affect it was 
expected that pre-motoric stages of processing would consequently be shorter to 
explain the observed LRP-R effect. There was no significant effect of emotion on 
the S-LRP response. However, in face of the significant effect of emotion on the 
LRP-R interval and the RT findings, one might be tempted to argue that this null 
effect merely reflects a lack of statistical power that disguises a real effect. This 
suspicion receives some support from the fact that detecting the onset of the 
LRP can be difficult due to its low signal-to-noise ratio. A secondary point worth 
mentioning is that inspection of the standard deviations of mean onset latency 
of the S-LRP revealed markedly higher variance for neutral faces relative to 
fearful and happy faces, which might also contribute to the failure to reach 
significance. Nevertheless, S-LRP onset was numerically earlier for fearful 
relative to happy faces, consistent with the above interpretation of the LRP-R 
interval and RT effects.  
However, a longer LPP latency for negative compared to neutral IAPS suggests 
that there is relatively delayed processing of negative information. Commonly, 
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the LPP component is considered to reflect aspects of stimulus analysis, such as 
stimulus evaluation (e.g. Donchin & Coles, 1988; Doucet & Stelmack, 1999).  
Therefore, the finding that negative IAPS had a significantly longer LPP latency 
may suggest prolonged stimulus analysis processes compared to neutral IAPS. 
Hence, it is possible that the negativity bias may operate at the evaluative stage 
of processing. 
Overall, there was a tendency for the HTA group to respond slower than the LTA 
in the faces condition, but this effect was not modulated by emotion. However, 
overt presentations of motor slowing cannot distinguish slowness due to 
cognitive factors from slowness due to motor-related influences. Nevertheless, 
the failure to observe group differences in cognitive measures of information 
processing speed (i.e. N2pc or LPP latency) favours the notion that anxiety has 
an antagonistic effect on motor execution stages, although future study is 
necessary to provide a more assured conclusion. 
Although the N2pc component did not reveal any attentional bias in terms of 
mental chronometry, affective modulation of N2pc amplitude for the IAPS 
pictures could be attributed to an attentional bias related to depth-of 
processing. Indeed, brain-imaging studies reveal enhanced activation in visual-
processing regions for emotionally arousing than neutral pictures (e.g., Bradley 
et al., 2003). Thus, the results of the present study could imply that engaging 
with a motivationally significant stimulus may result in subsequent facilitation of 
selective attentional processing of a lateralized visual target. A functional 
comparison could be made between this N2pc amplification and of the occipital 
P1 to non-emotional targets replacing fearful face stimuli in a dot-probe task 
(Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004). Together these data suggest 
that engaging with an emotional stimulus can bias processing of subsequent 
unrelated stimuli. Moreover, the current data found that the high anxiety group 
demonstrated a larger N2pc for negative than positive IAPS pictures, possibly 
reflecting effortful suppression of irrelevant information. The low anxiety group, 
on the other hand, showed enhanced N2pc amplitudes for targets following 
positive versus negative or neutral IAPS pictures. The presence of anxiety-
related effects on enhancement of the N2pc amplitude to emotional pictures is 
suggestive of an attentional bias to self-relevant stimuli. This fits nicely with 
Beck’s schema model (1985), which posits that anxiety is characterised by a 
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processing bias favouring threat-related information. Furthermore, Williams et 
al (1997) suggest that this attentional bias for threat cues is a distinctive 
cognitive vulnerability factor in anxiety. This selective processing has been 
demonstrated in a wide range of emotional disorders; for example, people with 
generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989), panic disorder 
(Mcnally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Mcnally, 
Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990). Low anxious participants, on the other hand, 
may have adopted a positive visual attention bias as a means of emotion 
regulation (see, Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). 
Emotion-related effects were uninfluenced by trait-anxiety level for the 
following SPCN component. The amplitude of the SCPN was larger for negative 
than neutral IAPS trials for both high and low anxious individuals. Given that the 
SPCN is believed to reflect neural activity associated with retention in visual 
short-term memory (Jolicoeur, Sessa, Dell'Acqua, & Robitaille, 2006; 
McCollough, Machizawa, & Vogel, 2007; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), the 
increased amplitude of the SPCN for negative IAPS pictures most likely reflects 
an increased memory load for affective negative versus neutral information.  
Typically, the SPCN is observed in experiments explicitly investigating visual 
short term memory (e.g., Brisson & Jolicoeur, 2007; Eimer, 1996; Robitaille & 
Jolicoeur, 2006), and has been proposed to be an index of memory load. In the 
present study, however, the affective stimuli were task-irrelevant and therefore 
were not required to be memorised. Holmes et al. (2009) similarly found the 
SPCN to be enhanced for task-irrelevant angry and happy relative to neutral 
faces, however, since the nature of their task ensured attentional engagement 
towards the location of the emotional cues they interpreted their findings as 
indicating the maintenance of attention towards emotional faces. The presence 
of an N2pc in the present study is consistent with the proposal that attention 
was oriented towards the lateralised target stimulus, away from the location of 
the emotional pictures when the SPCN emerged. Therefore, is does not seem 
plausible that the immediately proceeding SPCN reflects an attention-related 
effect. Rather, the presence of an enhanced SPCN to threat-related pictures 
may reflect an obligatory mechanism for emotionally arousing stimuli to have 
priority access to working memory, with more information stored in working 
memory when presented with negative versus neutral affective material. Taken 
Chapter 3  138 
together, these different patterns of N2pc and SPCN modulations by affective 
picture are supportive of the view that these two components reflect 
independent cognitive functions (cf. Jolicoeur, Brisson, & Robitaille, 2008).   
3.4.1 The Influence of Emotion on Stimulus Processing 
3.4.1.1 N170 
The N170 is associated with the structural encoding of faces (Bentin, Allison, 
Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Eimer, 2000), a process proposed to operate in 
parallel with facial expression discrimination (Eimer & Holmes, 2002). In 
accordance with this, it was shown in the present study and earlier studies 
(Eimer & Holmes, 2002; Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003) that the N170 was 
insensitive to facial expressions. Further consensus is met in the observance of 
early (P1) and post-N170 (EPN) components being selectively modulated by 
expression while the N170 time window remained unaffected. 
Notably, emotion-related effects were observed for the IAPS condition in the 
N170 time window. N170 amplitudes were reduced for positive and negative 
relative to neutral IAPS pictures. This effect is unlikely to be driven by affective 
properties of facial stimuli since IAPS pictures were selected to exclude frontal 
face views or pictures where facial expressions were identifiable. Thus, it would 
seem that this ERP modulation by affective pictures is dissociable from the face-
specific N170. However, future research is necessary to investigate the possible 
implications of this finding. 
3.4.1.2 P1 
In emotion research the P1 component is generally of interest because of its 
relation to spatial attention and sensory processing (Batty & Taylor, 2003; 
Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). The finding that facial expressions affect P1 
amplitude is consistent with other reports (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Eger, Jedynak, 
Iwaki, & Skrandies, 2003), which suggests that emotional information may affect 
a stage of face detection prior to the structural encoding of the face, as 
reflected by the N170.   
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Emotional content of the IAPS pictures was also found to be discriminated from 
neutral content very early in the information processing stream (~ 100 ms at 
occipital locations). The finding that P1 latencies were faster to negative IAPS 
also adds to the accumulating evidence that the P1 is sensitive to emotional 
information. Moreover, these findings are interesting because they document 
that the P1 component is differentially sensitive to stimuli of negative valence, 
not only emotional versus neutral stimuli. This early and relatively automatic 
mechanism of selective attention indexed by P1 latency reflects the special 
status of threat-related stimuli, in the speed of allocation of attentional 
resources.  
One interesting finding, however, was that although negative IAPS evoked an 
attentional orienting response as seen in the P1 latency effect, P1 amplitudes 
were in fact reduced for negative than either positive or neutral IAPS pictures. 
Similarly, fearful faces reduced P1 amplitudes relative to happy faces. 
Modulation of P1 amplitude by affective valence has been attributed to feedback 
signals originating in the amygdala triggered by rapid perceptual detection of a 
motivationally significant stimulus (see, Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007).  
However, the typical finding is for an enhanced P1 component in response to 
negative, relative to neutral or positive, facial expressions (Holmes, Kragh 
Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Pourtois, Dan, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005), 
purportedly since motivationally significant stimuli have attentional priority. 
One can only speculate as to why a reversal was observed in the present study. 
Firstly, one difference between this and other studies was that the affective 
stimulus was task irrelevant. However, it could be argued that salient stimuli 
should nonetheless have attentional gain and consequently inflate P1 amplitude.  
Clearly, negative IAPS pictures demonstrated priority processing in their earlier 
evocation of the P1, which leaves room for the possibility that emotional 
modulation of P1 amplitudes in this instance reflects inhibition that is related to 
top-down control.  Suppression of task-irrelevant positive and neutral stimuli 
may have enhanced P1 amplitudes (cf. Freunberger et al., 2008), whereas 
negative information may have received less input from top-down control 
mechanisms, with bottom-up influences exerting greater influence. The RT data 
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support this view, in that negative stimuli induced more errors than either 
neutral or positive valence stimuli for both the faces5 and IAPS conditions. Also, 
the HTA group made more errors on fearful versus happy face trials. It may have 
been more difficult to perform the judgement task when negatively-valenced 
distractor stimuli were presented and attentional suppression may have been 
necessary to ensure attentional re-allocation towards the task-relevant stimulus.  
An alternative interpretation of the observed P1 modulations by emotion is that 
these effects are not driven by the emotional nature of the stimulus but rather 
they reflect variations in the low-level features of the stimuli, such as contrast 
and spatial frequency. Indeed, the stimuli were not controlled in this respect. 
The P1 component is renowned for its sensitivity to variations in stimulus 
parameters, as would be expected given that it arises from activity originating in 
the extrastriate visual cortex. Thus, it cannot be ruled-out that the observed 
effects are simply stimulus parameter effects. 
3.4.1.3 EPN and LPP 
The finding of an enhanced EPN to fearful compared with neutral facial 
expressions is consistent with previous ERP studies (e.g., Eimer, Holmes, & 
McGlone, 2003; Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, & Matsumura, 2001; Schupp, 
Ohman et al., 2004).  The results suggest that the attentional capture of threat-
related facial expression is an automatic response. However, unlike previous 
reports of enhanced EPN amplitudes to happy relative to neutral faces (e.g., 
Marinkovic & Halgren, 1998; Schacht & Sommer, 2009), the present study failed 
to observe such an effect.  The emotion-linked EPN was not present for the IAPS 
pictures. The reason for this finding is unclear given that previous studies have 
reported emotion-related EPN effects with positive and negative IAPS pictures 
(Herrmann et al., 2009); however, a vital difference between this and other 
studies was that the affective stimuli were in fact task-irrelevant. Nevertheless, 
the EPN response to threatening faces suggests that socially relevant stimuli 
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  Increased RT error rate for fearful versus happy faces was only observed in the HTA group.  
The LTA group, by comparison, did not show modulation of error rates by emotion. 
Chapter 3  141 
have an obligatory influence on perceptual stages of processing, that perhaps 
negative IAPS, although highly arousing, fail to engage.  
In the context of the present EPN results, the failure to find an emotion-related 
effect on LPP in the faces condition may suggest that after the relatively early 
and automatic detection of fearful faces indexed by the EPN, attention was not 
sustained towards fearful faces. This may not be surprising since the nature of 
the task required that attention be oriented towards the non-affective 
lateralised target.  
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Chapter 4  Emotional Attention Set-Shifting and 
Anxiety 
4.1 Introduction 
The executive system theoretically functions to manage the myriad of cognitive 
processes performed by the brain to help coordinate goal-directed behaviour 
(e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  Attentional control processes 
are thought to be regulated by this ‘supervisory system’ (Shallice, 1988), 
suppressing automatic responses and consequently enabling selection based on 
intentional aims.  However, it is well documented that negative affect is 
prioritized by the attentional system (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991) and can command both covert 
attention (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and overt 
attention (i.e., eye movements; Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 
2005). These studies suggest an important role for emotionally salient stimuli in 
executive control processes.   
Maladaptive executive control processes associated with affective stimuli have 
been implicated in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety-related disorders 
(see, Mathews & MacLeod, 2005, for a review). For example, the attentional 
biases for emotionally-relevant stimuli found in generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD) and social phobia could be characterised as failures of executive control. 
Even within sub-clinical populations, anxiety is associated with an increased 
influence of the stimulus-driven attentional system via automatic threat-
detection processes (e.g. Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005).  Evidence from studies 
employing visual search (Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and dot-probe tasks (Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijendoorn, 2007; Mogg, Bradley, 
Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Rohner, 2002) provide converging evidence of a 
hypervigilance to threat in sub-clinical anxiety.  
Adaptive action control requires a degree of flexibility in the ability to switch 
goals or detect task-irrelevant yet significant stimuli. However, a heightened 
sensitivity for irrelevant information would promote distractibility and stimulus-
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driven behaviour. According to the attentional control theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) it is this imbalance between top-down and 
bottom-up inputs that characterises cognitive performance in anxiety, incurring 
deficits in mental set-shifting and inhibition.  One self-proclaimed criticism 
however, is that the theory focuses on cognitive tasks using non-emotional 
stimuli (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), therefore it is accepted 
that further research is required to examine cognitive flexibility in the context 
of, say, negative affect.  Given that anxious individuals are believed to be 
selectively biased toward processing threatening information (e.g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), the theory would predict that stimulus-driven attentional 
mechanisms would be more susceptible to threat-related stimuli. Thus, 
enhanced bottom-up processing of threat-related stimuli in anxiety might incur a 
cognitive advantage when switching towards the aversive stimulus is the task 
goal. Consequently, it would also predict impairment of task performance when 
attention must be diverted away from the source of threat. Empirical support for 
these predictions comes from a recent study investigating the role of emotion in 
executive control processing. Paulitzki, Risko, Oakman, and Stolz (2008) had 
participants switch between emotionally aversive and neutral tasks.  A number 
digit superimposed upon an image of a spider served as the trial stimulus and 
participants had to switch between the spider-task (hairy vs. smooth) and the 
digit task (odd vs. even) as indicated by a pre-trial cue.  Regressing participants’ 
scores on the fear of spiders questionnaire (FSQ) with RT performance revealed 
FSQ score to be a significant predictor of RTs on switch trials. More fearful 
participants were faster to switch to and slower to switch away from the 
aversive spider task. Thus, individuals scoring high on the FSQ demonstrated 
accelerated engagement towards (reduced RT in switching to the spider task) 
and decelerated disengagement from (increased RT in switching from the spider 
task) the emotionally aversive stimulus. Most importantly, this study clearly 
demonstrates that the emotional relevance of a task can affect the attentional 
shifting process of the central executive. 
Alternative models of anxiety have made explicit the role of behavioural 
(Mowrer, 1960) and cognitive (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996) avoidance of anxiety-producing cues in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders.  For example, Beck and 
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colleagues (1985) suggest that following the initial shift of attentional resources 
towards threat, individuals high in anxiety effortfully try to reduce the impact of 
those events via a cognitive avoidance strategy. Similarly, the central 
assumption of Sibrava and Borkovec’s (2006) cognitive avoidance theory of 
anxiety is that worry functions as a cognitive avoidance response to danger.  
Although the theory stresses that worry involves primarily verbal-linguistic 
thought, rather than imagery, Johnson (2009) recently linked trait anxiety and a 
propensity to experience worrisome thoughts with a difficulty in switching from 
a neutral to an emotional mental representation in a task-switching paradigm.  
Johnson interpreted this result as supportive of cognitive avoidance theory since 
an attempt to avoid attention to emotional mental representations is predicted 
to hinder the ability to switch to the emotional set. 
The task-switching paradigm is a popular means for empirically investigating 
executive control processes since it requires the regulation of processes from 
current and previous tasks, and the ability to resist interference from previous 
tasks. Generally, it takes more time to switch between tasks than it does to 
repeat the same task, with the difference in RT being referred as a ‘switch 
cost’. Switch costs are thought to reflect the extra time required to reconfigure 
the cognitive system to perform a new task (Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995).  To help elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
emotional attention set-shifting in anxiety the present study examined switch 
costs as a measure of cognitive control.    
4.1.1 Experimental Aims 
There exists a myriad of studies investigating the pattern of attentional 
deployment in anxiety. However, the study of Johnson (2009) is, to my 
knowledge, the only study to date that has examined the relation between 
emotional attention set-shifting and trait anxiety.  The study is based on an 
adapted version of the explicit-cueing task-switching paradigm which measures 
controlled attention between emotional and neutral mental sets (Johnson (in 
press)).  Participants performed either an emotional judgement or a neutral 
judgement task on a compound stimulus that consisted of a face (happy, angry, 
or neutral) with a shape centred between the eyes (circle, square, or triangle). 
Chapter 4  145 
A patterned versus solid bar served as the task cue; when the face stimulus was 
relevant participants had to identify the emotional expression, and for the 
emotionally neutral task participants had to indentify the type of shape. 
Emotional attention set-shifting in this context was defined as assessing 
attentional control capacity for emotional representations (ACCE) (Johnson, 
2009).  Overall, switching from an emotional set to a neutral set took 
significantly longer than switching from a neutral set to a neutral set. More 
specifically, individuals higher in trait anxiety and worrisome thoughts6 were 
slower to switch from a neutral to an emotional mental set. Based on these 
findings Johnson asserts that the ACCE task captured individual differences in 
attentional control capacity for emotional material.  
However, the experiment was designed such that emotion repetition trials were 
more frequent than any other type of trial; therefore, as Johnson (2009) points 
out, the attentional control demand was increased for an emotional to neutral 
task switch and decreased for a neutral to emotional task switch. Thus, the 
observed task-switching asymmetry may reflect the attentional control demands 
imposed by the task design rather than emotional attention set-shifting ability 
per se. The present study aimed to address this issue, to investigate individual 
differences in emotion attention set-shifting ability while ensuring 
equiprobability of repetition and repeat trial types for both emotional and 
neutral tasks. 
The central aim, however, was to extend Johnson’s (2009) investigation to 
determine whether attentional control for specifically threat-related stimuli is 
modulated by trait anxiety. Goal-directed attention is necessary to reconfigure 
stimulus-response task sets on switch trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), a process 
purported to be limited by increasing levels of anxiety (e.g. Miyake et al., 2000; 
Santos & Eysenck, 2006). Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) 
suggests that competing resources for attention may contribute to this lack of 
executive control in anxiety. However, the stimulus-driven attentional system 
                                         
 
6
  Trait anxiety was measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). The 
Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Matthews et al., 1999) was used to assess the degree to 
which an individual experienced worrisome thoughts.   
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may in fact facilitate switch performance when presented with an emotionally 
salient target stimulus (i.e. a threatening face). As such, individuals higher in 
anxiety should exhibit a reduced neutral to threat switch cost. Therefore, trait-
anxiety scores should be negatively correlated (i.e. performance improves as 
anxiety increases) with the switch cost on the threat-related task. Similarly, a 
threat-related bias of the stimulus-driven attentional system may hinder switch 
performance when a threat to neutral switch is necessary. In this instance, it 
was predicted that an increased threat to neutral switch cost will be observed 
with increasing levels of anxiety. Thus, trait-anxiety sores should be positively 
correlated (i.e. performance declines as anxiety increases) with the switch cost 
on the emotionally neutral task. If, however, individual differences in emotion 
set-shifting ability are not valence specific, it would be expected that switch 
costs between positive and neutral mental sets would mirror that of the threat-
related effects. 
Cognitive avoidance theory (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006) makes competing 
predictions.  Namely, that increasing levels of anxiety should be associated with 
increased switch costs when switching from a neutral to an emotional task since 
the cognitive avoidance of threat would result in an attentional bias towards the 
formerly neutral task. It would follow that trait-anxiety scores should be 
positively correlated (i.e. performance declines as anxiety increases) with the 
switch cost on the emotional task. On the other hand, when switching from an 
emotional to a neutral task cognitive avoidance theory predicts that individuals 
higher in anxiety will show a reduced switch cost. Support of this theory would 
require that trait-anxiety scores are negatively correlated (i.e. performance 
improves as anxiety increases) with the switch cost on the neutral task.   
A secondary aim was to examine emotional attention set-shifting using a variety 
of emotional stimulus types to assess whether attentional control capacity for 
emotional representations (ACCE; Johnson, 2009) could be generalised across 
emotional stimulus types.  Thus, participants performed two task-switching 
sessions; one for affective face stimuli (fearful and happy) and another for 
positively and negatively valenced IAPS pictures. In both sessions, the neutral 
task was a word/non-word judgement task.   
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-two University of Glasgow undergraduate students with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision participated in the experiment. The sample 
comprised of 19 females and 13 males, between the ages of 19 to 37 years, who 
were right-handed. The study was approved by the Glasgow University Research 
Ethics Committee and performed in appliance with their guidelines. Individuals 
with a history of inpatient psychiatric care, neurological disease, or head injury 
were excluded, as were individuals on medication for anxiety or depression.   
Participants were measured on established scales relevant to emotion 
processing: state and trait anxiety, using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, 1983); and depression, using the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-
II: Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Participants completed the state version of the 
STAI before the experimental session and the trait subscale and BDI was 
completed immediately following the experiment. Participants’ state anxiety 
scores before the experiment ranged from 22 to 65 (M = 33.0, SD = 9.3). 
Participant’s trait anxiety scores ranged from to (M = 39.2, SD = 10.2). These 
scores are similar to the published norms for college students (M(state) = 37.61, 
SD = 10.98; M(trait) = 39.35, SD = 9.66) (Spielberger, 1983). Participants’ BDI 
scores ranged from 0 to 19 (M = 5.9, SD = 4.3). 
4.2.2 Stimuli  
The visual stimulus consisted of a word stimulus superimposed on an affective 
picture, see Figure 4-1. Face stimuli were gray-scale photographs from the 
Ekman and Friesen database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Eight identities (four 
male, four female) were used, each with a fearful and a happy expression. The 
face images subtended approximately 10º visual angle in height and 7º visual 
angle in width. 
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Figure 4-1. Example stimulus showing a fearful face/real word combination. 
 
Pictures of positive and negative (threat-related) valenced scenes were selected 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008). A total of 16 grey-scale pictures were selected, 8 allocated to 
each emotional category: negative and positive7. Normative rating data on 
affective valence are available for each picture in the IAPS database on a 9-point 
scale ranging from unpleasant (1) to pleasant (9) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008).  Positive IAPS were rated as significantly more positive than the negative 
IAPS (M = 1.90 vs. 7.30), t(14) = 36.16, p < .0001, although they did not differ in 
respect to arousal (M = 6.51 vs. 5.66), t(14) = 2.14, p > .05. The IAPS pictures 
subtended approximately 7º visual angle in height and 10º visual angle in width.  
Four word sets were used; two real-word sets and two pseudo-word sets (see 
Appendix A). The real word sets were compiled from the Affective Norms for 
English Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999) consisting of forty 
neutral words each. The following criteria for word selection were employed: 
arousal values for words were less than 5.45 and valence levels between 4.00 
                                         
 
7
  According to their IAPS number, the negative pictures were: 3000 (mutilation), 3071 
(mutilation), 6212 (sniper), 9050 (plane crash), 9405 (mutilation), 9410 (soldier), 9433 
(mutilation), 9921 (fire); and the positive pictures were: 1340 (women with parrots), 1811 
(laughing monkeys), 2655 (child on beach), 5831 (seagulls on beach), 8030 (skier), 8180 (cliff 
divers), 8490 (roller-coaster), 8502 (money). 
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and 6.00. The two real-word sets did not differ with respect to valence (5.17 vs. 
5.26), t(78) = 0.70, p > .05, or arousal (4.35 vs. 4.11), t(78) = 1.93, p > .05. 
Words selected had a maximum occurrence of 57 per million (according to the 
CELEX norms; Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1993).  In addition, two sets of 
forty pseudo-word stimuli were generated from the ARC Nonword Database 
(Rastle, Harrington, & Coltheart, 2002), which were orthographically legal 
pronounceable non-words (e.g. uttle) and ranged between 4 and 10 letters.  A 
one-way ANOVA revealed that the number of letters was similar across the four 
word sets, F < 1, with a grand mean of 6.6 letters. Word stimuli were presented 
in red font and lowercase letters (Times New Roman) subtending 1º visual angle 
in height and varied in width according to the length of the word. Approximately 
three characters subtended 2.5º of visual angle. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit sound-attenuated cabin, and a computer 
screen was placed at a viewing distance of 80 cm. The task was a cued task-
switching paradigm. The experiment consisted of two successive experimental 
sections; one for the face stimuli and the other for the IAPS pictures. The order 
of presentation was balanced across participants so that half completed the face 
section followed by the IAPS section, and vice versa. Each section started with a 
practice block of 10 trials, which familiarised the participant with the response-
mapping (different response-mappings were used on the face and IAPS sessions 
so as to eliminate practice effects), followed by 9 experimental blocks, each 
containing 65 trials. Therefore, each participant completed 18 experimental 
blocks in total; 9 face blocks and 9 IAPS blocks. 
Mix, a pseudorandomisation program (Van Casteren & Davis, 2006; www.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/personal/maarten.van-casteren/Mix.htm) was used to generate 
orders for stimulus presentation.  Within each block, trials were 
pseudorandomised to produce approximately equal repeat and switch trials for 
all possible word-picture stimulus combinations and to ensure that different 
stimuli were presented on successive trials. Different real-word and pseudo-word 
sets were used for faces and IAPS sessions to eliminate possible familiarity 
effects on response rates.  
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Each trial commenced with the presentation of a central fixation cross for 300 
ms, after which a brief tone (100 ms) cued the trial type (word or image task) 
followed by a blank screen for another 100 ms. Therefore, after a cue-stimulus 
interval of 200 ms, a central image appeared (either a face or IAPS picture) with 
a word stimulus presented centrally across the image and remained on the 
screen for a maximum of 2000 ms or until a response was made. Stimuli were 
presented in front of a black background. Feedback was provided on incorrect 
trials, misses, and anticipations. The inter-trial interval was 1000-ms. 
Participants were instructed to focus their attention initially on the location of 
the fixation cross and to shift their attentional focus to the target as indicated 
by the cue preceding stimulus presentation. The cue was a tone of either 1000 
or 2000 Hz. The mapping of the cue varied across participants; for half of the 
participants the high tone cued the emotional picture and the low tone the word 
stimulus and vice versa for the other half of the participants. Responses were 
made with either a left or right hand keypress whenever they deemed the target 
image as positive/negative or the word stimulus as a word/pseudo-word. The 
four possible response-mappings were balanced across participants and different 
mappings were used for the faces and IAPS blocks to eliminate practice effects. 
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
Data reduction for the RT analysis included the elimination of the first trial of 
each experimental block since it could not be determined which task 
participants were set to perform prior to beginning each block. Trials with RT < 
100 ms (anticipations) and RT > 2,000 ms (misses) were excluded from data 
analysis, as were incorrect response trials and trials where an error was made on 
the preceding trial since the incorrect task set was activated prior to performing 
the current task. Separate analyses were performed on the faces and IAPS data 
sets. Where the assumption of sphericity was not met, Huynh-Feldt corrected p-
values were examined.  
Primary analyses focused on the attention set-shifting of emotional mental sets 
in general. Firstly, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed on RT differences 
between EE, NN, NE, and EN trials. Individual differences in set-shifting ability 
were operationalised by means of switch costs, calculated as a difference score 
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between switch and repeat trials. Thus, a-priori contrasts were then performed 
to examine the significance of NE and EN switch costs via pairwise contrasts 
between NE and EE trials and EN and NN trials, respectively. A subsequent 
repeated measures ANOVA investigated whether the emotionality of the task 
influenced the task-switching process by comparing mean NE and EN switch 
costs. Switch costs were calculated as follows. The mean RT for the NN 
(neutral→neutral) repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for the EN 
(emotional→neutral) switch trials to obtain individual differences in EN switch 
cost. The mean RT for the EE (emotional→ emotional) repetition trials was 
subtracted from the mean RT for the NE (neutral → emotional) switch trials to 
obtain individual differences in NE switch cost.  
Secondary analyses were concerned with attention set-shifting of happy versus 
fearful emotional representations. To investigate the cost of switching from an 
emotional to a neutral mental set a repeated measures ANOVA on RT with the 
variable trial type (EN(fearful), NN(fearful), EN(happy), and NN(happy)) was 
performed. A-priori contrasts were then performed to examine the significance 
of FN (fearful → neutral) and HN (happy → neutral) switch costs via pairwise 
contrasts between EN(fearful) and NN(fearful) trials and EN(happy), and 
NN(happy) trials, respectively. A repeated measures ANOVA with the variable 
switch cost (FN, HN) was then performed to investigate whether the 
emotionality of the task influenced the task-switching process. Switch costs 
were calculated as follows. The mean RT for the NN (neutral→neutral) 
repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for the FN (fearful→neutral) 
switch trials to obtain individual differences in FN switch cost. The mean RT for 
the FF (fearful → fearful) repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for 
the NF (neutral → fearful) switch trials to obtain individual differences in NF 
switch cost. Only neutral word trials where fearful faces were presented 
simultaneously were included in this analysis to avoid possible confounding with 
changes of expressions. Analogous switch costs were calculated for the happy 
faces condition except that only neutral word trials where happy faces were 
presented simultaneously were included in this analysis. To investigate the cost 
of switching from a neutral to an emotional mental set, analogous analyses were 
performed on the NE(fearful), EE(fearful), NE(happy), and EE(happy) trials and 
the neutral → emotional switch costs (NF, NH). 
Chapter 4  152 
For the IAPS data, comparable switch costs were calculated and analyses 
performed. General emotional switch costs were also referred to as EN and NE, 
whereas the emotion specific switch costs were termed NegN, NNeg, PosN, and 
NPos to reflect the positive and negative valence of the IAPS pictures. 
To test whether trait anxiety moderates switch cost, four separate regression 
analyses were performed where each type of emotional switch cost (i.e. FN, NF, 
HN, NH switch costs) served as the predictor and trait-anxiety score served as 
the criterion variable. For the IAPS data analysis, separate regression analyses 
were also performed where each type of switch cost (i.e. NegN, NNeg, PosN and 
NPos switch costs) served as the predictor and trait-anxiety score served as the 
criterion variable.   
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Faces 
4.3.1.1 Emotional Attention Switch Costs 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on RT with the variable trial type (EE, NN, 
NE and EN) revealed a significant effect, F(3, 93) = 79.72, p < .0001. Planned 
contrasts revealed a significant NE switch cost (M = 173 ms; i.e., NE minus EE 
trials), F(1, 31) = 228.43, p < .0001, and a significant EN switch cost (M = 172 
ms; i.e., EN minus NN trials), F(1, 31) = 196.73, p < .0001. As Figure 4-2 shows, a 
speed-accuracy trade-off cannot explain these results as faster RTs were 
associated with lower error rates. This inverse relationship between RT and 
accuracy provides compelling evidence that task reconfiguration processes are 
more demanding of attentional control processes than repetition trials. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with the variable switch cost (NE, EN) revealed that 
there was no significant difference between switch costs when either switching 
from an emotional set to a neutral set or switching from a neutral set to an 
emotional set, F < 1.   
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Figure 4-2. Reaction time and accuracy for NN, EN, EE, and NE trials for the faces condition. 
 
4.3.1.1.1 Switching from an Emotional Set to a Neutral Set  
A repeated measures ANOVA on RT with variable trial type (EN(fearful), 
NN(fearful), EN(happy), and NN(happy)) revealed a significant main effect, F(3, 
93) = 98.10, p < .0001. Planned contrasts revealed a significant FN switch cost 
when switching from a fearful set to a neutral set (M = 206 ms; i.e., EN(fearful) 
minus NN(fearful) trials), F(1, 31) = 162.28, p < .0001, and a significant HN 
switch cost when switching from a happy set to a neutral set (M = 180 ms; i.e., 
EN(happy) minus NN(happy) trials), F(1, 31) = 114.46, p < .0001. As Figure 4-3 
shows, a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot explain these results as faster RTs 
were associated with lower error rates. A repeated measures ANOVA with the 
variable switch cost (FN, HN) revealed that there was no significant difference 
between FN and HN switch costs, F(1, 31) = 2.07, p > .05.   
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Figure 4-3. Reaction time and accuracy for NN(fearful), EN(fearful), NN(happy) and 
NE(happy) trials for the faces condition. 
 
4.3.1.1.2 Switching from a Neutral Set to an Emotional Set  
A repeated measures ANOVA on RT with variable trial type (NE(fearful), 
EE(fearful), NE(happy), and EE(happy)) revealed a significant main effect, F(3, 
93) = 60.23, p < .0001. Planned contrasts revealed a significant NF switch cost 
when switching from a neutral set to a fearful set (M = 146 ms; i.e., NE(fearful) 
minus EE(fearful) trials), F(1, 31) = 86.32 , p < .0001, and a significant NH switch 
cost when switching from a neutral set to a happy set (M = 206 ms; i.e., 
NE(happy) minus EE(happy) trials), F(1, 31) = 118.68, p < .0001. As Figure 4-4 
shows, a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot explain these results as faster RTs 
were associated with lower error rates.  A repeated measures ANOVA with the 
variable switch cost (NF, NH) revealed that the switch cost associated with 
switching from a neutral set to a fearful set was significantly smaller (M = 60) 
than the switch cost associated with switching from a neutral set to a happy set, 
F(1, 31) = 7.73, p < .01. This provides evidence that disengaging a neutral set 
and engaging a fearful emotional set was less demanding on attentional control 
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processes than when disengaging a neutral set and engaging a happy emotional 
set.   
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Figure 4-4. Reaction time and accuracy for EE(fearful), NE(fearful), EE(happy) and 
NE(happy)  trials for the faces condition. 
 
4.3.1.2 Individual Differences in Emotional Attention Set-Shifting Ability   
To test whether trait anxiety moderates emotional switch costs, four regressions 
were performed where each type of switch cost (i.e. FN, HN, NF, NH) served as 
the predictor and trait-anxiety score served as the criterion variable. Table 4-1 
summarises the results from these analyses. 
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Table 4-1. Four regressions for switch costs on the faces condition with trait anxiety as the 
criterion variable in each case. 
Regression Predictor 
Variable 
Criterion 
Variable 
b SE b t-value 
(d.f. = 30) 
p-value 
1 FN Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-0.499 1.630 0.31 0.762 
2 HN Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-0.337 1.701 0.20 0.844 
3 NF Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-3.476 1.457 2.39    0.024* 
4 NH Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
0.309 1.909 0.16  0.873 
  
 N.B. FN = fearful→neutral(fearful); HN = happy→neutral(happy); NF = neutral(fearful)→fearful; 
NH = neutral(happy)→happy. For each regression, n = 32. Significant predictors are indicated 
with an asterisk. 
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Figure 4-5. Regression analyses for the faces condition with FN (top left), NF (top right), HN 
(bottom left) and NH (bottom right) switch costs as predictor variables and trait anxiety as 
the criterion variable in each case. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Fearful Switch Costs 
As the results from Table 4-1 suggest, trait anxiety significantly moderated the 
NF switch cost so that those higher in trait anxiety had an increased ability to 
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switch from a neutral mental set to a fearful mental set (see Figure 4-5, 
regression line is plotted). However, the FN switch cost was not significantly 
moderated by trait anxiety. 
4.3.1.3 Happy Switch Costs 
Neither HN nor NH switch costs were moderated by trait anxiety (c.f. Table 2-1, 
Figure 4-5). This indicates that trait anxiety could not account for the cost of 
switching attention between happy and neutral mental sets. 
4.3.2 IAPS 
4.3.2.1 Emotional Attention Switch Costs 
Analogous tests were performed on the IAPS data set. A repeated measures 
ANOVA on RT with the variable trial type (EE, NN, NE and EN) revealed a 
significant effect, F(3, 93) = 60.46, p < .0001. Planned contrasts revealed a 
significant NE switch cost (M = 163 ms; i.e., NE minus EE trials), F(1, 31) = 
122.73,  p < .0001, and a significant EN switch cost  (M = 160 ms; i.e., EN minus 
NN trials), F(1, 31) = 89.57, p < .0001. As Figure 4-6 shows, a speed-accuracy 
trade-off cannot explain these results, faster RTs were associated with lower 
error rates. A repeated measures ANOVA with the variable switch cost (NE, EN) 
revealed that there was no significant difference between switch costs when 
either switching from an emotional set to a neutral set or switching from a 
neutral set to an emotional set, F < 1.   
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Figure 4-6. Reaction time and accuracy for NN, EN, EE and NE trials for the IAPS condition. 
 
4.3.2.1.1 Switching from an Emotional Set to a Neutral Set 
A repeated measures ANOVA on RT with variable trial type (EN(negative), 
NN(negative), EN(positive), and NN(positive)) revealed a significant main effect, 
F(3, 93) = 39.72, p<.0001. Planned contrasts revealed a significant NegN switch 
cost when switching from a negative trial to a neutral trial (M = 159 ms; i.e., 
EN(negative) minus NN(negative) trials), F(1, 31) = 36.49, p < .0001, and a 
significant PosN switch cost when switching from a positive trial to a neutral 
trial (M = 204 ms; i.e., EN(positive) minus NN(positive) trials), F(1, 31) = 60.26, p 
< .0001. As Figure 4-7 shows, a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot explain these 
results as faster RTs were associated with lower error rates. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with the variable switch cost (NNeg, NPos) revealed that the 
switch cost associated with switching from a negative emotional task set to a 
neutral set was significantly smaller than the switch cost associated with 
switching from a positive set to a neutral set (M = 45 ms), F(1, 31) = 4.62, p < 
.05. This provides evidence that disengaging a negative set and engaging a 
neutral set was less demanding on attentional control processes than when 
disengaging from a positive emotional set to engage in a neutral set.    
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Figure 4-7. Reaction time and accuracy for NN(negative), EN(negative), NN(positive) and 
NE(positive) trials for the IAPS condition. 
 
4.3.2.1.2 Switching from a Neutral Set to an Emotional Set  
A repeated measures ANOVA on RT with variable trial type (NE(negative), 
EE(negative), NE(positive), and EE(positive)) revealed a significant main effect, 
F(3, 93) = 39.95, p < .0001. Planned contrasts revealed a significant NNeg switch 
cost when switching from a neutral trial to a negative trial (M = 181 ms; i.e., 
NE(negative) minus EE(negative) trials), F(1, 31) = 79.67, p < .0001, and a 
significant NPos switch cost when switching from a neutral trial to a positive 
trial (M = 164 ms; i.e., NE(positive) minus EE(positive) trials), F(1, 31) = 77.85, p 
< .0001. As Figure 4-8 shows, a speed-accuracy trade-off cannot explain these 
results as faster RTs were associated with higher accuracy rates. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with the variable switch cost (NNeg, NPos) revealed that there 
was no significant difference between switch costs when either switching from 
an neutral set to a negative set or switching from a neutral set to a positive set, 
F < 1.     
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Figure 4-8. Reaction time and accuracy for EE(negative), NE(negative), EE(positive) and 
NE(positive) trials for the IAPS condition. 
 
4.3.2.2 Individual Differences in Emotional Attention Set-Shifting Ability   
To test whether trait anxiety moderates emotional switch costs, four regressions 
were performed where each type of switch cost (i.e. EN, NE, NegN, PosN, NNeg, 
NPos) served as the predictor and trait-anxiety score served as the criterion 
variable. Table 4-2 summarises the results from these analyses. 
Table 4-2. Four regressions for switch costs on the IAPS condition with trait anxiety as the 
criterion variable in each case. 
Regression Predictor 
Variable 
Criterion 
Variable 
b SE b t-value 
(d.f. = 30) 
p-value 
1 NegN Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-3.994 2.567 1.56           0.130 
2 PosN Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-5.876 2.435 2.41           0.022* 
3 NNeg Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-2.851 1.986 1.44           0.161    
4 NPos Switch 
Cost 
Trait 
Anxiety 
-2.129 1.839 1.16 0.256 
  
 N.B. NegN = negative→neutral(negative); PosN = positive→neutral(positive); NNeg = 
neutral(negative)→negative; NPos = neutral(positive)→positive. For each regression, n = 32. 
Significant predictors are indicated with an asterisk. 
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Figure 4-9. Regression analyses for the IAPS condition with NegN (top left), NNeg (top 
right), PosN (bottom left) and NPos (bottom right) switch costs as predictor variables and 
trait anxiety as the criterion variable in each case. 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Negative Switch Costs 
Neither NegN nor NNeg switch costs were moderated by trait anxiety (c.f. Table 
4-2, Figure 4-9). This indicates that trait anxiety could not account for the cost 
of switching attention between negative and neutral mental sets. 
4.3.2.2.2 Positive Switch Costs 
As the results from Table 4-2 suggest, trait anxiety significantly moderated the 
PosN switch cost so that those higher in trait anxiety had an increased ability to 
switch from a positive mental set to a neutral mental set (see Figure 4-9). 
However, the NPos switch cost was not significantly moderated by trait anxiety. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The main interest of the current investigation was the effect of anxiety on 
cognitive control processes involved in the attentional deployment of emotional 
information. A variant of the classic task-switching paradigm, the ACCE task 
(Johnson, in press), was used to study emotional attention set-shifting ability. 
Johnson (2009) previously reported individual variation in attentional control 
capacity for emotion using this task. The current goal was firstly to try to 
replicate the findings of Johnson (2009), and secondly, yet more crucially, to 
extend these findings to look at valence-specific effects on emotional attention 
set-shifting. Significant emotional to neutral and neutral to emotional switch 
costs were observed for both the faces and IAPS data sets, which is rest-assuring 
that control processes were engaged when task requirements were changed. 
However, unlike Johnson (2009), the switch cost associated with the emotional 
task (i.e. the faces and IAPS tasks) was non-distinguishable from the switch cost 
associated with the emotionally neutral task (i.e. the word task). Therefore, the 
data suggest that the attentional control demands were similar on both switch 
tasks. These data clearly suggest that the asymmetry reported by Johnson (2009) 
reflect the attentional control demands imposed by the task design rather than 
emotional attention set-shifting ability. Concerning the second aim, however, 
investigation into emotional attention set-shifting for valence-specific material 
revealed significant modulatory effects by trait anxiety, which will be addressed 
in more detail below.   
The most important finding was that for face stimuli those higher in trait anxiety 
were faster to switch from a neutral to a threatening mental set. Nevertheless, 
this finding connecting ACCE and anxiety is directly relevant to theories of 
anxiety acknowledging a hypervigilance to threat (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).  
Attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) predicts 
that individuals high in anxiety should exhibit a generalized switching deficit due 
to the increased distractibility of the stimulus-driven attentional system 
interfering with goal-directed attention.  However, the theory also recognises 
that anxiety typically reduces attentional focus on the current task unless it 
involves threatening stimuli. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical 
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demonstration of an anxiety-related advantage to the central executive process 
of switching to a threatening mental set.   
Related reports of faster attentional orienting towards threatening stimuli with 
increasing levels of anxiety have been documented in the context of the visual 
probe task using a range of stimulus types, such as threat-related words, faces 
and scenes (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Broadbent & Broadbent, 
1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg et al., 2000).  One possible explanation for 
this robust finding may be that a faster attentional orienting towards threat 
would likely increase chances of survival. Thus, it logically follows that threat 
stimuli should be detected rapidly by both high and low anxious individuals 
albeit at varying degrees. Indeed, an anxiety-independent threat-related 
attentional bias has been reported in the literature (i.e., Öhman & Mineka, 
2001).  In the present context, there was a general pattern across all 
participants for a reduced switch cost when switching from a neutral to a fearful 
versus happy mental set, which seems to support the notion that the attentional 
bias to threat is a general adaptation.  
Anxiety is suggested to have an adaptive function that enables rapid detection of 
threat to impel a speedy reaction (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) however 
this bias may be heightened to a suboptimal level infringing upon current task 
goals when a perceived source of threat commands attention.  The disadvantage 
of an overly responsive threat-sensitive attentional system becomes all the more 
apparent when we consider that anxious patients are more likely to interpret 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening than less anxious, or non-anxious, patients. 
However, the present study shows that the processing bias associated with 
elevated levels of anxiety may prove to be advantageous in some contexts, 
particularly when the task demands emotional attention set-shifting from a 
neutral to a fearful mental set. 
The attentional bias to threat in anxiety was only apparent for emotional faces 
and not affective scenes, despite the fact that pictures depicting aversive threat 
scenes were used (e.g., violence, mutilation). Failing to generalise the 
attentional bias across stimulus types would seem to suggest that social 
significance, in addition to emotional value, is an important feature of 
attentionally engaging stimuli. These data provide compelling evidence that 
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stimulus type is an important factor to consider when investigating emotion-
cognition interactions and caution must be taken when comparing emotion-
specific effects across studies using different stimulus types. 
A second important finding was that switch costs were reduced when diverting 
attention away from threatening IAPS pictures and towards the neutral words 
task as compared to a positive to neutral switch. Following the assumption of 
attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) that 
anxiety increases the allocation of attention to threat-related stimuli, anxiety 
should also enhance attentional focus on a current task that involves threatening 
stimuli, thus impairing attentional shifting mechanisms away from this stimulus.  
The idea that anxiety selectively modulates cognitive control processes involved 
with the disengage component of attention is in line with other theories that 
address the relationship between anxiety and attentional bias (Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) and has received some 
empirical support (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Paulitzki, Risko, 
Oakman, & Stolz, 2008).  However, the present study did not find any evidence 
to support this hypothesis. In contrast, evidence of reduced switch costs when 
diverting attention away from threatening IAPS pictures and towards the neutral 
words task was thought to reflect avoidance of threat and/or the tendency to 
disengage attention away from threat. However, this attentional bias was not 
modulated by trait-anxiety and therefore was not consistent with Sibrava and 
Borkovec’s (2006) cognitive avoidance theory of anxiety presupposing an 
avoidance strategy for self-preservation.  It has been proposed that such 
cognitive biases are characteristic of people vulnerable to anxiety disorders, 
nevertheless the data suggest that the ability to disengage a negative emotional 
set may be a general adaption for regulating emotional state. 
The present study also revealed that trait anxiety was related to an anxiety-
related attentional bias for positive IAPS pictures, such that the positive to 
neutral switch cost was reduced with increasing levels of trait anxiety 
implicating an attentional avoidance of positive IAPS pictures. Although 
cognitive avoidance theory (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006) does not make specific 
predictions regarding the processing of positive information, this result seems 
counter-intuitive given that positive information is considered non-anxiety 
evoking.  However, diverting attention away from relatively innocuous stimuli in 
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search of possible sources of threat could be interpreted as a behaviour 
contributing to maintaining the experience of anxiety, but there are other 
possible explanations. Using non-threatening distractor stimuli, Graydon and 
Eysenck (1989) reported greater distraction for high trait-anxious individuals 
with increasing processing demands.  The authors concluded that since high 
anxious individuals have less residual working memory (e.g. see Darke, 1988) 
they have less processing capacity to prevent distracting stimuli from interfering 
with task performance. Therefore, reduced working memory capacity at the cost 
of increased distractibility may have contributed to the improved flexibility 
when switching to the emotional neutral task from the positive IAPS task. 
However, one would expect trait anxiety to modulate both positive and negative 
emotional switch costs, for both the IAPS and faces data sets, if the limited 
working memory capacity explanation was valid. The fact that differential 
effects were observed for the faces and IAPS sets would seem to suggest that 
selective attentional biases were responsible for the observed modulations by 
anxiety.  
Johnson (2009) points out that each switch cost represents a combination of all 
the executive processes required to disengage a previous mental set and engage 
a new mental set.  Therefore, ambiguity lies in the interpretation of which 
component processes are driving the observed switch costs. An attentional bias 
for threat-related information in anxiety would predict that speeded shifting or 
accelerated engagement is largely considered the main contributor to the 
observed reduced switch cost for threatening stimuli, although it is equally 
viable that anxious individuals disengage more quickly from neutral stimuli (in 
this case the words)  in order to detect more threatening stimuli more quickly. 
Despite this ambiguity, the present work demonstrates most importantly a 
threat-related processing bias, which affects task-switching processes. Future 
research is necessary to disambiguate the executive processes contributing to 
the observed switch cost reduction for neutral to threat-related task-set 
switching.   
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Chapter 5 The Metaphorical Representation of 
Affect Pervades Sensorimotor Behaviour 
5.1 Introduction 
Popular figures of speech often use metaphor to link affect with perceptual 
experience (Kovecses, 2000). One particularly pervasive and productive 
metaphor is the vertical position metaphor, which underlies the understanding 
of the relatively abstract concept of affect. Objects located ‘high’ or ‘above’ 
are generally considered to be positive and objects positioned ‘low’ or ‘down’ 
are generally evaluated negatively. This metaphor is perhaps most famously 
utilised in biblical accounts of heaven representing all that is good as located 
‘above’ and its counterpart, hell, ‘below’. Metaphor can also be an important 
communication tool. For example, the association of spatial location with 
positive mood state is expressed in the phrase “things are looking up”, whereas 
“feeling down” reflects a negative affective state. Even a lowered head tilt can 
be judged to be symptomatic of a more depressive state (Waxer, 1974a, 1976; 
Waxer, 1974b). 
Many examples can be offered to highlight the ubiquity of the pairing of affect 
with a metaphorical physical construct. Such abstract thoughts Piaget and 
Inhelder (1969) propose are built upon our earliest sensorimotor experiences. 
According to this view, children inextricably associate physical sensations with 
cognitive representations. For example, pleasant sensory experiences are held 
with a positive regard. This pairing between environmental feedback and 
abstract conceptual construction, they suggest, provides the foundation for 
future representations. In this sense we can trace the origins of describing 
something invoking a negative feeling state as literally ‘leaving a bad taste in 
the mouth’.   
Interaction with the physical world introduces biased associations between 
affect and vertical location. The earliest social (e.g. smiling) and physical (e.g. 
light and food) rewards an infant receives comes from above, therefore it makes 
perfect evolutionary sense that a positive cognitive bias continues to exert 
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subtle influences on spatial representation. Consider that we typically make a 
thumbs up gesture to signify a positive evaluation, while the converse is true of 
a thumbs down response. The spatial metaphor clearly permeates our 
conceptualization of the abstract notion of affect, allowing us to communicate 
our cognitive experiences intelligibly. However, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
have suggested, metaphoric representation may not solely serve as a 
communicative aid but may above all else reflect our cognitive constructs of 
abstract concepts routed in perceptual-conceptual associations acquired in 
infancy (see Meier & Robinson, 2005). Thus, it is of interest to explore 
empirically the spatial location metaphor as a consistent cognitive bias in the 
representation of the abstract concept of affect.  
Based on the ideas expressed in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Meier and Robinson 
(2005) identify three areas of exploration: the encoding and representation of 
affective stimuli based on spatial metaphor; sensorimotor production under 
affective bias; and the automaticity of these processes.  Existing findings 
provide convincing evidence that people represent affective stimuli in a 
metaphor-consistent way (i.e. up=good; down=bad). In one investigation 
(Lundholm, 1921), individuals were asked to visually depict positive and negative 
affective word stimuli in line-form as they saw fit.  Although metaphoric 
construct was not of primary concern in this study, words such as merry and 
cheerful were associated with lines having an upwards directional tendency and 
words such as sad and mournful with downward directional lines. In testing the 
proposition that the spatial representation of affect biases stimulus encoding, 
Crawford et al. (2006) reported a vertical location bias in affective stimulus 
recall, where after stimulus presentation participants reported to have seen 
positively valenced images higher (and negative lower) than their original 
location. These findings point to a relatively implicit activation of vertical 
metaphor when evaluating affective stimuli. 
In a series of studies, Meier and Robinson (2004) sought to determine whether 
the associations between valence and vertical position are obligatory rather than 
voluntary. To test this prediction, evaluation latencies of positive and negative 
words were assessed in a task where vertical position was irrelevant and positive 
and negative words were randomly located in either upper or lower visual 
positions. Evaluations of positive words were faster when presented in the upper 
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vertical position and conversely negative in the lower vertical position, in 
comparison to incongruent vertical metaphor locations. In a second study, 
positive or negative evaluations of centrally presented affective words were 
found to activate selective attention mechanisms in a metaphor-consistent 
manner. Responses were faster to non-affective target stimuli presented above 
relative to below fixation following evaluation of a centrally-positioned positive 
word, as were responses to stimuli presented below relative to above fixation 
faster following a negative word evaluation. The fact that vertical metaphor 
associations were necessarily retrieved in parallel to mental operations related 
to affective material suggests that metaphors linking affect and vertical 
direction are obligatory in nature. However, a third study further examined 
perceptual-conceptual associations by reversing the sequence of event in the 
second study. Participants first responded to an upper or lower spatial probe and 
subsequently evaluated centrally presented words. The results from these 
studies showed that while affective evaluations biased visual perception (i.e. 
‘bad’ activates ‘down’; study 2), the activation of areas of visual space was not 
sufficient to induce affective associations (i.e. ‘down’ does not activate ‘bad’; 
study 3). On the basis of these results, Meier and colleagues were able to 
confirm Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999; see also Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) arguments 
concerning the development of abstract thought being established upon 
concrete experience and conceptual thought. In summary, it appears that 
valence, and spatial location associations are unidirectional in nature and as 
such, affective metaphors may only be activated following affective judgements. 
Although people appear to represent affect automatically on the basis of 
verticality, the extent to which this affective bias pervades sensorimotor 
behaviour has received relatively little investigation. Contemporary theories of 
emotion (Davidson, Saron, Senulis, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; Elliot & Covington, 
2001 for a review; Lang, 2000) contend that emotion drives our basic 
motivational systems. Approach versus avoidance motivation systems are 
thought to direct our behavioural response to affective stimuli. The defensive 
reflex of blinking is an example of primitive avoidance behaviour that reflects an 
unpleasant reaction response (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Lang 
and colleagues (1990) reported that negative stimuli were associated with a 
greater blink reflex than positive stimuli.  Extending from this, approach- and 
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avoidance- related active motor movements appear to be strongly represented 
by spatial-affective associations, even when affective evaluations are not 
explicitly involved (Chen & Bargh, 1999); Approach responses (a ‘pull’ flexor 
motor movement) to positive stimuli and avoidant responses (a ‘push’ extensor 
motor movement) to negative stimuli are faster in comparison to incompatible 
conditions (Solarz, 1960).  In the vertical domain, Cacioppo et al. (1993) 
reported that participants’ like-dislike preferences of Chinese ideographs were 
biased as a function of their presentation during arm flexion (pushing up against 
a hard surface) or extension (pushing down on a hard surface).  Liking for stimuli 
was automatically influenced by the metaphorically consistent approach-
avoidance response. Based on these findings, the motor-process hypothesis 
(Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993) proposes that sensorimotor responses can 
influence attitude development, with arm flexion, in contrast to extension, 
associated with an approach motivational orientation.  Extrapolating from this 
finding and the ideas expressed in the developmental theories (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980, 1999; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), it is proposed that metaphors 
related to the verticality of affect (i.e., up=good; down=bad) could manifest in 
approach/avoidance motor behaviours along the relative directions ‘up’ and 
‘down’ respectively, when engaged in an affective experience.  
Forster and Strack (1996) propose a conceptual-motor compatibility model to 
explain how avoidance/approach motor behaviours could influence cognitive 
processes in this manner.  Cognitive constructs, they contend, store compatible 
motor-action and evaluative concepts. When compatible combinations of 
motoric and conceptual tasks are performed, cognitive capacity is facilitated, 
whereas incompatible combinations inhibit. Accordingly, vertical metaphor-
related stimulus-motoric pairings should systematically modulate the efficiency 
of the behavioural response to affective material. This mechanism, however, 
only appears to manifest when evaluative judgments in an affective dimension 
are given (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Forster & Strack, 1996), as such 
affective metaphors do  not appear to be activated from sensory experience 
alone, rather they require an active engagement of the stimulus.  
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5.1.1 Overview of Studies 
If affect is represented on the basis of a vertical metaphor, then an affective 
experience should activate the sensorimotor processes linked to the metaphor, 
in accordance with the second testable prediction of Meier and Robinson (2004).  
Forster and Strack (1996) make similar predictions in their conceptual-motor 
compatibility model.  According to the model, one should expect facilitation of 
response when compatible combinations of motor-action and conceptual task are 
performed (i.e. ‘up’ and ‘positive’). If a conceptual framework exists, linking 
compatible motoric and evaluative concepts, and is implicitly active, then 
compatible responses should be faster than incompatible responses.  
Here two studies are presented which directly test these predictions. Both are 
lexical decision tasks (modified from the classic Simon task) concerned with 
vertical position, emotional valence and reaction time response as recorded via 
an up/down finger movement sensor. In the first experiment, participants made 
emotional valence categorization judgements (using a vertical movement sensor) 
on positive and negative affective lexical stimuli presented on a vertical axis 
(above versus below a central fixation cross). It is important to note that 
participants would be consciously and intentionally evaluating word stimuli so 
any conceptual-motor compatibility effects, which might be observed cannot be 
said to be automatic under this procedure. To test whether conceptual-motor 
compatibility is non-conscious, Experiment 2 was designed to remove the 
conscious evaluation of the word stimulus, thus if the predicted conceptual-
motor compatibility effect was observed in this case, it could be conclude that 
automatic evaluation of word stimuli in turn automatically predisposes linking of 
compatible motoric and evaluative concepts.  
 In the second experiment, participants were required to make colour 
categorization judgements (using the same vertical movement sensor) on 
positive and negative lexical stimuli presented on a vertical axis (above versus 
below a central fixation cross). It was predicted that metaphor-consistent 
activation of sensorimotor behaviour would only become apparent following an 
affective judgement (i.e., Experiment 1), in line with the findings of Meier et al 
(2004; studies 2 and 3) and the predictions made by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
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and also Piaget and Inhelder (1969) concerning the development of perceptual-
conceptual associations.  
Additionally, Experiment 2 extends on previous work by Meier et al. (2004), who 
showed that associations between valence and vertical position are obligatory 
when affective judgements are made, by examining whether this association 
persists in the absence of valence evaluations.  It is expected that if affective 
metaphor bias is implicitly accessed, then the task-irrelevant factor, that is 
emotional valence (positive or negative), should influence response times in a 
metaphorically consistent manner; positive words would be responded to more 
quickly when in the higher (vs. lower) vertical position, whereas the opposite 
would be true for negative words. Experiment 1 allows one to test whether 
Meier et al.’s (2004) findings can be replicated when participants must once 
again perform affective judgements. 
In both experiments, stimulus position was irrelevant to the task but if a 
conceptual framework exists, integrating stimulus location and response 
mappings, and is implicitly active, then congruent8 upward responses to top 
positioned stimuli and downward responses to bottom positioned stimuli should 
produce faster reaction times than incongruent upward responses with bottom 
positioned stimuli and downwards responses to top positioned stimuli. This type 
of stimulus-response spatial congruency is referred to as the Simon effect and is 
a robust effect reported in many studies. Therefore, it was predicted that a 
Simon effect would be observed in both Experiments 1 and 2.  
5.1.1.1 Influence of anxiety on conceptual-motor compatibility 
A secondary aim was to investigate the concept of metaphor-consistent cognitive 
constructs, linking affect and vertical location, being modulated by anxiety.   
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  Congruency will be used to describe the accordance between stimulus and response locations, 
while the term compatibility will be used to differentiate the accordance of conceptual and 
response locations.   
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Models of anxiety focus on attentional processes because one function of anxiety 
is to facilitate the detection of threat, to enable a fast response. In accordance 
with the predictions of the cognitive theories (e.g., Bower, 1981; Bower, 1987; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Williams, Watts, Macleod, & 
Matthews, 1988), high levels of anxiety are associated with selective attentional 
biases of negative information. Selectivity for threat-related words in persons 
with a variety of anxiety disorders (e.g. post-traumatic stress, panic disorder, 
social phobia, GAD) have been documented with the modified Stroop task (e.g., 
Mathews & Macleod, 1985; McNally, Riemann, Louro, Lukach, & Kim, 1992; 
Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989).  Most notably the reported colour-naming 
interference does not appear to rely on conscious attention; interference from 
subliminally presented threatening stimuli has been reported in four studies 
(Macleod & Hagan, 1992; Macleod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, 
& Mathews, 1993; Mogg, Kentish, & Bradley, 1993).  Experiment 2 was a 
modified version of the emotional Stroop task, specifically, participants were 
asked to name the ink colour of the words (using upwards/downwards finger 
responses), disregarding their semantic content. Thus, it was hypothesised that 
an attentional bias in anxiety would be demonstrated in longer responses to 
name the colour of negatively valenced words. Furthermore, since one would 
expect highly anxious individuals to be distracted by the emotional content of 
the words, if there exists a conceptual-motor compatibility bias, facilitating 
responses when compatible combinations of motor-action and conceptual task 
are performed (i.e. ‘down’ and ‘negative), then heightened anxiety would be 
associated with an increased effort necessary to emit an incompatible 
behaviour, particularly with negatively valenced stimuli. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-four students were pre-selected based on their score on the trait version 
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) from a sample of 
48 University of Glasgow undergraduate students.  The sample comprised of 22 
females and 12 males, between the ages of 18 to 28 years, who were right-
handed native English speakers. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
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normal vision and without neurological disease. The study was approved by the 
Glasgow University Research Ethics Committee and performed in appliance with 
their guidelines. Participation was voluntary and paid. Participants were naïve to 
the full purpose of the study and gave consent on the basis of receiving a full 
debriefing on completion. 
A median split (median = 41) was performed on the scores of the trait version of 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) , excluding participants 
scoring in the range of 39-43. On this basis, two groups of 17 participants were 
created: the high anxiety group (HTA) and the low anxiety group (LTA). Group 
characteristics are reported in Table 5-1. Participants completed both the trait 
and state versions of the STAI before the ERP session. t-tests showed that the 
two groups were significantly different in trait-anxiety scores (t(32) = 11.56, p < 
.0001) and in state-anxiety scores (t(32) = 11.56, p < .0001) with the high-
anxious group scoring higher than the low-anxious group on both measures. 
Participants’ state anxiety scores ranged from 20 to 56 (M = 33.85, SD = 8.98).  
Participant’s trait anxiety scores ranged from 24 to 66 (M = 40.97, SD = 11.53).  
These scores are similar to the published norms for college students (M(state) = 
37.61, SD, 10.98; M(trait) = 39.35, SD, 9.66) (Spielberger, 1983). Participants 
also completed the Beck depression inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
Using the cut-off scores as recommended by Furlanetto et al., (2005), 19 of the 
participants were defined as having no or minimal depression, 13 as having mild 
to moderate depression and 2 with scores in the moderate to severe bracket.   Of 
the 15 participants with scores indicating clinical levels of depression, 12 of 
these belonged to the HTA group, including both participants with scores in the 
severe bracket.9 A t-test of group differences in depression scores was 
significant (t(32) = 4.68, p < .0001); the HTA group scoring higher as one might 
expect.  
                                         
 
9
    Total scores on the BDI less than 10 indicate the absence of depression or very minimal 
depression. Scores equal to and above 10 are considered to be indicative of clinical levels; 10-
18 for mild to moderate depression, 19-28 for moderate to severe depression and 29 and above 
for severe depression (Furlanetto, Mendlowicz, & Bueno, 2005).  N.B. The two reported cases 
belonging to the moderate to severe category scored a total of 22 and 25 each on the BDI. 
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Table 5-1. Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for scores on the Trait and State 
versions of the STAI and BDI. Statistics are provided for high and low anxiety groups. 
 High Low 
N 17 17 
Age (years) 23.3 (5.2) 25.6 (6.3) 
T-Anxiety 48.95 (8.6) 30.76 (4.5) 
S-Anxiety  37.79 (8.4) 28.41 (6.8) 
BDI 12.71(5.7) 4.53 (4.4) 
 
5.2.2 Stimuli 
Two word sets were employed, that is the original word set used by Meier and 
Robinson (2004) and a second set compiled from the Affective Norms for English 
Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999).  The Meier and Robinson (2004) 
set consisted of 100 words, half with positive meaning (e.g. baby) and half with 
negative meaning (e.g. diseased) (see Appendix B). The number of letters was 
similar for positive (M = 6.26) and negative words (M = 6.04), F < 1 (Meier & 
Robinson, 2004). In their study, 7 participants rated the valence of each of these 
words (1=extremely negative, 5=neutral, 9=extremely positive). Mean valence 
scores for the positive (M = 7.46) and negative (M = 2.42) word groups were 
significantly different on this rating, F(1, 98) = 1040.44, p < .0001, and the 
absolute difference between the valence rating of each word and the neutral 
midpoint was equal for positive and negative words, F < 1 (Meier & Robinson, 
2004).  The authors provided no norms regarding arousal or word frequency, 
therefore the arousal and valence values were determined for the words 
included in the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & 
Lang, 1999). In the ANEW dataset, valence is rated on a 1-9 scale (1 = negative 
to 9 = positive) and words are only included on the list if they have a valence 
standard deviation ≤ 2. Arousal is calculated relative to valence via a median 
split, excluding the middle 50 words since few words could be labelled as 
arousing and neutral or non-arousing and positive or negative. Each word has an 
arousal rating on a 9-point scale (1 = low to 9 = high).  
Average valence and arousal values for the 20 positive words included in the 
ANEW database were 7.38 and 5.29 and for the 23 negative words 2.92 and 5.64, 
respectively. Median valence scores are very similar to those reported in Meier 
and Robinson (2004) for the entire word set (M(positive) = 7.46; M(negative) = 
Chapter 5  175 
2.42). t-tests showed that there was a significant difference in emotional 
valence between the positive and negative word sets (7.38 vs. 2.92), t(41) = 
18.85, p < .0001, and that the arousal values of these sets did not significantly 
differ (5.63 vs. 5.29), t(41) = 1.22, p > .05.  
A supplementary word set (see Appendix B) was created from the ANEW 
database (Bradley & Lang, 1999) that excluded any of the words included in the 
original set of Meier and Robinson (2004). Using the CELEX Lexical Database 
(Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1993), word frequencies per million were 
determined for this set of positive and negative words; 25 low frequency (LF; 
9.64) positive words, 25 high frequency (HF; 52.6) positive words, 25 LF negative 
words (9.0) and 25 HF negative words (50.36). Word valence and arousal values 
for positive words were 7.98 and 6.68. Word valence and arousal values for 
negative words were 2.22 and 6.51, respectively. Positive words were rated as 
significantly more positive than the negative words (7.98 vs. 2.22), t(98) = 
62.52, p < .0001, although they did not differ in respect to arousal (6.67 vs. 
6.46), t(98) = 1.46, p > .05.  
5.2.3 Procedure 
On arrival, participants were invited to sit in front of a computer and to read the 
statements on-screen and decide how closely these statements described the 
way they felt, indicating their response in the spreadsheet. It was emphasised 
that they should answer as quickly and accurately as possible and that there was 
no right or wrong answer. They completed three spreadsheet templates 
measuring state anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression in order.  
Following this, participants were shown into the testing booth, a moderately 
sound-proofed room with ambulant lighting, and asked to sit in front of a 21” 
Samsung monitor, at a viewing distance of about 80 cm, with their chin placed 
on a chin-rest. Word stimuli were presented in coloured (greenish and bluish) 20-
point Helvetica font on a black background above or below fixation at a distance 
of 3º of visual angle from the centre of the screen. Approximately three 
characters subtended 1˚ of visual angle. Participants responded to word stimuli 
on the screen by using their right index finger to operate a response force key, 
which was mounted on a board. A leaf spring (55×20×2 mm) was held by an 
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adjustable clamp at one end, while the other end remained free. Strain gauges 
were attached near the fixed end of the leaf spring. The fingertip was located in 
an adjustable thimble-like holder fixed at the free end. The force key allowed 
for near-isometric recordings of index finger flexion (downward) and extension 
(upward). A response was registered as soon as force output exceeded a 
criterion of 60 cN (1 cN is about 1 gram) from the baseline force level in either 
the downward or upward force direction. The right forearm and palm rested 
comfortably on the board, such that any body movements other than right index 
finger movements were minimized. Reaction times were measured with 
millisecond resolution. Participants were encouraged to make rapid responses 
but also to respond accurately and feedback was given on these measures after 
each trial. 
Participants were instructed to read on-screen instructions as to how to move 
their finger in response to what they saw on-screen as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. Their understanding of the task was reinforced by the experimenter 
before each experimental task and by appropriate paper ‘map’ reminders on 
how to complete the task that remained with them throughout the experiment. 
The experiment was controlled by the Experimental Run Time System (ERTS) 
software (Dutta, 1995).  
When participants were ready, the experimenter pressed a key to begin each 
experimental task. This would clear the on-screen instructions and the first 
block of trials would begin. At the start of each trial, a fixation cross was shown 
in the centre of the screen for 700 ms. Following this, a word appeared either 
above or below fixation until response onset. Participants were told to evaluate 
each word as quickly as possible and as accurately as they could by performing 
the appropriate force key response. After word offset a blank interval of 500 ms 
duration followed before the next trial started with the presentation of the 
fixation cue.  
Participants completed both an affective judgement task (Experiment 1) and a 
colour judgement task (Experiment 2). Tasks were counterbalanced and 
participants randomly assigned to task orders to prevent order effects. Practice 
trials with performance feedback were also included to facilitate learning of the 
task and counteract practice effects. To eliminate any effects resulting from 
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allocation of response keys to word valence, the S-R mapping was balanced 
across participants. 
The affective judgment task started with a practice block consisting of 48 trials 
in which the words ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ were presented randomly above or 
below fixation and participants were asked to judge the valence of the word by 
responding with the appropriate response, ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. The practice 
and experimental stimuli were randomly presented in greenish or bluish colour. 
Then followed two blocks of 100 experimental trials each, one in which the 
words used by Meier and Robinson (2004) were presented and one in which the 
affective words of the new word set were displayed. Each block contained 50 
positive and 50 negative words that were presented in random order above or 
below fixation. Participants were asked to judge the valence of the word by 
responding either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. In the so-called compatible condition, 
positive words were assigned with an upward (extension) movement and 
negative words with a downward (flexion) movement. In the incompatible 
condition, this S-R assignment was reversed and positive words demanded 
downward (flexion) movement whereas negative words demanded upward 
(extension) movement. Word colour was task irrelevant. Participants performed 
one block using the compatible mapping and the other block using the 
incongruent mapping. The order of compatible and incompatible blocks was 
balanced across participants. 
In the colour task, participants were asked to decide whether the word was 
displayed in greenish or bluish colour, that is, word valence (positive or 
negative) was task-irrelevant. Participants were asked to judge the colour of the 
displayed stimulus and to respond according to instructions with the appropriate 
force key response. On one block of experimental trials participants responded 
with an upwards motion for greenish targets and a downwards motion for bluish 
targets, and vice versa for the second block. The order of this mapping was 
balanced across participants. The experiment started with a practice block of 48 
trials in which one stimulus of a set of three (HHHHHHHH, SSSSSSSS, XXXXXXXX) 
was randomly presented in greenish or bluish colour above or below fixation. 
Then followed two blocks of 100 experimental trials each, one in which the 
words used by Meier and Robinson (2004) were presented and one in which the 
affective words of the new word set were displayed. After the first block of 100 
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trials, there was a brief break. Each block contained 50 positive and 50 negative 
words that were presented in random order above or below fixation and the 
colour of the word stimulus was randomized. 
Half of the participants commenced with the affective judgment task and then 
performed the colour judgment task, whereas the other half of the participants 
performed the two tasks in reverse order. The order in which word lists were 
presented in the two tasks was balanced across participants. On completion of 
the experiments, each participant was then debriefed as to the purpose of the 
experiment and asked to complete the consent form to confirm this. 
5.2.4 Data analysis 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on the reaction time latencies and 
percentage error scores for both tasks and a 5% significance level was adopted 
for all analyses. Both the affective judgement and the colour judgement tasks 
employed a factorial 2x2x2x2 ANOVA with anxiety group (HTA vs. LTA) as a 
between-subjects factor and target location (top vs. bottom position relative to 
central fixation), response (upwards vs. downwards finger movement) and 
valence (positive vs. negative word) as within-subjects factors. The first four 
trials of each experimental block were considered warm-up trials and excluded 
from data analysis, as were incorrect response trials and those with RT < 100 ms 
(anticipations) and RT > 2,000 ms (misses). Analogous analyses were performed 
on the mean error percent rates. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Experiment 1 
Mean RT and mean error rate are depicted in Figure 5-1.  
5.3.1.1 RT Analysis 
A main effect of valence indicated that participants were faster to respond to 
positively valenced words relative to negatively valenced words (888 vs. 911 
ms), F(1,32) = 10.22, p < .01. The ANOVA revealed a significant Target Location 
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× Response interaction, F(1, 32) = 7.47, p < .05 (cf. Figure 5-1). Planned 
contrasts revealed that responses were significantly faster when an upwards 
response rather than a downwards response was made to stimuli located above 
fixation, (886 vs. 909 ms), F(1, 32) = 8.31, p < .01, and similarly downwards 
rather than upwards responses were faster for stimuli presented below fixation 
(893 vs. 910 ms), F(1, 32) = 7.68, p < .01. A significant Valence x Response 
interaction was observed, F(1, 32) = 5.19, p < .05. Planned contrasts revealed 
that participants’ responses were significantly faster when an upwards rather 
than a downwards response was made to positive stimuli (871 vs. 905 ms), F(1, 
32) = 4.29, p < .05. There was a strong trend for faster responses when a 
downwards rather than an upwards response was made to negative stimuli (896 
vs. 926 ms), F(1, 32) = 4.06, p = .05. There was a trend for the HTA group to 
respond slower overall in comparison to the LTA group (936 vs. 862 ms), F(1, 32) 
= 3.00, p = .09. No other effects were significant (all Fs < 2.89, ps > .05). 
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Figure 5-1. Mean reaction times and percentage error rates across the entire sample 
population in the affective judgement task. 
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5.3.1.2 Error Analysis 
Error rates were subjected to comparable ANOVAs performed on the RT data. 
There was a significant Target Location × Response interaction, F(1, 32) = 4.35, 
p < .05. However, planned comparisons revealed that there was no significant 
difference in error rate when either an upwards or downwards response was 
required for targets presented above fixation (10.8 vs. 11.7 %), F(1,32) = 0.43, p 
> .05. Neither was there a significant difference in error rate between upwards 
and downwards response trials when targets were presented below fixation (13.3 
vs. 11.7 %), F(1,32) = 2.07, p > .05, which indicates that the stimulus-response 
congruency effect observed in the RT data was not compromised by a speed 
accuracy trade-off. All other effects were insignificant (all Fs < 2.92). 
 
5.3.1.3 Regression Analyses 
Additional regression analyses were used to evaluate the predictive utility of 
trait-anxiety scores on the observed conceptual-motor compatibility effect for 
both positive and negative word stimuli. The conceptual-motor compatibility 
effect was defined as a difference in RTs between compatible and incompatible 
trials (i.e. incompatible – compatible)10, which was calculated separately for 
both positive and negative word stimuli. Positive scores reflect the fact that 
participants were faster on compatible trials, whereas negative scores reflect 
the fact that participants were faster on incompatible trials. However, the 
conceptual-motor compatibility effect was not significantly moderated by trait 
anxiety for either positive, β(32) = 0.97, p = .53, or negative word stimuli, β(32) 
= 0.12, p = .93. Plots of the fitted least squares regression lines are shown in 
Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 for positive and negative word stimuli, respectively. As 
the figures and the analyses indicate, trait-anxiety level was not a reliable 
predictor of the conceptual-motor compatibility effect for either positive or 
negative word stimuli. 
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  Regression analyses with trait anxiety as the criterion variable and conceptual-motor 
compatibility as the predictor variable were performed only for Experiment 1 since the 
conceptual-motor compatibility effect was not observed in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 5-2. Conceptual-motor compatibility effect for positive word stimuli (i.e., ‘incompatible RT’-
‘compatible RT’) plotted against trait-anxiety scores on the STAI along with the fitted least squares 
linear regression line. 
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Figure 5-3. Conceptual-motor compatibility effect for negative word stimuli (i.e., ‘incompatible 
RT’-‘compatible RT’) plotted against trait-anxiety scores on the STAI along with the fitted least squares 
linear regression line. 
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5.3.1.4 Discussion 
Metaphor-compatible directional movements were demonstrated to facilitate 
response latencies; participants were relatively faster to make upward responses 
to positive words and downward responses to negative words than to metaphor-
incompatible stimulus-response mappings. These findings suggest that a 
conceptual framework exists, linking compatible motoric and evaluative 
concepts, thus reconfirming the predictions of Meier et al. (2004), that the 
association between valence and verticality is obligatory rather than voluntary. 
The regression analyses intending to investigate the relationship between the 
conceptual-motor compatibility effect for both positive and negative stimuli and 
trait anxiety sores did not reveal self-reported anxiety to be a reliable predictor 
of the metaphoric motor bias to affective stimuli. This result is perhaps 
surprising in light of the anxiety literature reporting increased attentional 
distractibility in the face of environmental threat (Eysenck, 1988). Although 
whilst the word stimuli used in this experiment were controlled for valence and 
arousal, it is possible that stimuli with a greater biological significance (e.g. 
IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), or specifically threat-related stimuli, 
may evoke greater attentional biases than that observed and particularly in 
those with heightened anxiety. Indeed, Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod (1996) 
found that Stroop interference for emotional words was related to the degree to 
which words are semantically related to the schema in any specific disorder. For 
example, specific biases were reported for social phobia and specific phobia.   
Reaction times were faster when response movement direction and stimulus 
location corresponded (i.e. top stimulus/upwards response, bottom 
stimulus/downwards response) rather than not, clearly demonstrative of the 
classic Simon effect. It refers to the fact that stimulus-response mappings where 
the location of the stimulus (up or down) matches the location of the response 
(up or down) are easier to perform than otherwise incongruent mappings. Even 
though stimulus location is an irrelevant factor it cannot be ignored and 
interferes with response selection. There appears to be a comparable 
congruency between the spatial codes of the response and the task-irrelevant 
spatial codes of the stimulus (sensory driven versus metaphorical) producing the 
Simon and conceptual-motor compatibility effects. It was reasoned that if the 
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conceptual-motor compatibility effect originated from a spatial representation 
that shared circuitry with the spatial codes that produce the Simon effect, the 
two effects would show interactivity. The fact that these effects combined 
additively leads one to speculate that distinct processes are contributing to 
these RT effects.   
Overall, participants responded faster to positive words than negative words. 
This finding mirrors previous studies reporting faster categorization of positively 
toned words than negatively toned words (e.g. Feyereisen, Verbekedewitte, & 
Seron, 1986; Stenberg, Wiking, & Dahl, 1998), thus supporting the possibility 
that the cognitive system is biased for positive signals.  However, unlike the 
studies of Meier et al. (2004) the present study did not find that positive words 
were responded to more quickly when in the higher (vs. lower) vertical position, 
or vice versa for negative words. Therefore, the present findings do not support 
the proposition that associations between valence and vertical position are 
obligatory.   
5.3.2 Experiment 2 
The goal of the second experiment was to extend the findings from Experiment 1 
to test the automaticity of the conceptual-motor compatibility effect. For this 
purpose, word valence was task-irrelevant and participants had to respond 
instead to the colour of the words. Mean RT and mean error rate are depicted in 
Figure 5-4. 
5.3.2.1 RT Analysis 
The effect of group failed to reach significance, as did all other main effects (All 
Fs < 1.48). However, a significant Target Location × Response interaction was 
present, F(1, 32) = 45.43, p < .0001 (cf. Figure 5-4). Planned contrasts revealed 
that responses were significantly faster when an upwards response rather than a 
downwards response was made to stimuli located above fixation, (675 vs. 720 
ms), F(1, 32) = 26.88, p < .0001, and similarly downwards rather than upwards 
responses were faster to stimuli presented below fixation (671 vs. 720 ms), F(1, 
32) = 13.54, p < .001. All other interaction effects were non-significant (All Fs < 
1.98). 
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Figure 5-4. Mean reaction times and percentage error rates across the entire sample 
population in the colour task. 
 
5.3.2.2 Error Analysis 
The Target Location × Response interaction was significant, F(1, 32) = 4.43, p < 
.05. However, planned comparisons revealed that there was no significant 
difference in error rate between upwards and downwards response trials when 
targets were presented above fixation (6.7 vs. 6.3 %), F(1,32) = .03, p > .05. 
Neither was there a significant difference in error rate between upwards and 
downwards response trials when targets were presented below fixation (7.6 vs. 
5.0 %), F(1,32) = 3.61, p > .05. Therefore, the stimulus-response congruency 
effect observed in the RT data does not appear to be a corollary of a speed-
accuracy trade-off. All other main effects and interactions failed to reach 
significance (all Fs < 2.24).   
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5.3.2.3 Discussion 
In the second experiment, participants were asked to make upwards or 
downwards finger responses determined by the colour of affective word stimuli; 
the emotional valence of the word was task irrelevant, as was target location. 
The irrelevant dimension of word valence did not significantly influence 
responses in this task unlike for the affective judgement task, thus the data 
support the notion that the encoding and representation of affective stimuli 
based on spatial metaphor does not occur automatically - it requires active 
engagement with the affective stimulus (as in Experiment 1). 
As predicted, an independent Simon effect was observed; responses were faster 
when stimulus and response locations were congruent than when they were 
incongruent.   
5.4 General Discussion 
Two experiments sought to determine whether metaphorical representation of 
affective evaluations pervades action responses. Only when affective 
judgements of the word stimuli were made did the association between vertical 
space and the mental representation of affect become apparent. The evidence 
supports the view that obligatory activation of the vertical-metaphor is 
contingent upon the semantic evaluation of affective words and is manifest in 
metaphor-consistent motor facilitation.  
As demonstrated in Experiment 1, explicit affective judgments were a necessity 
for metaphor-consistent behaviour to emerge. Metaphor-compatible directional 
movements were demonstrated to facilitate response latencies; participants 
were relatively faster to make upward responses to positive words and 
downward responses to negative words than to metaphor-incompatible stimulus-
response mappings. These findings suggest that a conceptual framework exists, 
linking compatible motoric and evaluative concepts, and is implicitly active, 
thus reconfirming the predictions of Meier et al. (2004), that the association 
between valence and verticality is obligatory rather than voluntary. Extending 
from the studies of Meier et al. (2004), the current findings suggest that this 
association is only activated following valence evaluations, therefore is does not 
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appear to be fully automatic. In the current investigation, the spatial metaphor 
did not influence verticality per se, but rather directional movements along the 
vertical axis specifically. Unlike the studies of Meier et al. (2004) the current 
investigation did not find that positive words were responded to more quickly 
when in the higher (vs. lower) vertical position, or vice versa for negative words. 
Nonetheless, the results are demonstrative of an obligatory metaphorical 
representation of affect along the vertical domain pervading sensorimotor 
responses. 
The results from Experiment 1 are consistent with the conceptual-compatibility 
model proposed by Forster and Strack (1996), whereby stimulus and response 
incompatibility (either perceptual-motor as is the case of the Simon effect or 
conceptual-motor incompatibility) affects execution of specific behaviours.  
Behaviours that are closely associated with abstract spatial representation of 
affect are more easily elicited than by antagonistic behaviours. Building upon 
the foundations set by Forster and Strack’s (1996) model, a possible mechanism 
for the observed phenomenon can be put forward. On the basis of these findings, 
affective judgements may have influenced sensorimotor performance by taxing 
cognitive capacity in the execution of finger movements. For example, it may be 
easier to make an upwards finger movement when we evaluate a positive 
stimulus than when we are required to make a downwards movement. The 
increased effort necessary to emit an incompatible behaviour may reflect the 
greater interference on incompatible trials, which must be overcome before an 
appropriate response is executed. Indeed, cognitive interference stemming from 
spatial-affective associations does not appear to have been an issue in 
Experiment 2 when the valence of the word stimuli was irrelevant, giving weight 
to this claim.  
Neumann and Strack (2000) suggest that motor movement processing is 
facilitated by affective processing in order to serve evolutionary beneficial goals 
of approach and avoidance. In fitting with this account, Experiment 1 showed 
that finger extension to produce an upwards movement was facilitated in 
response to positive words, whereas a downwards flexion enhanced response 
rates to negative words. In this context, extension can be interpreted as an 
approach response and flexion as avoidance. Forster and Strack’s (1996) 
conceptual-motor compatibility model proposes that cognitive constructs store 
Chapter 5  187 
compatible motor action and evaluative concepts that when accessed facilitate 
performance, while incompatible combinations inhibit. However, the problem of 
ambiguity of response reported in the literature (Forster & Strack, 1996; Puca, 
Rinkenauer, & Breidenstein, 2006) is not fully explained by this model.  This 
concept refers to the fact that movement towards the self can be interpreted as 
both approach or withdrawal, depending on the context and can be accordingly 
induced by manipulating the active frame of reference (e.g. Seibt, Neumann, 
Nussinson, & Strack, 2008).  In contrast to the present study, Cacioppo and his 
co-workers (1993) found effects indicative of a self-related frame of reference; 
isometric arm flexion in an upwards movement towards the self was associated 
with approach and a downwards arm extension with avoidance.  While the 
contrasting findings of Cacioppo and colleagues (1993) and the present study 
highlight the dissociation of approach/avoidance from motor flexion/extension 
along the vertical dimension, they also raise the possibility that metaphorical 
representation of affect can induce the selected frame of reference to influence 
behaviour in a metaphor-consistent way.  For example, positive = up and 
negative = down, therefore any motor response (flexion or extension) which is in 
accordance with this metaphor is viable and facilitated in comparison to 
antagonistic motor actions. However, additional experimentation is necessary to 
test empirically this prediction.   
Attentional biases with respect to aversive stimuli have been demonstrated in 
individuals with heightened anxiety. Higher levels of anxiety are associated with 
a greater tendency for attentional capture of threat-related stimuli (Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001) and also with more difficulty disengaging attention from these 
stimuli (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002).  A consequence of this attentional bias for 
negative valence is that aversive stimuli tend to elicit slower responses in 
individuals with elevated anxiety on a range of cognitive tasks. Such propensity 
has been demonstrated by means of the emotional Stroop task, i.e. delayed 
responses when presented with threat-related words, and the dot-probe task 
where slower responses are observed for targets replacing neutral stimuli, 
presumably due to slow disengagement from threat stimuli. Furthermore, the 
bias reportedly persists under masked conditions suggesting that it is an 
automatic, pre-attentive process. Unfortunately, the current findings do not 
contribute to the attentional-bias to threat hypothesis. Stroop-like interference 
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effects were not observed for either the high or low anxiety groups in 
Experiment 2. The high trait anxiety group tended to respond slower (to both 
positive and negative valence words) than the low anxiety group only under 
conditions of elaborate conscious processing of word valence (Experiment 1), 
which is more indicative of a general attentional bias to task-relevant emotional 
information, irrespective of valence. Moreover, this attentional bias to 
emotional information in the HTA appears to be restricted to the disengage 
component of attention, since the effect only became apparent when affective 
judgements had to be made on the stimulus. Thus, the data do not support an 
attentional orienting bias towards emotional information for heightened anxiety.  
5.4.1 Outlook 
Response-slowing following negative stimulus presentation is a common finding 
in cognitive tasks. This behavioural pattern has been linked to an instinctual 
freezing response in the face of danger. Evolutionary theorists would argue that 
one of the benefits of immobilization is that most predatory animals respond 
more readily to visual movement than to other cues. Consistent with this 
proposal, the delayed responses to negative word stimuli in the affective 
judgement task suggest that negative stimuli cause a generalized motor 
suppression. Difficulty disengaging attention from negative information is 
thought to be responsible for the observed slowing (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & 
Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  If one also considers the results on the 
colour task where word valence was task-irrelevant and reaction times were not 
modulated by valence, the combined findings support the delayed 
disengagement explanation. Although it cannot be stated conclusively, 
automatic vigilance for emotional information in this task seems unlikely given 
that attention had to be directed towards the emotionality of the word stimulus 
before any modulatory effects of valence were observed. However, the current 
results do support the notion that negative words arrest attentional resources 
once they are engaged in processing, resulting in slower responses on tasks 
where word valence is response-relevant.  
In summary, the findings strongly imply that the semantic processing of affective 
words can invoke a metaphorical representation of affect in the spatial domain, 
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where positive equates with ‘upwards’ and negative with ‘downwards’. Although 
the data suggest that the metaphorical representation of affect is obligatory, it 
does not appear to be automatic since a semantic evaluation of the stimulus was 
required to induce this effect. According to Kornblum et al., (1990) physical or 
conceptual overlap between the stimulus and response dimensions is essential 
for S-R compatibility effects.  The current investigation provides an account that 
is consistent with the spatial representation of affect facilitating compatible 
directional movements. However, this conceptual-motor compatibility effect 
was not modulated by anxiety, therefore one can interpret this as evidence of a 
general response bias under the influence of the affective metaphor. Thus, the 
findings suggest that popular use of linguistic metaphors depicting spatial 
representation of affect may reflect our underlying cognitive construct of the 
abstract concept of valence. 
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Chapter 6 General Discussion 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter will state, summarise, and discuss the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the work presented in this thesis. In addition, some possible 
extensions of this work will be considered. This thesis concerns the study of the 
emotion-cognition interaction as it relates to subclinical anxiety. The questions 
addressed include: the attentional mechanisms underlying the threat-related 
bias in anxiety (Chapters 2 and 3), executive control processes in anxiety 
(Chapter 4), and the mental representation of affect (Chapter 5). Before 
discussing the results in a wider context, a brief overview of the main findings 
will be provided. 
To answer the question of automaticity of the threat-related processing bias in 
anxiety, Chapter 2 sought to elucidate whether facilitated processing of threat, 
evidenced by emotion-related ERP modulations, would occur rapidly and 
preattentively. The rationale of the experiment was driven by the studies of 
Bishop et al. (2004), who reported that threat-related stimuli can evoke 
amygdala activity without attentional engagement or conscious awareness in 
high-anxious but not low-anxious participants, and Eimer et al. (2003), who 
reported emotional expression processing, as reflected by ERP modulations, to 
be gated by spatial attention. Eimer et al. (2003) recognised that the activity 
measured in ERP and fMRI studies of attention and emotion processing are likely 
indicative of different stages of information processing, and concluded that ERP 
measures of affective processing may be attention-dependent. In light of the 
anxiety-specific amygdala response to unattended threat reported in the Bishop 
et al. (2004) study, Chapter 2 investigated whether such preattentive processing 
of threat in anxiety would modulate ERP measures of affective processing.  
Spatial attention was manipulated using a similar paradigm as Vuilleumier et al. 
(2001) and Holmes et al. (2003), although participants were instructed to match 
two peripheral faces or two peripheral Landolt squares.  The results from the 
experiment reported in Chapter 2 do not offer support to the claim that 
differences in individual anxiety levels are important predictors of emotion-
specific ERP responses during unattended conditions, and instead questions 
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whether an attention-independent processing bias for emotional faces is specific 
to heightened anxiety. This is based on the finding of an enhanced LPP response 
for threat/happy versus neutral faces and an enhanced slow wave for threat 
versus neutral faces, neither modulated by the focus of attention for both high 
and low anxiety groups.  
The ERP technique was once again implemented in Chapter 3 to investigate 
whether threat-related information sustains visual attention as postulated by the 
delayed disengagement hypothesis (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001).  
Participants made an orientation judgement of a letter stimulus presented to 
the left or right of a central affective image. Given the usefulness of the ERP 
technique as a tool for investigating the mental chronometry of attentional 
deployment, it was hypothesised that if threat-related stimuli are able to 
prolong attentional processing, N2pc onset should be delayed relative to the 
neutral condition. Notably, no emotion-specific modulations of the N2pc latency 
were observed, thus failing to support the delayed disengagement hypothesis. 
However, since LPP latency has been held to index stimulus evaluation time 
(Donchin & Coles, 1988), delayed LPP latency for negative relative to neutral 
IAPS pictures implies that information with a negative emotional value can 
prolong analysis and evaluative processes. Moreover, a longer LRP-R interval for 
threatening faces compared to neutral and happy is consistent with the view 
that motor responses freeze in face of threat. Thus, it appears that the 
negativity bias may operate at evaluative and motor-response stages of 
processing.  
Chapter 4 investigated whether emotional attention set-shifting – a proposed 
stage of information processing when one switches between emotional and 
neutral mental sets- revealed significant modulatory effects by trait anxiety. 
Using a variant of the classic task-switching paradigm, which incorporates 
emotional mental set representations, the results on the ACCE task (Johnson, in 
press) showed that participants scoring higher in trait anxiety were faster to 
switch from a neutral to a threatening mental set. This finding connecting ACCE 
and anxiety is directly relevant to theories of anxiety acknowledging a 
hypervigilance to threat (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).  However, this processing 
bias for threat in anxiety was only apparent for emotional faces and not 
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affective scenes, despite the fact that pictures depicting aversive threat scenes 
were used (e.g., violence, mutilation).   
In a series of experiments, Chapter 5 investigated the notion that affect is 
represented along a metaphorical vertical axis, such that ‘good’ equates with 
‘up’ and ‘bad’ with ‘down’. Within the affective judgement task (Experiment 1, 
Chapter 5), participants made emotional valence categorization judgements 
(using a vertical movement sensor) on positive and negative affective lexical 
stimuli presented on a vertical axis. According to Forster and Strack’s (1996) 
conceptual-motor compatibility model, if a conceptual framework exists, linking 
compatible motoric and evaluative concepts, and is implicitly active, then 
compatible responses should be faster (i.e. ‘up’ and ‘positive’) than 
incompatible responses (i.e. ‘up’ and ‘negative’).  To test whether conceptual-
motor compatibility is automatic, word valence was an irrelevant stimulus 
dimension in the colour judgement task (Experiment 2, Chapter 5) and 
participants were required to make colour categorization judgements (using the 
same vertical movement sensor) on positive and negative lexical stimuli 
presented on a vertical axis. The findings from these experiments suggest that 
the vertical representation of affect facilitates compatible directional 
movements, however, the representation of affect based on spatial metaphor 
does not occur automatically, rather it requires active engagement with the 
affective stimulus. 
6.2 The Role of Attention in Emotion Processing 
Behavioural studies demonstrating preferential attentional engagement of 
threat-related stimuli suggest that we possess a tendency to prioritise 
threatening stimuli, perhaps as a result of a preattentive, parallel search for 
immediate signals of threat (Hansen & Hansen, 1988).  Researchers have 
reported an amygdala response to threatening stimuli under conditions where 
the focus of attention was diverted away from the stimulus (i.e. Vuilleumier, 
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). In addition, a study investigating object-based 
attention while keeping spatial attention constant reported similar activation of 
the amygdala to both attended and unattended fearful and neutral faces 
(Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003). Chapter 2 investigated 
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the role of attention in the processing of emotional facial expression by studying 
the impact of directing attention towards or away from faces on emotion-
induced modulations of the ERP waveform. Emotional (both fearful and happy) 
faces elicited a late enhanced positivity (LPP) occurring around 500 - 700 ms 
post-stimulus, similar to the results from our other ERP studies (e.g. Eimer & 
Holmes, 2002; Krolak-Salmon, Fischer, Vighetto, & Mauguiere, 2001; Williams, 
Palmer, Liddell, Song, & Gordon, 2006), and the enhanced positivity for fearful 
versus neutral faces persisted throughout the 700-1,000 ms time range. The 
observed ERP modulations sensitive to emotional facial expression were 
unaffected by spatial attention. These results provide good evidence that the 
processing of emotional information is automatic and can occur independently of 
attention. 
In contrast, previous ERP studies have demonstrated that emotion-specific ERP 
modulations are strongly dependent on spatial attention (Eimer, Holmes, & 
McGlone, 2003; Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003). Attended emotional faces 
reportedly triggered an enhanced positivity relative to neutral faces, with an 
early frontocentral effect and a subsequent more broadly distributed sustained 
emotional positivity. In Chapter 2, emotional faces did not modulate an early 
frontocentral negativity as reported in these ERP studies, perhaps because by 
comparison emotional expression was task-irrelevant in the faces-attended task 
(participants performed an identity judgement task). Thus, the attention 
manipulation may not provide the sole explanation for the observed modulation 
of the ERP waveform. It is possible that this early frontocentral positivity is 
evoked by an evaluative stage of affective processing. Failure to observe this 
emotion effect when participants performed the alternative non-emotional task 
lends support to this hypothesis.  
It has been suggested that the concept of attentional load can explain the 
discrepancies among the studies (Lavie, 1995; Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 
2003). Studies reporting that the processing of emotional stimuli is gated by 
attention may have employed tasks, which place a greater demand on 
attentional load. In comparison, the studies reporting little or no effect of 
attention could have utilised less attentional consuming tasks, with redundant 
processing capacity being used for task-irrelevant or unattended stimuli. The 
study in Chapter 2 and Holmes et al.’s (2003) study used the same spatial-
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orienting paradigm but with different non-face tasks. The faces-unattended task 
in the Holmes et al. (2003) study required participants to compare two houses, 
while in Chapter 2 a comparison of two Landolt squares was performed. 
Therefore, it is possible that the reported contradictory conclusions regarding 
the role of attention in affective processing was due to this manipulation. 
However, Chapter 2 reports that while LPP and slow wave responses to attended 
and unattended emotional faces were the same, earlier EPN responses to 
emotionally faces were, by comparison, gated by spatial attention. The fact that 
the emotion-specific EPN component was strongly dependant upon spatial 
attention supports the notion that the attentional load of the Landolt squares 
task was sufficient to consume most, if not all, of the attentional resources, 
which could have been used for the processing of unattended faces. These 
observations suggest that subsequent stages in emotional face processing (i.e. 
the processing stages underlying the LPP and slow wave responses) are fully 
processed, regardless of other current task demands. 
6.3 Reflections on Chapter 3 and Future Research 
There is considerable evidence that highly anxious individuals are sensitive to 
threat-related stimuli. However, the temporal course of this threat-related bias 
is still unclear. It has been proposed that difficulty in disengaging from 
threatening material may be implicated (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). 
Notably, in Chapter 3 no emotion-specific modulations of the N2pc latency were 
observed, for either high or low anxious individuals, thus failing to support the 
delayed disengagement hypothesis. Posner and colleagues (Posner, 1980; Posner 
& Petersen, 1990) have identified three operations when attending to a new 
stimulus: an initial orienting of attention to the stimulus; active engagement of 
the stimulus; and lastly, disengaging attention from the stimulus. However in 
Chapter 3, the central affective image was task-irrelevant, therefore 
participants were not required to engage with the stimulus. Since participants 
were instructed to initiate attention to the central location, it was assumed that 
participants would be engaging attention with the affective stimulus prior to 
averting attention to the peripheral target. This might explain the failure to 
observe emotional modulation of N2pc latency. Therefore, a future study could 
investigate delayed attention effects on N2pc latency following active 
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engagement with the affective stimulus, for example, by means of an affective 
judgement task. 
6.4 Cognitive Avoidance of Threat 
From stimulus onset to overt response, the reaction time period can be 
partitioned into at least two stages of information processing; psychological 
processing and response output. The interval between stimulus onset and the 
onset of the S-LRP is related to the duration of pre-motor processes (i.e., 
stimulus identification and response selection processes). The R-LRP interval is 
related to the duration of reaction readiness. Chapter 3 revealed that while RTs 
were consistent across emotional conditions, the response-locked LRP interval 
was longest for fearful faces and the complementary S-LRP shortest for fearful 
faces.  
Therefore, the speed of stimulus-related information processing as indicated by 
shorter S-LRP latencies for threatening than happy faces indicates that affective 
faces effectively modulate early perceptual and cognitive stages of information 
processing and can be interpreted to reflect subsequent cognitive avoidance of 
threat after initial orienting. Such a ‘vigilant–avoidant’ pattern of processing 
would be compatible with recent cognitive models of fear and anxiety (e.g. 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman, 1996). However, this pattern of attentional 
deployment was not modulated by anxiety. Thus, the data does not support a 
vigilance-avoidance pattern of processing as contributing to the maintenance of 
anxious states. 
A longer LRP-R interval for threatening stimuli is consistent with the view that 
motor responses freeze in face of threat (Fox et al., 2001). Therefore, it might 
seem paradoxical that cognitive avoidance of threat is not followed by a higher 
reaction readiness to remove the source of threat. Nevertheless, the findings 
from the experiment in Chapter 3 imply that both psychological processes and 
reaction readiness periods of the information processing stream are involved in 
the negativity bias. However, further research is necessary to disentangle their 
individual contributions to the threat-related processing bias.   
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6.5 Affective Modulation of the Visual P1 Component  
In emotion research the P1 component is generally of interest because of its 
relation to spatial attention and sensory processing (Batty & Taylor, 2003; 
Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). In Chapter 3, affective images (faces and IAPS) 
were found to modulate P1 amplitudes, which implies that sensory processes 
were influenced by the emotional property of irrelevant stimuli. Thus, this study 
provides additional evidence for the notion that there is very rapid attentional 
orienting towards emotional information. In contrast, Chapter 2 found no 
evidence of a greater deployment of processing resources to emotional faces 
(fearful or happy) relative to neutral faces within the P1 time range. This 
inconsistency is perhaps strange given that the same facial stimuli (i.e. selected 
from the CAFE database) were used in both experiments. However, in Chapter 2, 
pairs of faces were presented laterally, whereas single faces were presented 
foveally at fixation in Chapter 3. These observations suggest that there are 
important differences in the impact of spatial location on cortical stages of 
emotional processing. When affective stimuli are presented at fixation, an initial 
rapid detection of their emotional value (as reflected by early emotional 
expression effects on P1 amplitudes) takes place. In contrast, no evidence for 
emotional expression processing within the P1 time range can be found when 
faces are presented peripherally. 
Anxiety-related enhancement of the occipital P1 component for negative as 
compared with neutral or happy faces has also been reported in the literature; 
with the magnitude of this effect being significantly enhanced for the high-
anxiety group in comparison with the low-anxiety group (e.g. Holmes, Kragh 
Nielsen, & Green, 2008; Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008). This is consistent 
with increased levels of trait anxiety potentiating attentional vigilance for 
threat-related material. However, Chapter 2 did not report anxiety-related 
modulations of the P1 component, consistent with previous studies (Fox, 
Derakshan, & Shoker, 2008; Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; Rossignol, 
Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005).  
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6.6 Facilitated Emotional Processing: Evidence from the 
EPN component 
An early posterior negativity (EPN) as an index of early emotion discrimination 
and both ERP experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 reported an enhanced EPN to 
emotional compared with neutral faces around 200-300 ms post-stimulus. When 
the emotional valence of the face stimuli was task relevant (Chapter 2) 
enhanced EPN amplitudes were observed for both fearful and happy relative to 
neutral faces. However, when emotional expression was task-irrelevant (Chapter 
3), the EPN was enhanced for fearful relative to neutral faces but an EPN for 
happy relative to neutral faces was not observed. Both studies utilised the same 
stimulus set (i.e., the CAFE database), therefore it is possible that this 
difference in the EPN response is due to variations in experimental manipulation 
rather than stimulus-driven factors. However, different participants took part in 
these two experiments, which could also explain this inconsistency.  
The EPN component reflects facilitated processing of emotional images and has 
been found to be sensitive to both fearful faces (e.g., Eimer, Holmes, & 
McGlone, 2003; Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, & Matsumura, 2001; Schupp, 
Ohman et al., 2004) and happy faces (e.g., Marinkovic & Halgren, 1998; Schacht 
& Sommer, 2009) relative to neutral faces. However, the fact that fearful faces 
continued to evoke an EPN when task-irrelevant, unlike the happy faces, implies 
that fearful stimuli demonstrate successful bottom-up attentional control. 
However, the EPN effect for fearful (and happy) faces was absent when 
attention was diverted away from the faces (Chapter 2). Therefore, it does not 
appear that that the attentional capture of threatening facial expression is a 
fully automatic response.   
The emotion-linked EPN was not present for IAPS pictures (Chapter 3). This is 
perhaps surprising given the literature reporting emotion-related EPN effects 
with both positive and negative IAPS pictures (Herrmann et al., 2009). However, 
previous studies using IAPS stimuli have reported that the amplitude of the EPN 
was most pronounced for stimuli of high evolutionary significance, i.e. erotic 
images and pictures of mutilations (Junghofer, Bradley, Elbert, & Lang, 2001; 
Schupp et al., 2003). The IAPS stimuli in Chapter 3 were selected to be of high 
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emotional arousal, which included pictures of mutilations in the negative set. 
However, as mentioned previously, the affective images were task-irrelevant 
and so the IAPS pictures (particularly the negative set) may not have been of 
sufficient threat-value to induce an EPN response such as that observed for the 
fearful faces. Facial stimuli have, in comparison to IAPS pictures, a high social 
and evolutionary significance, therefore perhaps negative facial expressions are 
also more attentionally engaging than scenes of a negative tone.  
6.7 N170 and Emotional Face Processing 
The renowned face recognition model of Bruce and Young (1986) differentiates 
between facial identity and facial expression processes.  This model is supported 
by event-related potential studies linking the N170 component with the 
structural encoding of faces (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; 
Eimer, 2000), a process proposed to operate in parallel with facial expression 
discrimination (Eimer & Holmes, 2002). The results from experimental Chapters 
2 and 3 are accordance with this model and previous studies (e.g. Eimer & 
Holmes, 2002), showing that the N170 was insensitive to facial expressions, 
while other ERP components were modulated by affect. Thus, Chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrate that facial configuration processing occurred independently of 
affective encoding.   
In Chapter 2 only post-N170 components were affected by emotional expression, 
however in Chapter 3, the preceding P1 was modulated by emotion. Thus, the 
data are in conflict with regards to the time course of facial structural analysis 
and facial expression processes. The results from Chapter 2 suggest that the 
affective property of face stimuli is processed only once initial face 
configuration and identification is complete, while Chapter 3 implies that the 
structural encoding of faces can operate in parallel with facial expression 
discrimination. However, both studies agree that the N170 reflects only basic 
structural encoding of facial information and is insensitive to affective 
properties of faces. 
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6.8 Executive Control in Anxiety 
In Chapter 4, the most important finding was that those higher in trait anxiety 
were faster to switch from a neutral to a threatening mental set. This improved 
ability to switch attention to the emotional judgement task when threatening 
faces are presented is in accordance with a hypervigilance theory of anxiety. 
The argument follows that facilitated attentional orienting to threat is a causal 
factor in anxiety disorders (Mathews & Macleod, 1994). However, it is also 
assumed that priority threat processing is a ‘normal adaptive mechanism’ (Yiend 
& Mathews, 2001) for survival purposes.   
Attentional capture by threat is suggested to be governed by a decision 
threshold that permits interruption of goal-directed behaviour when a potential 
threat risk exceeds a certain level (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). It is 
hypothesised that individual variation in anxiety is related to response threshold 
differences. Therefore, highly threatening stimuli should surpass this threshold 
and capture the attention of everyone, while less threatening stimuli should only 
surpass a relatively low threshold as in anxiety-prone individuals (see Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Therefore, the result reported in 
Chapter 4 shows that while fearful faces were sufficient to elicit a vigilant 
response across all participants (in part because they were task-relevant), 
reduced switch costs associated with increasing anxiety could be interpreted as 
arising from variations in this threshold level. 
6.9 The Vertical Metaphor: Embodied Cognition versus 
Evaluative Response Coding  
The experiments of Chapter 5 revealed that metaphor-compatible directional 
movements were demonstrated to facilitate response latencies, such that 
participants were relatively faster to make upward responses to positively-
evaluated words and downward responses to negatively-evaluated words than to 
metaphor-incompatible stimulus-response mappings. These findings suggest that 
a conceptual framework exists, linking compatible motoric and evaluative 
concepts. But what are the means by which this is achieved? Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999) argue that the nature of human cognition, including conceptual thought, 
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is shaped by aspects of the body. This sentiment encapsulates an embodied mind 
theory of cognition which has historical roots in Kant’s philosophical view of the 
mind-body problem.  
The understanding of emotional valence in terms of a vertical metaphor appears 
to be implicit. For example, Meier and colleagues (2007) reported that people 
encode God-related concepts faster if presented in a high versus low vertical 
position.  The authors claim to have shown that vertical perceptions are invoked 
when the abstract dualistic concept of “good and evil” is accessed. Further, it 
has been hypothesised that the mapping between conceptual domains, in this 
case, understanding valence in terms of directionality, corresponds to neural 
mappings in the brain (see Feldman & Narayanan, 2004).  
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s book, Metaphors We Live By (1980), explains 
how conceptual metaphors shape our understanding of abstract concepts and aid 
in communication. However, these metaphors are not only linguistic tools, they 
shape our thoughts and perceptions and consequently our actions.  For example, 
a thumbs up sign is a visual way to express the way you feel. Similarly, the 
experiments in chapter 5 imply that the vertical metaphor is not only a 
communicative aid, but has a deeper mode of concept representation-we 
implicitly act in accordance with this metaphor.   
The embodied cognition interpretation of the findings in Chapter 5, however, 
rests on the following assumption; that affective evaluation of emotional stimuli 
assigns affective codes to motor responses on a metaphorical level. That is, if 
there exists an implicit vertical-metaphor representation of affect, a 
behavioural response to positive-affect stimuli should invoke an upwards 
response coding, while a behavioural response to negative-affect stimuli should 
invoke a downwards response coding. Forster and Strack’s (1996) conceptual-
compatibility model explains this affective S-R compatibility principle as such; 
behaviours that are closely associated with abstract spatial representation of 
affect are more easily elicited than by antagonistic behaviours. However, this 
leaves open the possibility that different conceptualisations of affective-
mapping between affective stimuli and lever movements could similarly induce 
behaviours that match or mismatch the valence of the invoking stimuli. Indeed, 
a series of experiments showed that the response label assignment significantly 
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predicted approach and avoidance related movements to positive and negative 
valenced words (Eder & Rothermund, 2008). Participants performed identical 
arm-bending pull and arm-extension push movements of a lever that were 
labelled as either towards and away or upwards and downwards. Lever 
movements labelled upwards and downwards reversed the standard affective 
mapping affects obtained with towards and away lever labels despite the 
execution of identical motor movements.   
If the vertical representation of affect is embodied in cognition then metaphor-
consistent movements should not depend upon the evaluative meaning of 
response labels that are used in the task instructions. In Chapter 5, the response 
labels upwards-downwards were applied to vertical movements of a finger 
sensor. Therefore, an embodied cognition account would be supported if this 
study could be replicated using response labels towards and away to label finger 
flexions and extensions, respectively.  
6.10 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, this thesis combined behavioural and electrophysiological 
approaches to the study of the emotion-cognition interaction as it relates to 
individual variation in trait-anxiety. The attentional bias to threat was 
investigated in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. While the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 
showed that threatening stimuli can prioritise processing resources, there was no 
evidence for an anxiety-related bias in either the preattentive stage of 
processing (Chapter2) or in the disengage component of attention (Chapter3). 
However, using a task-switching paradigm, Chapter 4 showed that trait anxiety 
predicts a hypervigilance for threat, mirroring the findings from previous studies 
reporting a threat-related bias in the orienting component of visual attention. 
Finally, Chapter 5 investigated how affect is mentally represented. The data 
suggest that the vertical position metaphor underlies our understanding of the 
relatively abstract concept of affect. Although it is less clear whether the 
vertical representation of affect advocates an embodied view of conceptual 
structure (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) or an evaluative response-coding view 
(see Eder & Rothermund, 2008). Future research is necessary to help clarify this 
issue.  
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Appendix A: Stimuli from Chapter 4 Experiment 
The real word sets were compiled from the Affective Norms for English Words 
(ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
V = Valence Mean; A = Arousal Mean; W = Word Length; F = Frequency.  
  
F = word frequencies per million (CELEX Lexical Database; Baayen, Piepenbrock, 
& Gulikers, 1995). 
 
Real-Word Set 1 
V  A  W  F 
frog   5.71 4.54 4 1 
icebox  5.00 4.84 6 3 
limber  5.45 4.85 6 2 
ketchup  5.68 4.52 7 1 
mystic  6.00 4.84 6 3 
lighthouse  5.89 4.41 10 2 
repentant  5.86 5.05 9 1 
appliance  5.10 4.05 9 5 
nonchalant  4.74 3.12 9 1 
rattle   5.03 4.36 6 5 
swamp  4.90 4.40 5 5 
trumpet  5.70 4.80 7 7 
salute   5.92 5.31 6 3 
scissors  5.05 4.47 8 1 
thermometer 4.37 3.79 11 2 
clumsy  4.00 5.18 6 6 
hawk   5.88 4.39 4 14 
cane   4.00 4.20 4 12 
boxer   5.51 5.12 5 1 
pamphlet  4.79 3.62 8 3 
hairdryer  4.84 3.71 9 2 
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sphere  5.33 3.88 6 22 
lantern  5.57 4.05 7 13 
tamper  4.10 4.95 6 1 
basket  5.45 3.63 6 17 
mushroom  5.78 4.72 8 2 
reserved  4.88 3.27 8 27 
patent  5.29 3.50 6 35 
hide   4.32 5.28 4 22 
avenue  5.50 4.12 6 46 
consoled  5.78 4.53 8 2 
glacier  5.50 4.24 7 1 
nonsense  4.61 4.17 8 13 
absurd  4.26 4.36 6 17 
bench   4.61 3.59 5 35 
alley   4.48 4.91 5 8 
runner  5.67 4.76 6 1 
stove   4.98 4.51 5 15 
gender  5.73 4.38 6 2 
golfer   5.61 3.73 6 3 
 
Average  5.17 4.35 6.6 9.62 
 
Real-Word Set 2 
V  A  W  F 
headlight  5.24 3.81 9 7 
locker   5.19 3.38 6 9 
windmill  5.6 3.74 8 1 
salad   5.74 3.81 5 9 
errand  4.58 3.85 6 7 
utensil  5.14 3.57 7 2 
jelly   5.66 3.7 5 3 
context  5.2 4.22 7 2 
kettle   5.22 3.22 6 3 
hairpin  5.26 3.27 7 1 
owl   5.8 3.98 3 2 
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mantel  4.93 3.27 6 3 
inhabitant  5.05 3.95 10 2 
activate  5.46 4.86 8 2 
banner  5.4 3.83 6 8 
fork   5.29 3.96 4 14 
violin   5.43 3.49 6 11 
wagon   5.37 3.98 5 55 
bland   4.1 3.29 5 3 
humble  5.86 3.74 6 18 
vanity   4.29 5 6 7 
radiator  4.67 4.02 8 4 
sentiment  5.98 4.41 9 23 
muddy  4.44 4.13 5 10 
coarse  4.55 4.21 6 10 
trunk   5.09 4.18 5 8 
sheltered  5.75 4.28 9 4 
highway  5.92 5.16 7 40 
insect   4.07 4.07 6 14 
spray   5.45 4.14 5 16 
privacy  5.88 4.12 7 12 
hammer  4.88 4.58 6 9 
lump   4.16 4.8 4 7 
whistle  5.81 4.69 7 4 
truck   5.47 4.84 5 57 
quart   5.39 3.59 5 3 
alien   5.6 5.45 5 16 
custom  5.85 4.66 6 14 
nursery  5.73 4.04 7 13 
invest   5.93 5.12 6 3 
 
Average  5.26 4.11 6.22 11.49 
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Pseudo-Word Sets 1 and 2 
N.B. W = Word Length 
Set 1   W   Set 2   W 
nesterilly  10   chelesing  9 
splath   6   jootine  7 
noradly  7   dusious  7 
tabanol  7   occle   5 
durate  6   nyson   5 
ammolodate  10   clorious  8 
andesker  8   clife   5 
rebration  9   plining  7 
camboliate  10   plembiator  10 
clife   5   blaptious  9 
sharb   5   prumptious  10 
thriney  7   zocker  6 
fotion   6   facsiliate  10 
strimple  8   calidorate  10 
momberment 10   numbial  7 
pammel  6   harch   5 
tury   4   chunts  6 
nisk   4   stip   4 
uttle   5   drit   4 
excemming  9   plounch  7 
moller   6   cuttal   6 
crobment  8   illarin   7 
slamperic  9   sleck   5 
flines   6   bequette  8 
tallow   6   plude   5 
snafe   5   blonce  6 
bidiment  8   bareming  8 
givest   6   plaction  8 
berrow  6   diberate  8 
yender  6   gond   4 
caborial  8   ploon   5 
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occle   5   thumfiate  9 
bleth   5   fupple   6 
hethlem  7   quone   5 
faner   5   harin   5 
lindermy  8   quannet  7 
drack   5   wollen  6 
blacken  7   glat   4 
thoungle  8   naughder  8 
factam  6   stime   5 
 
Average  6.80      6.65 
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Appendix B:  Stimuli from Chapter 5 Experiment 
Word List from Meier and Robinson (2004) 
V = Valence Mean; A = Arousal Mean; W = Word Length 
Positive     Negative 
V A W    V A W 
active    7  aimless   7 
agile    5  argue    5 
ambitious   9  beggar 3.22 4.91 6 
baby  8.22 5.53 4  bitter    6 
brave  7.15  6.15 5  cancer 1.5 6.42 6 
candy  6.54 4.58 5  cheat    5 
champion 8.44 5.85 8  clumsy 4 5.18 6 
clean    5  crime  2.89 5.41 5 
cordially   9  critical   8 
devotion   7  crooked   7 
dream  6.73 4.53 5  crude  3.12 5.07 5 
earnest   7  cruel  1.97 5.86 5 
ethical   7  danger 2.95 7.32 6 
faith    5  dead  1.94 5.73 4 
festival   8  defeat   6 
garden 6.71 4.39 6  delay    5 
generous   8  devil  2.21 6.07 5 
genius    6  diseased   8 
gentle  7.31 3.21 6  divorce 2.22 6.33 7 
gracious   8  enemy   5 
heaven 7.30 5.61 6  fickle    6 
hero    4  foolish   7 
justice 7.78 5.47 7  fraud  2.67 5.75 5 
kiss  8.26 7.32 4  greedy   6 
leisure   7  hostile 2.73 6.44 7 
love  8.72 6.44 4  insane  2.85 5.83 6 
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loyal  7.55 5.16 5  insolent 4.35 5.38 8 
mature   6  liar    4 
mercy    5  mediocre   8 
neat    4  mosquito 2.80 4.78 8 
nurse  6.08 4.84 5  nasty  3.58 4.89 5 
polite    6  neurotic 4.45 5.13 8 
power  6.54 6.67 5  obnoxious 3.50 4.74 9 
pretty  7.75 6.03 6  poison  1.98 6.05 6 
prompt   6  pompous   7 
radiant 6.73 5.39 7  profane   7 
reliable   8  rude  2.50 6.31 4 
righteous   9  sarcastic   9 
satisfying   10  shallow   7 
sensible   8  sloppy    6 
sincere   7  sour  3.93 5.10 4 
sleep  7.20 2.80 5  spider  3.33 5.71 6 
studious   8  steal    5 
sweet    5  stingy    6 
talented   8  theft    5 
trust  6.68 5.30 5  touchy   6 
truthful   8  ugly  2.43 5.38 4 
victory 8.32 6.63 7  unfair    6  
wise  7.52 3.91 4  vain    4 
witty    5  vulgar    6 
 
Average 7.38 5.29 6.28    2.92 5.63 6.04 
 
New Word List 
Words selected from the ANEW database (Bradley & Lang, 1999). 
V = Valence Mean; A = Arousal Mean; W = Word Length; F = Frequency.  
F = word frequencies per million (CELEX Lexical Database; Baayen, Piepenbrock, 
& Gulikers, 1995). 
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Low Frequency Words 
Positive      Negative 
V A W F    V A W F 
admired 7.74 6.11 7 20 abuse  1.8 6.83 5 14 
aroused 7.97 6.63 7 15 annoy  2.74 6.49 5 4 
birthday 7.84 6.68 8 20 betray 1.68 7.24 6 8 
cheer  8.10 6.12 5 11 brutal  2.80 6.60 5 13 
dazzle  7.29 6.33 6 1 demon 2.11 6.76 5 6 
ecstasy 7.98 7.38 7 6 detest  2.17 6.06 6 4 
elated  7.45 6.21 6 3 disloyal 1.93 6.56 8 2 
erotic  7.43 7.24 6 9 foul  2.81 4.93 4 9 
fame  7.93 6.55 4 10 hatred 1.98 6.66 6 21 
flirt  7.52 6.91 5 1 infection 1.66 5.03 8 18 
glory  7.55 6.02 5 22 insult  2.29 6 6 13 
graduate 8.19 7.25 8 8 killer  1.89 7.86 6 11 
hug  8.00 5.35 3 6 leprosy 2.09 6.29 7 1 
lust  7.12 6.88 4 10 lice  2.31 5 4 2 
miracle 8.60 7.65 7 15 nightmare 1.91 7.59 9 13 
nude  6.82 6.41 4 6 rotten  2.26 4.53 6 12 
orgasm 8.32 8.10 6 9 slap  2.95 6.46 4 7 
rainbow 8.14 4.64 7 6 slaughter 1.64 6.77 9 12 
rescue 7.70 6.53 6 20 suffocate 1.56 6.03 9 1 
riches  7.70 6.17 6 6 surgery 2.86 6.35 7 12 
sexy  8.02 7.36 4 4 terrified 1.72 7.86 9 15 
terrific 8.16 6.23 8 12 torture 1.56 6.10 7 15 
thrill  8.05 8.02 6 5 toxic  2.10 6.40 5 6 
treasure 8.27 6.75 8 9 tumour 2.36 6.51 6 2 
triumphant 8.82 6.78 10 7 venom 2.68 6.08 5 3 
 
Average 7.87 6.65 6.12 9.64   2.15 6.36 6.28 8.96  
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High Frequency Words 
 
Positive      Negative 
V A W F    V A W F 
affection 8.39 6.21 9 24 accident 2.05 6.26 8 49 
cash  8.37 7.37 4 54 afraid  2.00 6.67 6 112 
confident 7.98 6.22 8 28 anger  2.34 7.63 5 74 
desire  7.69 7.35 6 65 assault 2.03 7.51 7 21 
engaged 8.00 6.77 7 35 bloody 2.90 6.41 6 64 
excitement 7.50 7.67 9 37 bomb  2.10 7.15 4 32 
fun  8.37 7.22 3 46 confused 3.21 6.03 8 27 
gift  7.77 6.14 4 31 crash  2.31 6.95 5 19 
happy  8.21 6.49 5 135 destroy 2.64 6.83 7 44 
holiday 7.55 6.59 7 58 disaster 1.73 6.33 8 33 
humour 8.56 5.50 6 27 funeral 1.39 4.94 7 22 
joke  8.10 6.74 4 33 guilty  2.63 6.04 6 51 
joy  8.60 7.22 3 40 hate  2.12 6.95 4 55 
laughter 8.45 6.75 8 48 hell  2.24 5.38 4 94 
leader  7.63 6.27 6 68 horror  2.76 7.21 6 30 
lucky  8.17 6.53 5 47 nervous 3.29 6.59 7 48 
passion 8.03 7.26 7 31 pain  2.13 6.50 4 75 
pleasure 8.28 5.74 8 83 pressure 3.38 6.07 8 106 
progress 7.73 6.02 8 73 rape  1.25 6.81 4 19 
promotion 8.20 6.44 9 15 rejected 1.50 6.37 8 35 
romantic 8.32 7.59 8 32 stress  2.09 7.45 5 35 
sex  8.05 7.36 3 124 tragedy 1.78 6.24 6 19 
success 8.29 6.11 7 102 trouble 3.03 6.85 7 146 
sunlight 7.76 6.10 8 22 victim  2.18 6.06 6 28 
win  8.38 7.72 3 58 violent 2.29 6.89 7 39 
 
Average 8.09 6.69 6.2 52.64   2.29 6.57 6.12 51.08 
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